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SUMMARY
This thesis presents a resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework for un-
manned autonomous systems in the presence of a critical fault mode during the operation.
Such a critical fault mode significantly impairs system performances and long-term mission
capabilities. If it is not adequately treated, system and mission failures are inevitable. This
research assumes that 1) mission and mission profile are given, 2) a fault grows monotoni-
cally, 3) fault indicators are definable, 4) multiple fault modes do not coincide, 5) measure-
ments regarding fault indicators are online, and 6) system knowledge and historical data
are accurate and obtainable.
This research has been motivated by the safety concerns that prevent Unmanned Au-
tonomous Systems (UAS) from active introductions to practical applications. Various
sources predicting unmanned system market values suggest significant growth in not only
the number of UAS applications, but also financial benefits on industries. However, any
delay in the realization of UAS applications will cause a loss of the opportunity cost.
According to the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) incidence reports, mechanical fail-
ures come out to be one of the top reasons for the incidents except for human errors. Tech-
nically, it is impossible to avoid any fault or failure in any systems. However, it can be
possible to save the faulty system if the faults are treated properly.
In this regard, this research has reviewed the state-of-the-art techniques regarding sys-
tem safety improvement in the presence of a critical fault mode and identified research
opportunities by gap analyses. Promising concepts that have been extensively reviewed
are resilience engineering and Active Fault Tolerant Control (AFTCS) systems. Resilience
engineering has been more focus on system design and resilience assessment methods.
AFTCS mainly contributes to the fast and stable operating point recovery without the con-
sideration of long-term system performances. Prognostics-enhanced reconfigurable control
frameworks have proposed the online prognosis within the control scheme but do not ad-
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dress comprehensive mission capability trade-offs.
The proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework is composed of
three fundamental modules: 1) immediate performance recovery by Model Predictive Con-
trol (MPC) and Differential Dynamic Programming (DDP) approaches, 2) long-term mis-
sion capability trade-offs by an optimization routine, and 3) situational awareness by a
particle filtering-based fault diagnosis and case-based reasoning. Critical development of
this thesis is an introduction of an adaptation parameter in an MPC formulation (Module 1)
and optimization process to find an optimal value for the adaptation parameter (Module 2).
Module 3 enables long-term mission capability reasoning when a new fault growth pattern
is observed. A set of research questions and hypotheses helps form the technical approach
and a grand experimentation plan.
In order to test the efficacy of the proposed framework, under-actuated hovercraft as a
testbed and an insulation degradation of an electrical thrust motor as a critical fault mode
are introduced. The experiments explore the effect of the adaptation parameter on long-
term mission capabilities and identify the necessity of the proper trade-offs. Further exper-
iments investigate the efficacy of each module and the integrated framework. The experi-
ment results show that the adaptation parameter adjusts a control strategy, so that mission
capabilities are optimized while vulnerable long-term mission capabilities are recovered.
The integrated framework presents the improvement to the probability of mission success




Unmanned systems keep replacing manned systems as a paradigm shift. According to the
Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) market forecast reports, the UAS market value
is expected to grow two to three times higher in ten years [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Figure 1.1 and
1.2 are UAV market forecast reports for military and commercial applications, respectively.
Considering the economic impacts of UAS application in job markets and component man-
ufacturing industries, the UAS market value may very well exceed, which is predicted in the
reports. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have already been deployed and are actively
performing in military operations. Some of the notable UAVs in the military industry in-
clude Hunter and Shadow of the US Army, Pioneer and Fire Scout of the US Navy, and
Predator and Global Hawk of the US Air Force. Their various missions range from re-
connaissance to armed attack. Further development of UAVs is expected to enhance the
mission profiles to even more agile tasks such as combats and search & rescue in complex
environments. Besides, Unmanned Surface and Underwater Vehicles (USVs and UUVs)
are also developed and introduced in military applications. UASs are also up-and-coming
systems for industrial purposes such as commercial surveillance, agriculture, scientific re-
search, journalism, and cargo transportation. There is no doubt that UAS will play critical
roles in various missions.
However, regulations have limited the effective utilization of UAS due to safety con-
cerns. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced new rules for drones in 2016,
which restrict operations only for small UAVs under 55 pounds to line-of-sight visibility
and daylight-only flights [6].
These restrictive regulations significantly delay the potential usefulness of civilian and
commercial UAVs. Larry Downes, who is a co-author of Big bang disruption, stated that
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Figure 1.1: Military drone market forecast [4]
Figure 1.2: Commercial drone market forecast [5]
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[7]:
“When it comes to flying electronic devices weighing up to 55 pounds, safety
is an essential requirement. But are the delays justified? The short answer is
no. The proposed rules are vague and incomplete, where they could easily be
straightforward and even obvious. Special rules for micro-drones should have
come first, not just hinted at last. And an unnecessarily restrictive require-
ment that all drone operation requires continual ’line of sight’ visibility and
daylight-only operation means that some of the most high-potential applica-
tions, including local delivery services and nighttime agricultural monitoring,
are still banned.”
Such restrictions in UAS application are mainly due to safety concerns. Extreme dis-
turbances in the middle of operations can cause system/mission failures, which ultimately
can result in the loss of the physical system, intelligence leakage, collateral damages to
ground structures, or even human lives. According to an investigation report in 2016 by
the Washington Post, 236 military drone crashes were classified as Class A mishaps since
2001, which are accidents that caused at least $2 million loss [8]. One article from the
Washington Post pointed out concerns regarding exposure of secret US military operation
strategies due to drone crashes in hostile territories [9]. Another article stated that a Reaper
crashed near a densely populated area in San Diego during a surveillance mission in 2014
[10].
Due to confidentiality issues, the details of the causes of military UAV accidents have
not been fully disclosed. Several investigations, however, reported that the primary causes
were pilot errors and mechanical failures [11, 12]. As human intervention decreases with
increasing unmanned systems, mechanical failures will be one of the top culprits of UAV
crashes.
Mechanical faults/failures - particularly in vehicle-type systems - affect overall sys-
tem performances such as system stability, controllability, maneuverability, duration, and
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ranges. For example, suppose that one UAV is given a mission: fly from point A to point
B with a fixed cruise speed setting. Suppose that the UAV takes off from point A, and a
fault occurs in one actuator on the way to point B, resulting in thrust power loss and control
asymmetry. If the thrust power loss is not significant, then the UAV could still perform
the given mission by a closed-loop controller. However, if the control asymmetry becomes
severe, then the corresponding performance degradation will not be ignorable, possibly
causing critical events such as mission failure and system loss. Unfortunately, no one can
guarantee that the fault/failure events never happen during the operation.
The consequences of critical faults and failures are not acceptable. There will be a sys-
tem loss for sure. Due to the system loss, a mission could fail. The loss and failure of a
system and mission will highly likely cost a considerable amount of money. Collateral dam-
ages would add costs. Also, such UAV’s are a collection of knowledge in multi-disciplines;
thus, the loss of such systems could lead to the leakage of proprietary intellectual proper-
ties.
To alleviate this issue, improving robustness could increase system reliability and de-
crease system sensitivity to component fault/failure events. In definition, robust design
means a design concept of optimizing system performances under various disturbance sce-
narios [13]. Simply speaking, it could be done by 1) improving system reliability, and 2)
introducing hardware redundancies, or both.
However, making a 100-percent reliable system is undoubtedly impossible. Instead,
future engineering systems would have more chances of experiencing more undesirable
situations due to the growing need for advanced mission capabilities [14]. Shelton de-
scribed the increase in capability requirements and correspondingly more capable systems
in the US military [15]. In order to cope with the increase in capability requirements, a sys-
tem needs more subsystems, components, and their interconnections serving the growing
requirements. Sometimes, even multiple systems for a single mission may be necessary. As
such, the increase in the mission capability requirements inherently drives the system com-
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plexity higher [16]. Moreover, increasing system complexity results in more operational
performance uncertainty [13].
Moreover, introducing redundancy is not a desirable option. Recent developments of
UAS tend toward lighter and smaller systems. Significant weight and volume requirements
constrain the design of such small systems, and there is little affordable space for the re-
dundant subsystems.
Such difficulties have led to active safety management techniques for critical faults and
failures. A Fault Tolerant Control System (FTCS) is a control system that can tolerate
undesirable fault effects and improve system reliability and survivability.
Resilience engineering is another research thread that has been recently highlighted
as a promising concept for safety improvement [13]. Resilience is a bio-inspired idea
initially introduced in ecological systems by Holling [17], where the essential elements
are intelligent decisions and actions by observing environments and anticipating what will
happen. In engineering, the concept of resilience is still evolving, but there is no doubt that
it has excellent potentials if it is appropriately applied.
Under the motivations, the objectives of this research are:
Ultimate Research Goal
• To develop a design methodology of a control framework that can intel-
ligently alleviate the impact of critical fault modes during operations and
manage the degraded system to complete its mission before failure
• To embrace the concept of resilience in the control framework. A proactive




A brief list of research contributions was summarized below:
1. An introduction to the concept of resilience in AFTCS
2. Consideration of the impact of adaptation on mission capabilities
3. An introduction to an adaptation parameter
4. A resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework
5. MPC-DDP as AFTCS
6. Simulation-based mission capability modeling
7. CBR for unknown fault growth models
8. Under-actuated hovercraft and thrust motor fault example.
9. Demonstration of resilience improvement
10. Design methodology for the proposed framework
11. Demonstration of test cases in Matlab
1.2 Dissertation structure
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the research
motivation. From the motivation, research problems, objectives, and research contributions
were identified.
Chapter 2 reviews literature regarding fault & failure, fault diagnosis & failure prog-
nosis, resilience engineering, and FTCS. Three research gaps have been identified from
the state-of-the-art techniques of resilience engineering and FTCS. The gaps have posed a
focused research problem and research objectives.
6
Chapter 3 proposes technical approaches addressing the research problem. Three sub-
modules and the integrated framework are described. As deriving the alternatives of techni-
cal approaches, research questions have been defined for each module and the framework.
Along with the research questions, testable hypotheses have raised to prove the effective-
ness and efficacy of the proposed methods.
Based on the hypotheses defined in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 demonstrates grand exper-
imentation plans and test results accordingly. Under-actuated hovercraft and insulation
degradation in an electric thrust motor were introduced as a testbed. Each module was
assessed one-by-one by the tests, and corresponding hypotheses were rejected or not re-
jected based on results and observations. It finalizes the technical methods for the proposed
framework.
Chapter 5 described the design methodology of the proposed framework. Assumptions
were categorized to identify the requirements and limitations of the proposed framework.
Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing research objectives and technical findings through-
out the research. The observations suggest possible future works that can advance the pro-




2.1 Fault and failure
Fault and failure for engineering systems are distinguishable terms in diagnostics/prognostics
as shown below:
• Definition: Fault
– An unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property or parameter of
the systems from the normal conditions [18, 19]
– An unpredicted or unexpected change in systems, such as component malfunc-
tion and variations in operating condition, tending to degrade overall system
performance [20, 21]
• Definition: Failure
– A permanent interruption of the system ability to perform a required function
under specified operating conditions [19]
According to the definitions above, faults are in the physical domain, whereas failures
lie in the functional domain. For instance, at a system design phase, designers usually
conduct functional decomposition of a system to meet the design requirements. The re-
quirements hierarchically flow down as top functions are decomposed into sub-functions.
At a certain level of functional decomposition, sub-functions require to choose physical
subsystems or control algorithms performing the corresponding sub-functions. Then, the
subsystems or control algorithms derive sub-functions again until physical subsystems are
decomposed into very low-level components. From this perspective, faults are the root
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causes of functional degradation, possibly resulting in failures. Failures, on the other hand,
imply a complete loss or unacceptable degradation of specific functionality. Thus, failures
are the consequences of faults. The effects of faults are supposed to be captured in a mea-
surement domain as “symptoms.” In other words, when a physical subsystem is faulty, the
corresponding functionality suffers, and the effect is shown through detailed measurements.
In this context, the existence of a fault does not necessarily mean a total loss of certain
system functionality. Instead, a minor or an early stage of fault development may be ac-
ceptable during system operation. As an analogy, people can live with a minor or an early
development stage of diseases. For example, in case of an outbreak of a tumor, people
may not even know they have it because organs function just fine with little effect from the
tumor. Maybe treatments are not necessary if the tumor does not turn out to be malignant.
However, if the tumor transforms into a form of cancer and grows, organs affected by can-
cer will not be the same as before. Their functionality will be severely degraded, which can
cause gradually growing pain as a type of symptoms so that the patient feels that something
is wrong with his/her health. If the disease is not treated the right way at the right time, the
organs will eventually collapse, and the effect may even cause death.
This disease analogy can be correctly translated into the concept of the fault and failure
from the engineering point of view as shown in Figure 2.1. For instance, the initiation of a
tiny crack on the surface of bearing support is a fault and does not cause an immediate loss
of bearing functionality, but only negligible vibrations as a symptom. If the crack is worn
out by bearing balls during the operation, or the vibrations are within the acceptable level,
there will be no need of fixing or replacing the support. On the contrary, if the crack keeps
propagating as the bearing operates, vibrations will get severe, and finally, the bearing will
be no longer usable due to the bearing support failure.
Fault and failure can be categorized by their characteristics. Failure Modes and Effects
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) published in MIL-STD-1629A [22] and BS 5760-5 [23]
provide a procedure about how to rank possible fault and failure modes based on their
9
Figure 2.1: Analogy of fault growth to disease
effects and consequences. There are three categories to support the ranking procedure as
followings [22]:
1. Severity classification: Severity is a level of consequences of failure effects on a
total system. MIL-STD-1629A suggests four categories: minor, marginal, critical,
and catastrophic.
2. Frequency of occurrence: Frequency of occurrence is characterized by a level of
the failure rate of a subsystem or a component. Mean-time-to-failure or probability
of occurrence are means of quantitative or qualitative measures, respectively.
3. Detectability: Detectability is characterized by the probability of detection of defects
based on the current design of a system.
Category 1 and 2, severity and frequency of failure modes, can define criticality as
shown in Figure 2.2. Criticality increases as failures become severe and frequent. BS
5760-5 suggests a means of a quantitative measure of the failure criticality. Category 3, on
the other hand, shows whether a current configuration of a system is capable of monitor-
ing specified failures. If a particular defect causing catastrophic results is not detectable,
10
Figure 2.2: Example of criticality matrix [22]
radical design changes of the system may be necessary. Finally, based on the ranking and
detectability of failures, detectable faults causing critical consequences are chosen.
Moreover, faults behave in different ways. It implies that a fault diagnosis and failure
prognosis framework aims at monitoring specific types of faults and monitors them based
on their characteristics. Faults can also be categorized by their characteristics as described
in the reference [24]:
1. Time behavior point of view
(a) Intermittent faults: These faults persist for only a limited period after their initi-
ation. It should be noted, however, that even upon their termination, the system
may not behave in the same manner as before the fault initiation.
(b) Permanent faults: Once occurred, these faults exist forever unless the faulty
component is serviced/repaired or replaced by a redundant one, if possible.
2. Fault severity point of view
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(a) Mono-severity level faults (MSLFs): These are faults that occur only at a single
state. For example, a stuck-closed fault in a valve can occur only in one config-
uration. Other examples include stuck-open fault in valves, floating fault, and
hard-over failure (HOF) in electric motors.
(b) Finite multi-severity level faults (FMSLFs): FMSLFs are comprised of a set of
MSLFs. Failure of a valve, which may be a two-state failure, being either stuck-
open or stuck-closed, is an excellent example of FMSLFs. Other examples
include HOF and float failure in actuators.
(c) Infinite severity level faults (ISLFs): This type of faults can take place over
a continuum, infinite level of severities. Examples of ISLFs include loss of
effectiveness and lock-in-place in electric motors and almost all types of sensor
faults, including bias, drift, loss of accuracy, freezing, and sensor calibration
error.
2.2 Fault diagnosis and failure prognosis
Fault diagnosis and failure prognosis systems are like a doctor for engineering systems. As
doctors do, the fault diagnosis and failure prognosis framework should be able to form a set
of knowledge from sensor measurement data. For most cases, unfortunately, measurements
do not explicitly represent the states of system health, but they are instead the“symptoms”
of the states. Also, measurements are highly likely to be multi-dimensional; i.e., multiple
different types of measurements are gathered at the same time, and every measurement is
differently affected by various fault events. Moreover, measurements are prone to sensor
noises and system disturbances. All of the three factors described above make it difficult to
estimate the states of system health correctly [25]. In this regard, tracking every possible
fault signature is costly, inefficient, and unnecessary. Instead, specific faults potentially
resulting in significant impacts on a system should be analyzed before developing fault
diagnosis and failure prognosis framework. FMECA is a useful tool for fault selection
12
Figure 2.3: General fault diagnosis process (Redrawn based on [26])
analysis [25].
A general process for fault diagnosis is depicted in Figure 2.3 [26]. It starts with obtain-
ing measurements. Measurements, however, do not directly represent the state of health in
most cases. Also, measurements are usually high-dimensional, and it makes it challenging
to process the signals directly to distinguish one phenomenon to another. Therefore, Mea-
surement data have to be manipulated in intelligent ways such that the manipulated data
can represent the states of faults by a fault feature in a reduced dimension. Then, fault and
failure modes are identified by the fault features. The results out of this process, which is
a process to build knowledge of the system health, should be “enough” and “accurate.” In
this context, “accurate” means that the results should be robust against uncertainties as well
as sensitive to the specific fault of interest.
In terms of the meaning of “enough,” on the other hand, medical diagnosis presents
an excellent analogy to the depths of required knowledge for system health monitoring.
Suppose that a patient sits in front of a medical doctor and talks about symptoms like pains
or allergic reactions. The first thing the doctor wants to know is whether the patient has a
disease. Once it is determined that the patient has one, the doctor will try to find out what
the disease is, where it is, and when it has happened. Then, the doctor will figure out how
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severe the disease is and by when it has to be treated before it is too late. All the informa-
tion described above is the same information that the fault diagnosis and failure prognosis
framework provides for engineering systems. A framework first determines whether a sys-
tem is under the presence of a fault (fault detection.) If a fault is detected, then a framework
tracks what the problem is in the system such as where it resides (fault isolation,) and how
severe it is (fault identification.) Based on the severity of the fault, a framework predicts
a remaining useful life (RUL) of the system before the specific functionality of the system
fails due to the evolution of the fault (failure prognosis.)
In this regard, fault detection, isolation, identification, and failure prognosis provide
different levels of information. The latter functions, the detailed information about a fault
mode. It implies that different levels of a priori knowledge are required for each function.
Therefore, there are briefly two different research aspects in the study of fault diagnosis
and failure prognosis.
1. Study of fault feature selection and extraction on specific systems
2. Study of signal processing techniques for reliable and robust fault state estimation
This thesis focuses on a general procedure for safety improvement, not for a specific
system.
The purpose of fault diagnosis and failure prognosis researches has been focused on
developing methods which can accurately detect, isolate, identify faults, and predict fail-
ures based on system knowledge by using sensor measurements when a fault occurs during
operations. There are two primary evaluation criteria for fault diagnosis and failure.
1. Sensitivity to fault modes
2. Robustness to noises and disturbances
Traditional approaches of fault diagnosis - such as limit checking, frequency spectrum
analysis, or fault dictionary approach - were summarized in [27]. Most of these traditional
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Figure 2.4: Categories of diagnostic methods [26]
approaches were appropriate for simple or static systems whose fault modes and their char-
acteristic behaviors are well-known or whose current states corresponding to measurements
only depend on current inputs, not previous states.
For dynamic systems, however, the traditional approaches face significant limitations
as addressed in [28]; therefore, many different fault diagnosis methods for dynamic sys-
tems have been developed in the past few decades. Venkatasubramanian et al. reviewed
categorized FDI methods based on different concepts of approaches as shown in Figure
2.4 [26, 29, 30]. In this review, diagnostic methods are categorized into two different ap-
proaches: a model-based approach and process history-based approach. Both approaches
were subdivided into quantitative and qualitative approaches, and specific methods under
each different branch were reviewed and discussed.
Diagnostic methods described in [26, 29, 30] share two general ideas:
1. Formulating and utilizing a priori knowledge about systems and fault effects
2. Evaluating incoming signals comparing to a priori knowledge formulations by search
techniques or learning algorithms
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Figure 2.5: A general structure of model-based fault diagnosis framework.
Quantitative model-based methods use mathematical functional relationships between
inputs and outputs of systems in order to formulate a priori knowledge. Those input-output
relationships are used for generating analytical redundancy. Analytical redundancy is often
explained by comparing to hardware redundancy, which utilizes redundant sensor mea-
surements. It requires extra cost and physical spaces for the redundant sensors resulting
in limited applicability. On the contrary, analytical redundancy is to make “artificial sig-
nals” representing expected system behaviors by system inputs and mathematical functions.
Then, artificially generated signals are compared to measured signals, and see if there are
inconsistencies: so-called “residuals.” Residuals are differences between artificial signals
and measured signals, and they are expected to be around zero when the system is healthy
and significantly different values when the system changes.
Quantitative model-based approaches using the analytical redundancies were inten-
sively studied in the 1980s and 90s. Patton, Frank, Isermann, Krammer(data?) Figure
2.5 represents a general structure of model-based fault diagnosis using analytical redun-
dancy. As shown in the figure, quantitative model-based approaches are composed of two
general steps: residual generation and residual evaluation.
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Most quantitative model-based methods start from linear state space models [31] as:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +R1f(t) + Ed(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t) +R2f(t)
(2.1)
where x is a state vector; y is an output vector; u is an input vector; d is an unknown
system uncertainty vector; f is a fault vector; R1 and R2 are fault effect matrices on system
behaviors and output measurements, respectively; A, B, C, and D are system parameter
matrices; E is a distribution matrix for d; and t is the time. A basic assumption here is that
A, B, C, D, E, R1, and R2 are known matrices. Also, a dimension of f is pre-determined,
which means that faults of interest are decided.
Lee et al. surveyed the most commonly used diagnostics/prognostics algorithms, their
applications, advantages, and disadvantages [32]. Formulation and evaluation methods
characterize fault diagnostics methods differently. Usually, there is no single generic method
or solution. Instead, different fault models and applications require specific properties of
diagnostics methods.
2.2.1 State-of-the-art techniques
A filtering-based approach is widely used in fault diagnosis and failure prognosis applica-
tions when fault dynamics is well-known. The filtering-based method uses a fault dynamics
model as well as fault-related data to estimate the state of the fault and predict system RUL
as depicted in Figure 2.6. It effectively reduces measurement noises and increases the accu-
racy of the fault state estimation. Also, their inherent property of uncertainty quantification
provides a statistical measure of detection confidence. Figure 2.7 illustrates a notional fault
feature representation by probability density function (pdf). As the estimate pdf deviates
from the baseline, there is a high chance of the presence of a fault. Type-I and Type-II errors
impose limits determining the state of health. The most popular filtering-based methods are
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Figure 2.6: Filtering-based diagnosis
Figure 2.7: Fault detection and identification by probability density function representation
Kalman and particle filtering methods.
The particle filtering-based approach has a benefit over the Kalman filtering-based
method. Unlike the Kalman filtering-based approach, the particle filtering-based method
does not assume a Gaussian noise; thus, theoretically, it can handle any uncertainty dis-
tributions in the measurement. Equation 2.2 shows a general particle filtering-based fault
feature estimation model by nonlinear Bayesian state estimation [33].
xd (t+ 1) = fb (xd (t) + n (t))
xc (t+ 1) = ft (xd (t) , xc (t) , w (t))
y (t) = ht (xd (t) , xc (t) , v (t))
(2.2)
where fb, ft and ht are nonlinear mappings, xd (t) is a Boolean state associated with the
presence of a particular fault mode in the system, xc (t) is the evolution of the system given
those operating conditions, w (t) and v (t) are non-Gaussian distributions for the process
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Figure 2.8: Particle filtering-based fault diagnosis and failure prognosis [33]
and feature noises.
Figure 2.8 illustrates a comprehensive online and offline diagnosis and prognosis pro-
cedure using the particle filtering method.
2.3 Resilience engineering
The concept of resilience has come to a new design and operational goal for system safety
improvement [34]. Historically, for safety management, reliability engineering has majorly
focused on preventing fault and failure events and managing them during its lifetime.
Recently, however, system engineering experts question the adequacy of reliability en-
gineering and risk mitigation techniques as complex system safety assessment methods
[13]. Risk identification and reliability engineering techniques do not adequately cover
the environmental and operational uncertainties. It is simply impossible to prevent threats,
system failures, and operational hazards at all times in any systems. Many unpleasant acci-
dents have easily proved it during the missions of carefully designed and operated complex
systems: the Space Shuttle Columbia [35], unmanned aircraft accidents due to human fac-
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tors [36]. Also, traditional risk management techniques mainly rely on past incidents and
their investigations, and they utilize failure probabilities obtained from historical data [37].
Diagnostics, which is one of the methods for system health monitoring, is to detect the root
causes of faults and failures, not the risk as of their consequences [13]. Past researches on
design approaches for the system safety improvement were briefly reviewed in Appendix
A.
In this context, there have been needs of a paradigm shift from a passive, reactive
and diagnosis-based approach to an active, proactive and prognosis-based approach, which
monitors and assesses risks and system survivability [37]. As an answer to the needs, a new
concept, so-called resilience engineering, has been introduced. Madni stated that resilience
engineering is to develop a proactive engineering framework with the understanding of
failures in complex systems, organizational contributors to risk, and human performance
driver [38]. It encompasses the measurement of resiliency, decision support for capability-
safety trade-offs, and dynamic evaluation & updates of risk models in order to effectively
improve the ability of safety investment prioritization.
System resilience is an evolving concept, which was initially introduced in ecological
systems by Holling [17]. Resilience was defined:
• Definition: Resilience
1. A measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to absorb change
and disturbance and still maintain the same relationship between populations
or state variables [17]
2. The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and
recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand
and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or
incidents [39]
A resilient system was viewed as:
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• Definition: Resilient Systems
1. A system that can adjust its functions prior to or following changes and distur-
bances so that it can go on working even after a major mishap or in the presence
of continuous stress, mainly by being able to be proactive on safety [40]
2. A system that is capable of deploying tactical changes, while supported by its
built-in robustness, in order to avoid a given set of threats, or restore its mission
capability and health levels, if degraded [13]
Based on the definitions, mission capability is significant for resilient systems. Mission
capability was defined as [41]:
• Definition: Mission Capability
– A measure of the results of the mission; given the condition of the system during
the mission
System resilience is one of the system characteristics, which contributes to system
safety, robustness, and survivability [13]. In this notion of system resilience, failure means
the failure of appropriate adaptation to operational disturbances and unexpected events with
finite resources and reaction time [40]. Success, likewise, means successful adaptation to
the risks to avoid possible dangerous outcomes.
The concept of resilience engineering can be considered as an advanced version of tra-
ditional safety and survivability engineering disciplines. Particularly, Hollnagel described
challenges that resilience engineering should be able to tackle [40]:
1. Performance conditions are always underspecified.
2. Adverse events can be attributed to an unexpected combination of normal perfor-
mance variability.
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3. Safety management cannot be based on hindsight nor solely rely on error tabulation
and failure probability calculations.
A significant difference between traditional safety management approaches and re-
silience engineering is whether a system can proactively reduce system susceptibility or
not [40]. The term, proactive, is an essential feature because it means a system can actively
remove dangerous environment and prevent unwanted events during the operations. This
feature is a new vision of survivability engineering in that traditional safety management
approaches have been reactive or passive, and they also focused on vulnerability reduction.
With the consideration of proactive characteristics, Hollnagel proposed basic functionality
that a resilient system has to be able to: anticipate, monitor, and respond [40]. Figure 2.9
describes the three basic functions of a resilient system and their relationships [13].
1. Anticipate: predict and prepare for disturbances, including any changes in operating
conditions such as potential threats, operational disruptions, or destabilizing condi-
tions.
2. Monitor: monitor risks and threat effects as a part of system performances in addi-
tion to mission performance and system health states.
3. Respond: react against monitored risks and threats. This functionality is a system
property representing flexibility and adaptability.
2.3.1 State-of-the-art techniques
For safety improvement, resilience design approaches have proposed various assessment
metrics. Richard et al. suggested a survivability assessment method for aerospace and
mechanical systems, inspired by the concept of resilience. It is an epoch analysis regarding
the system’s dynamic performance response, as shown in Figure 2.10 [42].












Know what to expect
Know what to seeKnow what to do
Figure 2.9: Fundamental functionality of resilient systems [13, 40]
Figure 2.10: Conceptualization of survivability by system performance [42]
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1. Time-weighted average utility loss, UL, which is defined by
UL = U0 − U t
where U t = 1tdl
∫
U (t) dt, U (t) is utility function varying over time, and tdl is the
design life.
2. Threshold Availability, AT , which is defined as the ratio of the time that U (t) is




Madni and Jackson proposed generic resilience metrics [38]:
1. Time and cost to restore operation
2. Time and cost to restore configuration
3. Time and cost to restore functionality and performance
4. The degree to which pre-disruption state has been restored
5. Potential disruptions avoided
6. Adaptability within time and cost constraints
Vugrin et al. addressed a recovery effort as well as an impact of disturbance for re-
silience assessment as depicted in Figure 2.11 [43].
Balchanos reviewed resilience metrics and proposed a resilience assessment method-
ology in terms of system capability over mission time, namely Epoch, as shown in Figure
2.12. Balchanos suggested resilience metrics based on the concept of Richards method but
came up with more metrics for each epoch in terms of absorbability, recoverability, and
survivability [13].
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Figure 2.11: Graphical comparison of the resilience of two systems [43]
Figure 2.12: Fundamental functionality of resilient systems [13]
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Figure 2.13: TIRESIAS for system resilience assessment [13]
Balchanos’ proposed resilience assessment framework is called TIRESIAS: Topologi-
cal Investigation for Resilient and Effective Systems through Increased Architectural Sur-
vivability. The overview of TIRESIAS is depicted in Figure 2.13.
Watson et al. proposed a conceptual framework for developing resilience metrics for
electric, oil, and gas infrastructure. He suggested resilience metrics in terms of various
factors. Key factors are [34]:
1. Threat: Metrics should show what types of severe disturbances and how severe dis-
turbances should be considered.
2. Performance: Metrics should be able to indicate how well a system satisfies given
mission goals. It is not about system characteristics such as redundancies; instead, it
measures how well a system delivers its performance in the presence of threats.
3. Consequence: Metrics should represent the ultimate consequences of severe distur-
bances. Sometimes, performance-based metrics may be measurable quantities of
consequences.
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Figure 2.14: Overview of Resilience Analysis Process [34]
4. Uncertainty: By the definition of resilience, a system needs to be able to handle
unknown and unanticipated disturbances at a certain level.
Based on the resilience key factors, Resilience Analysis Process (RAP) was introduced
as illustrated in Figure 2.14.
2.3.2 Research gap analysis
In summary, as an emerging concept of system safety, resilience engineering is stemmed
from reliability and robust engineering. Resilience engineering research proposed resilience
assessment metrics. The resilience metrics have been represented by system performance
& mission capability degradation, uncertainty impact and recovery time, recovery efforts,
consequences, or threat levels in various research. Resilience design approaches proposed
a system design framework focusing on resilience metrics improvement.
By the inherent nature of resilience, resilient systems are required to have adaptation
capability. The performance of adaptability is vital to resilience improvement, not only sys-
tem reliability and robustness. Therefore, resilience design approaches evaluate the system
27
resilience with a certain level of adaptability. Alternatively, the adaptability requirements
are derived from the desirability of system resilience.
The adaptation capability is highly relevant to control systems. However, resilience
engineering or resilience design approaches do not explicitly address the control problem
in terms of system resilience. Research on the actual implementation of a reconfigurable
control system having a concept of system resilience improvement will help the realization
of resilience design.
Research Gap 1
A resilience design approach does not explicitly address the practical implemen-
tation of adaptation/recovery policies under threats.
2.4 Fault Tolerant Control Systems (FTCS)
The socio-technical system in risk management was described by Rasmussen and Sve-
dung [44], and Leveson depicted its hierarchical model as shown in Figure 2.16 [45]. This
hierarchical model is a general working procedure when an organization (system) faces
undesirable events or a chain of events. Based on a particular root cause, at a certain point
of time, a system may encounter a critical event, causing hazard release. In response to
those events, different hierarchical supervisors react based on observations and reports. In
this regard, Leveson stated that [45]:
“Safety can be viewed as a control problem, and safety is managed by a control
structure embedded in an adaptive socio-technical system. The goal of the
control structure is to enforce constraints on system development (including
both the development process itself and the resulting system design) and on
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Figure 2.16: A generic control architecture with process modules [45]
It shows that control theory is one of the critical approaches to safety management
because accidents happen when a control system does not correctly deal with external dis-
turbances, component failure, or dysfunction among system components [45]. Figure 2.16
shows a typical socio-technical control architecture. There are multiple control loops to
handle disturbances; an automated controller operates an inner-loop control, and a human
controller supervises an outer- loop control. Both controllers obtain information about sys-
tem states from feedback measurements and command control variables to make system
states of being as close to the desired states as possible. Besides, there can be interactions
between the two controllers. Based on what types of displays the inner-loop controller
provides, the outer controller reactions will vary. As such, a system will behave differently
based on how well a control structure works.
Now, what types of disturbances a control structure can deal with determines the types
of safety-related problems that a control structure is designed to solve. Figure 2.17 illus-


























Figure 2.17: Safety problems with respect to types of disturbances [46]
malevolent sources, they are more about security problems wherever they are originated. If
they are accidental and originated from exogenous sources, then they are “See-and-Avoid”
types of problems; e.g., one of the significant safety concerns for utilization of UAS in
National Airspace System (NAS) is how to reduce significant mid-air collisions during the
operation [47]. Finally, disturbances from natural and endogenous sources are system fault
and failure problems.
All problems described above are essential for system safety. However, ‘natural and
accidental’ types of disturbances are more common for any systems, whereas ‘malevolent’
disturbances are more severe in military systems. Also, just like the same argument of sys-
tem capability and system dependability, the ability of “See-and-Avoid” heavily depends
on the quality of system integrity. It implies that system fault and failure analysis and their
treatments will be critical to entire system safety improvement.
For the treatment of fault/failure events, a conventional feedback controller may not
suffice in terms of system performances or stability when actuators, sensors, or other system
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components malfunction; thus, new control system designs have been studied, specifically
for safety-critical systems such as aircraft, spacecraft, nuclear power plants, or chemical
plants. [48, 49]. For these safety-critical systems, there has been extensive research in the
past several decades as a new controller design, which can tolerate undesirable fault effects
and improve system reliability and availability. This type of control systems is called Fault
Tolerant Control System, FTCS.
In the historical point of view, a large amount of research on FTCS was driven by
system designs of aircraft flight controls [50]. The research was motivated by commercial
aircraft accidents [49]. Delta Flight 1080 encountered the jammed elevator during its flight
[51]. Fortunately, in this accident, the pilot saved the aircraft with his knowledge about
actuation redundancies and with his experiences in the control reconfiguration. However,
most of the failures caused severe damages and casualties such as the American Airlines
DC-10 (Flight 191) crash in 1979 [52] and the EL AL Boeing 747-200F (Flight 1862)
freighter in 1992 [53]. To avoid those fault-related flight accidents, control systems that
aid pilots by providing proper accommodation started to gain the spotlight. Recently, other
safety-critical industries have also picked up the idea due to increased safety and reliability
demands [49].
FTCS is briefly categorized into two sub-categories: Passive FTCS (PFTCS) and Active
FTCS (AFTCS) [49]. PFTCS aims at designing control systems to be highly robust so that
control systems can deal with pre-designated unwanted situations without any changes of
control systems [54]. AFTCS, on the contrary, intends to design control systems to enable
control systems to react to undesirable events by reconfiguring control actions flexibly. In
this type of control systems, the controller compensates for fault effects by pre-determined
control laws [55, 56, 57] or online control law adaptation [58, 59]. Figure 2.18 summarizes
general comparisons between PFTCS and AFTCS.
Since PFTCS does not require the online adaptation, the way that a controller works is
as simple as the traditional controllers do. It uses fixed control laws and does not require
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Figure 2.18: A conceptual overview of AFTCS [49]
online fault detection and identification functionality [49, 60]. However, since PFTCS is
supposed to be designed to cope with every possible operating condition, it does not provide
an optimal control law for the standard condition as well as all possible faulty conditions
[60].
On the contrary, AFTCS is a control system that flexibly reacts to undesirable fault
& failure events in the middle of missions automatically [49]. Since it is adaptive, it in-
evitably requires online monitoring capability in order to recognize how the system works
and whether the system is faulty or not. It requires expensive computations on the fly real-
time. As computational power and the size of central processing units (CPUs) have been
considerably improving, AFTCS is a very appealing approach for system safety improve-
ment. In this paper, AFTCS is the research area of interest.
AFTCS is generally composed of necessary modules as listed below and shown in
Figure 2.19


















Figure 2.19: Overview of an active fault tolerant control system structure [49]
It has closed feedback loops coming from sensors onboard just like traditional control
systems. Measurements are fed into navigation modules estimating the current states of a
system. By the guidance module, references, for example, target positions that a system has
to be headed, go into a controller module. As AFTCS, the fault detection module monitors
fault modes online. Once it detects a fault, the reconfiguration mechanism finds adaptive
control actions based on its strategy.
The inclusion of Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) module distinguishes AFTCS
from PFTCS [49]. FDD monitors possible faults in critical sub-systems or components.
Then, based on the fault-related knowledge from the first module, the second module,
reconfigurable mechanism, optimizes a control strategy such that a system can maintain
stability and system performances under faulty conditions as close as possible to the orig-
inal system performances. The third module, reconfigurable controller, reconfigures con-
troller algorithms as decided in the reconfiguration mechanism module. The last module,
command/reference governor, reshapes input references when actuators are saturated. Sat-
uration of actuators usually makes it difficult for the system to follow control inputs and
directed waypoints/paths. All four modules are necessary for the success of AFTCS.
Zhang et al. reviewed literature about reconfigurable fault-tolerant control systems [49].
It classified reconfigurable control design methods into mathematical design tools, con-
troller design approaches, reconfiguration mechanisms, and applied system characteristics
for typical AFTCS designs as shown in Figure 2.20. The literature reviewed in this survey
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uses the fault detection and diagnostics information for reactive capability.
Figure 2.21 illustrates how AFTCS is different from nominal control or PFTCS in gen-
eral. The left figure depicts a designed operating point a conventional feedback control
system. For PFTCS, a designed operating point is chosen away from the nominal operating
point by considering possible drifts due to fault modes as shown in the center figure. It may
imply that a system mainly operates on a sub-optimal operating point because the rate of
the fault or failure is usually not much high. Unlikely, AFTCS allows a system to operate
on an optimal design point when the system is healthy. When a fault occurs, AFTCS re-
distributes control authority to put an operating point back to the design point as close as
possible.
2.4.1 State-of-the-art Techniques
Prognostics-based reconfigurable control methods partly address the long-term system uti-
lization problem in the presence of fault or failure modes. The prognostics routine provides
RUL. Then, a reconfigurable controller optimizes its control strategy to extend the RUL so
that the RUL exceeds the mission time required.
Under small disturbances, the low-level reconfiguration module compensates for the ef-
fects of small disturbances by adjusting set points for the actuator components. In the case
of extreme disturbances, however, due to the severe degradation of the system capability,
the system is not able to satisfy mission requirements; thus, it cannot perform/complete the
given mission. In order to resolve this issue, the middle-level reconfiguration module is
introduced to extend and recover the system capability by reconfiguring the guidance and
control strategy. The system capability recovery in terms of an extended RUL is achieved at
the expense of degraded system performance. It is noted that the proposed reconfiguration
strategy does not entail any hardware changes (replacement or insertion of new hardware).
It addresses only the software components of the framework. Therefore, the trade-off be-
tween the performance requirements and increased RUL must be carried out correctly in
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Fig. 2. Classification of AFTCS.
Fig. 3. Combination of reconfigurable control algorithms in AFTCS.
Y. Zhang, J. Jiang / Annual Reviews in Control 32 (2008) 229–252 233
Figure 2.20: Classification of AFTCS [49].
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Figure 2.21: A conceptual overview of control systems
the middle-level reconfiguration module. This trade-off is the essence of the middle-level
reconfiguration.
In a broad perspective of AFTCS, Clements proposed a concept of hierarchical control
architecture [61]. He showed the interconnections among fault detection & identification,
set-point controller, control redistribution, control gain adaptation, and component restruc-
turing in three hierarchical levels as depicted in Figure 2.22.
Drozeski developed a three-tier hierarchical control scheme based on Clements’ control
architecture. Drozeski formulated a general form of an objective function for high-level
AFTCS as expressed in Eq. 2.3 [60].
J (M,R) = U (Pe,M,Mcom) (2.3)
where U is a cost function that quantifies the usefulness of the vehicle for its mission. Pe
is a measure of the closed loop performance of the vehicle. It is a function of a fault mode,
Fm, and restructuring & reconfiguration actions, R. Mcom is an assigned mission, and M is
a set of parameters for mission adaptation such as nominal jerks, accelerations, and veloc-
ities used by path planners. Drozeski used parameter-based FDI and system identification
routine to estimate system and fault states. As a reconfigurable controller, an adaptive neu-
ral network flight controller by dynamic inversion and pseudo control hedging method were
employed. In the test case, mono severity-level faults were considered.












































Figure 1. Clements’ hierarchical fault-tolerant control architecture.
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Figure 2.22: Clements hierarchical fault-tolerant control architecture [61])
tomated Contingency Management (ACM) concept [62]. The proposed framework is a
conceptual structure, which broadened the perspective of FTC, from strategic planning to
tactical and trajectory re-planning as shown in Figure 2.23. Technical methods for each
planning function were not addressed.
Tang et al. extended the ACM framework by integrating a prognostics module [63].
Figure 2.24 depicts a conceptual ACM+P system hierarchy. In the test cases, a swashplate
collective actuator failure mode was tested as infinite severity-level fault behavior. The pro-
posed framework drove the faulty swashplate of a helicopter so that the faulty component
failed at a minimal impact position.
Later, Tang et al. tested Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) enhanced ACM
framework with a real-time robot test application [64]. As the battery life for a degrading
property, a path of unmanned ground vehicle was optimized by the D* algorithm consider-
ing mission time, easiness of travel, and RUL. This study addressed the change of mission
time for the optimization criterion.
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Figure 2.23: Overview of Automated Contingency Management framework [62]
Figure 2.24: Conceptual ACM+P system hierarchy [63]
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Figure 2.25: Reconfigurable control architecture with three tier strategies (modified and
redrawn based on [65])
In the meantime, Brown et al. introduced a 3-tier hierarchical strategy for the recon-
figurable control architecture [65] as illustrated in Figure 2.25. The 3-tier hierarchical ar-
chitecture presented three different reconfiguration problems through the levels of impact
of a fault mode. With a minor impact, the low-level reconfiguration adjusts control set-
points to minimize the fault growth allowing deviations from the original references. As
severer fault modes degrade system health, mid or high-level redistributes control author-
ity or adapts its mission. In this study, he proposed the low-level control reconfiguration
by MPC as a reconfigurable controller and the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis and
failure prognosis routine. At each control prediction in MPC, set-points were reconfigured
so that RUL within the MPC time window exceeded RUL required.
Bole proposed prognostics-enhanced load allocation framework [66]. He addressed the
challenges in predicting RUL due to the changes in fault growth rate as loading conditions
vary. Just like [65], MPC and a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis and failure prognosis
routine were used. Figure 2.26 illustrates the impact of loading conditions on RUL [66].
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Figure 2.26: Evaluation of prognostic constraint at several finite horizons for two sample
component loading profiles denoted ’High’ and ’Low’ [66]
2.4.2 Research gap analysis
In summary, conventional AFTCS recover the operating point as close to the design point
as possible when a fault, specifically an actuator fault mode, occurs during the operation.
However, conventional AFTCS do not address the impact of a fault on long-term system
performances.
Prognostics-enhanced reconfigurable control methods address challenges in the loss
of system usable time due to fault modes as well as the operating point degradation. A
prognostics routine produces RUL prediction, and a reconfigurable controller modifies the
control strategy to extend the predicted RUL so that the RUL exceed a given mission time
required. In case that a fault growth rate is loading conditions-dependent, MPC-based
reconfiguration helps regulate control inputs so that the State-Of-Health (SOH) prediction
of the MPC optimal control time window resides within acceptable SOH bounds.
In this regard, the prognostics-enhanced reconfigurable control methods assume a mis-
sion terminal time is known. The mission time required, however, may change as a control
strategy is reconfigured in the presence of a critical fault mode, which makes system per-
formances significantly impaired. For instance, if a control reconfiguration causes a slow
movement of the faulty unmanned vehicle, a mission time to destination inevitably in-
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creases. It means that both RUL and the mission time required increase. In this example,
therefore, time is not a proper mission capability domain.
Research Gap 2
Prognostics-enhanced reconfigurable control methods assume that a complete
mission time is given. → Comprehensive long-term mission capability has not
been addressed.
Likewise, acceptable SOH bounds are highly dependent on a mission time required and
mission profile in MPC-based reconfigurable control methods. It implies that improper
SOH bounds could cause unsatisfactory adaptation and catastrophic failure.
Research Gap 3
Mission capability trade-off has not been addressed.
2.5 Problem Definition and Research Objectives
Research gaps identified in the previous section show the research opportunities and re-
quirements. The research gaps are summarized below:
Research Gap 1
A resilience design approach does not explicitly address the practical implemen-
tation of adaptation/recovery policies under threats.
Research Gap 2
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Prognostics-enhanced reconfigurable control methods assume that a complete
mission time is given. → Comprehensive long-term mission capability has not
been addressed.
Research Gap 3
Mission capability trade-off has not been addressed.
Research Gap 1 demonstrates the need for a reconfigurable controller, which is suitable
for a resilient system. For a resilient system, an adaptive controller needs to reconfigure
control strategy considering long-term mission capability as well as stability and system
performance recovery. Research Gap 2 and 3 indicates that the current reconfigurable con-
trol methods cannot deliver the performance requirements as a control system for resilient
systems.
In this regard, the research problem of this study is defined below:
Research Problem Definition
A reconfigurable control method, which comprehensively helps meet long-term
mission requirements in the presence of a critical fault mode, is missing.
This research hypothesizes that the long-term mission capability prediction is required
for a proper control reconfiguration considering system resilience improvement. The pre-
diction of the long-term mission capability must address uncertainties in fault growth pat-
terns and rates.
In order to fill the research gaps, this research aims at developing a design methodology
for a reconfigurable controller, which can handle critical fault modes, so that the faulty
system still be able to satisfy the mission requirements without a catastrophic failure. The
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proposed reconfigurable control methodology will help improve system resilience. The
over-arching hypothesis and research objectives are summarized below:
Over-arching Hypothesis
If long-term mission capabilities are considered in control reconfiguration in the
presence of a critical fault mode, system resilience will be improved.
Research Objectives
To develop a design methodology for a reconfigurable controller, handling criti-
cal fault modes in consideration of system resilience improvement
The next chapter describes the proposed technical approach for the resilience-enhanced
reconfigurable control framework. It reviews possible alternative methods, and justifies the
selection of proper methods by deriving a set of research questions. In order to prove the




This chapter introduces a novel Resilience-Enhanced Reconfigurable Control framework
for the resilient design of complex engineering systems. Figure 3.1 depicts the main mod-
ules of the resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework. The Case-Based Rea-
soning (CBR) module detects and identifies a faulty system condition during operations
and proposes a reconfigurable control strategy to the long-term mission capability predic-
tion module. The long-term mission capability prediction module determines an adaptation
parameter and updates it online, considering consequences. Finally, a Model Predictive
Control-Differential Dynamic Programming (MPC-DDP) module redistributes the control
authority in order to maintain acceptable stability bounds while performing a short-term
performance trade-off.
The proposed framework is configured in terms of feedback loops, as shown in Figure
3.2. It continually monitors the system states, adjusts the level of reconfiguration if needed,
and feeds adapted control inputs to the system in the presence of faulty conditions.
The major difference of the proposed framework from the past reconfigurable control
methods is the consideration of system resilience within the picture of control reconfigu-
ration when the system operates under the presence of critical fault modes. In this regard,
each module needs to address the fundamental properties that resilient systems should have
adequately. Table 3.1 summarizes a question set that each module will have to answer.
Module 1 focuses on stability and reference-tracking performance recovery as an AFTCS.
Failing to maintain the system stability and reference-tracking performance could cause
catastrophic system/mission failure quickly. With the knowledge of the fault presence and
its level of degradation, DDP optimizes the sequence of control inputs for a finite time win-
dow. MPC extends the usability of DDP to a longer time than the size of the finite time
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Figure 3.1: Resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework with three fundamen-
tal modules: MPC-DDP, longterm mission capability prediction, and fault detection and
identification
Figure 3.2: Overview of the proposed framework in a closed loop control
46





Will the stability be maintained?
What is an optimal trajectory?




How much will the faulty system be able to operate once a fault occurs?




Does a fault occur?
What is the fault mode?
How severe the fault?
How fast will the fault grow?
window of DDP.
Now, the question is if the design operating point would be a desired operating point
under the presence of a (critical) fault mode. A faulty system is not the same as its design
condition. Maintaining operating points close to the design operating point could expedite
the growth of the fault. If it does, the design operating point could be out of the feasible area
under a faulty condition considering mission requirements. It implies that a new desired
operating point has to be defined in order to prevent the faulty system from mission and
system failure if necessary.
To help the understanding, Figure 3.3 depicts the idea of the impact of a critical fault
mode to notional constraints and desired operating points. The blue-shaded ellipses repre-
sent a notional shape of the objective function. The objective function is usually defined by
system-performances, control efforts, and their corresponding coefficients. The left figure
shows the impact of a critical fault on the operating point. The operating point is shifted
from the designed point to the outside of the feasible region. The right figure represents a
desirable adaptation with a new objective function and constraints involved.
In this regard, this study was mainly motivated by the question about how to determine
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Figure 3.3: Notional impact of a critical fault and desirable reconfiguration. The left figure
shows the impact on the operating point. The right figure represents desirable adaptation
with a new objective function.
the objective function so that the faulty system could successfully complete its mission
considering long-term mission capability, not only the immediate performance recovery.
Module 2 in the proposed framework determines the shape of an MPC-DDP objective
function by adjusting an adaptation parameter in MPC-DDP formulation once a critical
fault mode is detected. For that, a simulation-based mission capability modeling approach
was introduced.
The simulation-based mission capability modeling and optimization approach is in-
evitably highly sensitive to fault growth patterns and rates. However, there is no guarantee
that the same fault mode grows the same way every time. In order to address the issue, a
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) approach was introduced in Module 3. Module 3 identifies
a fault growth model as well as detects and identifies a fault mode. Long-term mission ca-
pability prediction is then reasoned by experiences (cases) in CBR, and tossed it to Module
2 for the adaptation parameter optimization.
So far, Chapter 3 described the overview of the proposed technical methods module-by-
module. Next section explains how the proposed methods have been chosen by literature
reviews, detail descriptions of alternative methods, and their comparisons. In order to
help the justification, a set of research questions have been raised. Then, hypotheses and
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experiment plans have been followed in order to justify that the proposed methods and
framework are right ways of system resilience improvement.
3.1 Overview of the proposed technical methods
3.1.1 Module 1: Immediate Recovery by MPC-DDP
A cost function for optimal control is written as:
V (x (t0) , t0) = minu
[∫ t0+T
t0
l (x (τ) , u (τ) , τ) dτ + Φ (x (t0 + T ) , t0 + T )
]
(3.1)
where V is a value function, x is a system state vector, u is a control input vector, t0 is a
control time, T is a time window, l is a running cost, and Φ is a terminal cost.
The system dynamics impose an equality condition, while physical constraints are in-
troduced as inequality conditions.
dx
dt
= F (x (t) , xf (t) , u (t))
dxf
dt
= Ff (xf (t) , sf (t))
sf (t) = Fs (u (t) , t)
g (x (t) , u (t)) ≤ 0
(3.2)
where F is a system dynamics, xf is a fault (feature) state, sf is a stressor for the fault
growth, Ff is a fault growth dynamics, Fs is a stressor-control input mapping function, and
g is a state and input constraints.
The running cost function, l, is typically formulated as a quadratic function, as shown
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in Eq. 3.3. It is a linear combination of two terms: system performance and control effort.
l (x (t) , u (t) , t) =
1
2
(x (t)− r (t))T K (x (t)− r (t)) + ρR ·
1
2
u (t)T Ru (t) (3.3)
where r is a reference, K and R are coefficient matrices, and ρR is an adaptation param-
eter. The right-hand-side of Eq. 3.3 is a representation of the energy of the states and
control inputs at each time instance. The adaptation parameter, ρR, balances between sys-
tem performances and control efforts. The higher the adaptation parameter, the less agile
the system movement.
Control input constraints are handled in a variety of ways. A naive clamping method
constrains the input signals on the boundaries if the optimal control signals exceed their
limits. It is easily applied, without guaranteeing though that the DDP input sequence is an
optimal solution. Applying squashing functions on the control inputs is a soft constraint
method. Unlike the naive clamping technique, it is expected to produce an optimal solution
although, due to the nature of the non-linearity of a squashing function, the DDP approach
may not converge when the higher order terms become significant. Tassa, Mansad, and
Todorov proposed a quadratic programming approach to address this issue [67].
Unlike control input constraints, state constraints are relatively difficult to realize. In
many applications, they are formulated indirectly as a cost function. For instance, if a
system state must be within a specific safe range, a running cost function can be formulated
as an exponential function for the system state introducing a very high cost below or beyond
the designated safety limits.
The optimal control inputs, using DDP, are iteratively calculated at every control step:
δu∗ (tk) = −Q−1uuQu −Q−1uuQuxδx (tk) (3.4)
The DDP module exhibits a second-order fast convergence rate, as shown in Eq. 3.4.
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However, careful treatment is required in the construction of the Hessian matrix, Quu.
Quu must be invertible; i.e., Quu > 0 is a necessary condition for the application of the
DDP algorithm. Moreover, since system dynamics are generally nonlinear, their linear
approximation implies that the step size for the update of control inputs in the iterative
process must be regularized.
The beauty of DDP is that it provides not only a sequence of optimal control inputs but
also an optimal trajectory simultaneously. Since Q is a function of the coefficients K and
R, different choices for these coefficients result in different system behaviors, as long as
Quu is invertible and the system is controllable. Therefore, these coefficients are vital to
determining the level of trade-offs between system performance and control effort.
An important point to note is that the accuracy of system dynamics is critical for suc-
cessful control planning. In this regard, the system dynamics should adequately reflect the
effect of fault and failure modes. If physical effects are not easily incorporated into the
physics-based state-space model or an unknown fault occurs, online system identification
is deemed necessary. In this case, a recursive least square regression method for the dy-
namic system parameters can resolve this issue. Another popular approach is stochastic
modeling.
3.1.2 Module 2: Long-term mission capability recovery by a simulation-based prediction
model
Long-term mission capabilities are modeled with respect to system states, x, fault states,
xf , and the adaptation parameter, ρR, which was introduced in Module 1. Assuming that
vulnerable mission capabilities and superior mission capabilities are pre-identified, ρR is
optimized at every control time step as shown in Eq. 3.5 and Eq. 3.6. Figure 3.4 represents
the overall procedure of Module 2.
max
ρR(t)
J (x (t) , xf (t) , ρ (t)) (3.5)
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Figure 3.4: Overview of Module 2
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subject to:
MC (x (t) , xf (t) , ρR (t)) ≥MCreq. (3.6)
where J is an objective function, which is the most superior long-term mission capability,
x is a system state, xf is a fault state, MC is a vulnerable long-term mission capability
available, and MCreq. is a long-term mission capability required.
J is the most superior long-term mission capability that is impaired and sacrificed due to
the fault and the reconfigured control strategy. The objective function, therefore, minimizes
the loss of the most superior mission capability after reconfiguration. MC is vulnerable
long-term mission capabilities available that need to be extended to satisfy the long-term
mission capabilities required, MCreq.. Here, the mission capability is re-defined as:
• Definition: Long-term Mission Capability
– A measure of the maximum system performance available until the system fails;
given the condition of the system during the mission
The long-term mission capability depends on a series of ρR in future selection. Assum-
ing that Eq. 3.2 and a mission profile are given and well-known, a system can be simulated
by inducing an artificial fault mode. For a simple MC modeling, ρR is set to be constant in
each simulation episode.
By randomly inducing a fault mode at any mission point, MC at a certain combination
of x, xf , and ρR is evaluated in a statistical manner considering (aleatory) uncertainties
and noises. For example, by assuming a Gaussian distribution, MC prediction can be
parameterized by two statistical parameters, mean (µMC) and standard deviation (σMC):
MC (x, xf , ρR) ∼ N (µMC , σMC) (3.7)
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Figure 3.5: Notional representation of MCα shift by ρR
By regression techniques, µMC and σMC are regressed with respect to x, xf , and ρR:
µMC = FµMC (x, xf , ρR)
σMC = FσMC (x, xf , ρR)
(3.8)
where FµMC and FσMC are regression functions.
For a robust adaptation, statistical confidence is introduced instead of µMC . Therefore,
the original constraint equation, Eq. 3.6 can be re-written:
MCα ≥MCreq. (3.9)
Likewise, the objective function, J , is expressed by a regression function in terms of
x, xf , and ρR. These regression mappings described above make the optimization problem
simple. Any iteration solver can be applied. A preferable method will be dependent on the
system and the mission capabilities. If the objective function is monotonic for ρR, then a
zero-crossing detection algorithm will find a solution for MCα −MCreq. = 0. Figure 3.5
illustrates a notional shift of MCα by ρR.
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Figure 3.6: Overview of Module 3
3.1.3 Module 3: Situational awareness by particle filtering-based fault diagnosis and CBR
For the better prediction of the mission capability in Module 2, an unknown fault growth
rate is identified, and a mission capability prediction model is adjusted accordingly by
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) in Module 3 as depicted in Figure 3.6. A particle filtering-
based fault diagnosis approach detects a fault mode and estimates its state. Fault state
estimates are used to identify the fault growth rate online. Then, a corresponding mission
capability prediction model is reasoned and used in Module 2.





Figure 3.7 describes the cycle of CBR process. As a new event arrives, probable so-
lutions stored in the case base are retrieved that are most similar to the new event. If the
event perfectly matches one of the cases in the case base - i.e., the incoming problem is
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Figure 3.7: A cycle of CBR process (redrawn based on [68])
identified as a case experienced in the past - then, the corresponding solution is applied.
If the event does not precisely match any stored cases, a set of predetermined rules, in the
form of similarity metrics, are called upon to adapt stored solutions to the new event. The
new event forms a new case in the case base.
CBR is composed of four knowledge containers [69, 70].
1. Vocabulary: Data structure and its elements representing the primitive notion
2. Similarity measure: Numerical modeling of similarity
• Reflexivity: sim (x, x) = 1
• Symmetry: sim (x, y) = sim (y, x)
• Nearest neighbor: m is the nearest neighbor to p if sim (p,m) ≥ sim (p,m′)
• Distance function: d (x, y) < d (u, v)↔ sim (x, y) > sim (u, v)
3. Case-base: Experience representation composed of a problem-solution pair
• c (p, s) ∈ CB
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Figure 3.8: Offline case-base modeling procedure
• CB is a case-base, c is a case, p is a problem, and s is a solution
4. Solution transformation: Solution adaptation rules
In Module 3, a fault growth model is translated into a case. By recalling fault dynamics
in Eq. 3.2, possible typical fault growth rates are modeled as:
ẋf = Ff i (xf , sf , coeff.i) (3.10)
where i is a case number and coeff. is a vector of model coefficients.
Assuming that the same fault mode shares the same growth pattern, coef.i is a vocabu-
lary of a case problem. Physics or test data can determine the structure of the fault growth
model. A symbolic regression technique is a candidate, determining the best regression
model out of data. Model coefficients - a problem of a case - can also be represented by
statistical representation in consideration of estimation uncertainties.
On the other hand, a solution of a case is the mission capability prediction model
MCi (x, xf , sf ), which is obtained by simulation-based modeling as described in the pre-
vious section. By putting the problem and solution, a case is designed. Figure 5.3 shows a
conceptual procedure of offline case-base modeling.
ci (coef.i,MCi (x, xf , sf )) ∈ CB (3.11)
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Figure 3.9: Online reasoning procedure
For the similarity measure, the nearest neighbors can be selected by Euclidean distance
between coef.i and coef.p where coef.p is a present coef. estimated online. Assuming that a
similar case produces a similar result, an inverse distance weighting method can be used for
the solution transformation rule. Of course, a selection of a specific method should rely on
the characteristics of the application system, fault modes, a fault growth model structure,
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d (coef.p, coef.i) =| coef.p − coef.i |2
(3.13)
Figure 3.9 depicts an online reasoning procedure.
3.1.4 Assumptions
The proposed technical approach was built upon a set of assumptions. The assumptions
provide a guideline for the application of the proposed framework as well as its limitations.
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The assumptions can be grouped into four categories, as shown below.
Known
1. Mission and mission requirements are known.
2. The most superior mission capabilities are known.
3. Critical failure modes and corresponding common fault modes for a given
system are identified.
4. Vulnerable mission capabilities due to fault modes are known.
5. System dynamics models are known and reasonably accurate.
6. Fault features are known and selected for each fault mode accordingly. →
Fault features can isolate a fault mode from others.
7. Impact of fault levels on system performances and states are identifiable.
8. Typical fault growth models are identifiable.
Unknown
1. Fault growth models are unknown when a fault mode is detected.
Problems of Interest
1. The proposed framework does not deal with sensor fault modes.
2. Once a fault occurs, it stays unless it is repaired.
3. The severity of a fault grows monotonically.
4. Multiple fault modes do not coincide.
5. Time is not the only vulnerable long-term mission capability domain in the
presence of a critical fault mode.
59
Hardware
1. Proper sensors for health monitoring as well as system controls are on-
board.
The Known category defines necessary information in order to design the proposed
resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework. The Problems of Interest category
defines applications that the proposed framework is applicable. As long as the assumptions
are met, the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework will work in
any dynamical systems. The Unknown is a challenge that the proposed framework needs
to address. Finally, the Hardware category explains the requirement for sensors on board.
3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses
This section explains how the proposed technical methods in each module demonstrated in
the previous section were chosen out of alternatives addressed by a set of research ques-
tions. Hypotheses were formulated accordingly to test the efficacy of the proposed meth-
ods.
The proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework can be viewed as
the advanced version of AFTCS. Therefore, it is good to start with the major components
of AFTCS as reviewed in Chapter 2. AFTCS is generally composed of:
1. Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD)
2. Reconfiguration Mechanism
3. Reconfigurable controller
4. Command / reference governor
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Table 3.2: Proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control functions and requirements
AFTCS functions Proposed functions Requirements










Immediate recovery Performance trade-offs
and learning
The four modules above can be mapped to three fundamental functions. First, FDD
is a required capability of the reasoning function since it must be able to identify and be
aware of what is going on in the system online. Reasoning, however, should not be limited
to fault diagnosis on known fault modes or fault growth patterns. A necessary property
of reasoning is to induce conclusions for unknown situations by combining the incoming
evidence and a priori knowledge.
Second, the reconfiguration mechanism and command/reference governor modules are
mapped to the long-term performance trade-off function in the proposed framework. The
proposed framework needs to optimize the operating conditions considering not only the
impact of a critical fault mode, but also the changes in mission capability (consequences)
due to the modification of a control strategy comprehensively.
Lastly, the reconfigurable controller and mechanism modules are relevant to the imme-
diate recovery function. The immediate recovery function must produce control signals to
make the impaired system stable and to help the faulty system follow its references. Just
like long-term performance trade-offs, it also needs to consider the loss of performance and
its degradation comparing to performance requirements.
The relationships between the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control func-
tions and AFTCS modules are shown in Table 3.2.
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3.2.1 Module 1: Immediate Performance Recovery
Research Question 1-1
What is a proper reconfigurable control method for Module 1?
Module 1 is fundamentally the same as the traditional reconfigurable controller. Therefore,
it is a good idea to review popular methods for the reconfigurable controller in order to
develop or choose a proper method for the proposed framework. The goal of reconfigurable
controllers is to put the degrading operating points back to the original operating point as
close as possible. With this regard, reconfigurable control systems typically aim at:
1. Stabilization
2. Equilibrium recovery
3. Output trajectory recovery
4. State trajectory recovery
Zhang and Jiang extensively reviewed literature about reconfigurable fault-tolerant con-
trol systems [49]. Based on mathematical design tools, they classified reconfigurable con-
trol design methods into controller design approaches, reconfiguration mechanisms, and
applied system characteristics for typical AFTCS designs. This classification is beneficial
to distinguish characteristics of different reconfiguration methods and choose a proper one
based on the required properties of the proposed framework.
In terms of the design approach, online automatic redesign methods are more flexible
to unknown fault modes than pre-computed control laws. Moreover, when a fault can grow
over time, the intensity of the impact of a fault varies as a system operates; thus, a handful
of pre-calculated controllers would not be able to handle it properly.
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For reconfigurable mechanism, each approach is briefly reviewed to compare them as
followings: First, a switching approach is to choose proper control gains or control laws
among multiple models for healthy and faulty plant conditions considered. It is also called
projection approach in another literature because this reconfiguration mechanism projects
an incoming situation to a known scenario [72]. It can provide expected and satisfactory
results for modeled conditions. However, since it requires pre-computed control laws by
its nature, a switching approach itself is not enough to cope with degrading system perfor-
mances.
As a second approach, a model-matching approach defines a reference model, which
satisfies nominal control specifications. Let us consider a Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) sys-
tem:
x (k + 1) = Ax (k) +Bu (k) (3.14)
where x (k) ∈ Rn is a system state vector, u (k) ∈ Rm is a control input vector, and
A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×m are system property matrices. Suppose that a classical feedback
control law is used,
u (k) = −Kx (k) (3.15)
where K is a state gain matrix. If K satisfies nominal control specifications, say K∗, Eq.
3.14 can be rewritten as:
x (k + 1) = (A−BK∗)x (k) ≡M∗x (k) (3.16)
M∗ is then a reference model. Now, as a fault occurs in a plant or an actuator, A or
B changes: Af or Bf . In turn, a closed-loop model of the faulty system can be no longer
the same as the reference model, M∗. Therefore, an adaptive routine finds Kf∗ making
a closed-loop model be M∗ for Af or Bf . In order to get the reconfigured control gain,
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matrix inversion is inevitable. Therefore, a Pseudo Inverse (PI) method is popularly used.
However, an exact model-matching approach does not guarantee system stability after
reconfiguration; thus, an admissible model-matching approach was proposed by Staroswiecki
[73] and extended for a Linear Time-Varying (LTV) system by de Oca et al. [74]
A third approach is a model following. A model-following approach is similar to a
model-matching, but a model-following approach makes system states or outputs follow
reference states or outputs [75]. It distinguishes a reference model and a plant model. A
reference model is:
ẋm = Amxm +Bmum (3.17)
A plant model is
ẋp = Apxp +Bpup (3.18)
Then, it chooses control gains to minimize an error, e = xm − xp. Like a model-
matching approach, PI method is widely used.
Even though both model-matching and model-following methods are well-targeting
stabilization and recovery, there are several limitations. First, they are limited to linear
systems. Second, since it mainly focuses on reference tracking, it is difficult to embed di-
agnostic and prognostics knowledge in these methods. Gao and Antsaklis even argued that
a model-following approach does not require fault diagnostic routine in their framework
[75].
An optimization approach, on the other hand, is to solve an optimization problem to get
the best control inputs. The basic idea is to make a trade-off between system performances
and control efforts by minimizing (or maximizing) an objective function. A typical form
of the cost function is an integral of a linear combination of quadratic terms for states and
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x (t)T Qx (t) + u (t)T Ru (t)
)
dt (3.19)
where Q and R are positive semi-definite weighting matrices balancing between state er-
rors and control efforts. This approach does not explicitly show the quality of stability
of a system, but the cost function penalizes violations of reconfiguration goals (stability,
equilibrium, output, and state trajectory recoveries). Therefore, as long as a (faulty) sys-
tem is controllable, it finds optimal control inputs [72]. The most significant benefit of
this approach is its flexibility to embrace diagnostic and prognostic knowledge into the
formulation. The main drawback of this approach is the computational requirement.
Lunze et al. also suggested a fault hiding approach for control reconfiguration [72].
What distinguishes a fault hiding approach from the other approaches above is that a fault
hiding approach uses a nominal controller as is in the presence of a fault. Instead, it attaches
virtual sensors or actuators that accommodate sensor measurements or control input signals
to produce a designed control quality. Thus, it does not redesign a controller. However, it
does not have trade-off capability, but only signal manipulations.
Table 3.3 summarizes reconfigurable control mechanisms reviewed above and com-
pares them based on requirements for the proposed framework. It is shown that optimal
control-based approach fits well to the problem of interest. Of course, it does not mean that
only one approach must be chosen; instead, in practice, a combination of them can result
in better outcomes than an independent approach [49].
One of the most popular optimization-based reconfiguration methods is a Linear Quadratic
(LQ)-based method. It is an automatic way of getting feedback gains. Assuming that Eq.
3.14 is a system model and Eq. 3.15 is a control law stabilizing the system, P is a solu-
tion matrix of algebraic Ricatti equation (a continuous-time case) for Eq. 3.19 considering
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Table 3.3: Comparisons of reconfigurable control approaches
Approach Automatic Redesign Trade-off Prognosis
Switching × ◦ ×
Matching ◦ × ×
Following ◦ ◦ ×
Optimizing ◦ ◦ ◦
Fault Hiding ◦ × ×
infinite horizon:
K = R−1BTP (3.20)
0 = ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q (3.21)
A solution to the Ricatti equation is achieved by matrix factorization or iterative process
of the equation. One of the drawbacks of this approach, however, is the fact that there is
no explicit relationship between the quality of stability and parameter matrices. It means
that it is necessary to decide parameter values to obtain “optimal” control gains, which
satisfies stability requirements. Besides, this approach is mostly limited to linear systems
only. Therefore, pole placement methods with full state feedback are generally preferred
to a LQ-based approach.
Another optimization-based approach is Model Predictive Control (MPC), also known
as Receding Horizon Control (RHC). MPC has been a popular method for reconfigurable
control in recent researches. Figure 3.10 compared MPC with other popular methods of
control reconfiguration, and MPC has more excellent properties over other methods. A
key concept of MPC is to obtain an open-loop optimal control input sequence for a finite
control horizon by solving Eq. 3.19, but only apply the first (or two) control input(s) to
the system, measure the following measurements, and repeat to solve the optimal control
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Figure 3.10: Reconfigurable control method comparison [79]
at every discrete control time step. Because of this, MPC implicitly produces closed-loop
control characteristics.
One of merits of MPC is the fact that it can solve for a constrained system, and the sys-
tem of interest does not have to be linear. It enables diagnostics and prognostics knowledge
to be successfully considered in the objective function or constraints. Also, MPC has been
proven to stabilize a system asymptotically in general [76, 77]. The proofs showed that the
total cost function, Eq. 3.19, is a Lyapunov function of a system. Appendix B presents the
proof from [78].
In order to solve MPC optimal control, Dynamic Programming (DP) approach can be
used at each control time for the finite receding horizon if the system dynamics is relatively
well-known. DP requires the environment having Markov property. Markov property is
observed if a certain state is solely dependent on the previous state and action. Its formal
definition is:
p (s′, r) = Prob (St+1 = s
′, Rt+1 = r|St = s, At = a) (3.22)
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Figure 3.11: Principle of Optimality. If S̃G is optimal, then X̃G is optimal at any point,
X , on the optimal path, S̃G
for all s′, s, a, and r. s and s′ are two different states, a is an action, and r is a reward at a
certain state, s,
Most state-space model follows Markov property. A general discrete dynamics model
is expressed as:
x (tk+1) = f (x (tk) , u (tk)) + ω (tk) (3.23)
where x is a state vector, u is a control input vector, f (·) is a transition function, and is
process noise. For instance, velocity and position (states) of aircraft at a certain point of
time only rely on velocity and position and a control input at the previous time step. In this
case, if a state is defined only by vehicle positions, then it no longer possesses the Markov
property because a history of positions is necessary to identify the next position. Then
the running environment with the Markov property is called the Markov Decision Process
(MDP).
Assuming the MDP, DP utilizes the Principle of Optimality or also known as Bellmans
Principle [80]. Richard Bellman stated the Principle of Optimality as:
“An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial
decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with
regard to the state resulting from the first decision.” Bellman (1957), page 83.
The basic idea of the Principle of Optimality is depicted in Figure 3.11. If the path,
S̃G, is an optimal path, then any path, X̃G is optimal where the point X is on the path,
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S̃G. Based on the Principle of Optimality, a large class problem can be solved at once by
solving a small problem within the larger class [80]. Suppose that a general nonlinear cost
function, V (·), within a fixed finite time in the discrete time domain is expressed by:
V (x (t0) , t0) =
∫ tf
t0
l (x (τ) , u (τ) , τ) dτ + Φ (x (tf ) , tf ) (3.24)
where t0 is a start time, tf is a final time, l is a running cost (or an immediate cost), and
Φ is a final cost. Solving the optimal control problem is to find the sequence of control
inputs, [u (t0) , u (t1) , · · · , u (tf )], which minimizes V (x (t0) , t0). This large problem,
which considers the entire mission time, can be reformulated into a set of small recursive
problems as follows:




l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) dt+ V (x (tk + δt) , tk + δt)
]
(3.25)
Equation 3.25 means that a cost at any time, V (x (tk) , tk), can be defined as a sum
of the immediate cost at tk and the cost at next time step, V (x (tk + δt) , tk + δt). The
boundary condition of this problem is at the final time, tf :
V (x (tf ) , tf ) = Φ (x (tk) , tf ) (3.26)
Therefore, the optimal control problem is solved from the final time to the initial time
backward.
DP assumes that an accurate state transition model exists. (The model is also called a
plant or environment model.) Suppose that state-space system dynamics is given as:
dx
dt
= F (x (t) , u (t)) (3.27)
where u ∈ Rn is a control input (desired force/torque) vector, and x ∈ Rm is a state vector.
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If we manipulate Eq. 3.25,



















l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) dt+
∂V
∂t
dt+ V Tx · F (x (tk) , u (tk)) dt
]
(3.30)








l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) + V
T
x · F (x (tk) , u (tk))
]
(3.31)
Equation 3.31 is a partial differential equation, also known as Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation. Finding an optimal control policy means solving HJB equation. The
Riccati equation by the LQ-based optimal control approach is a special case when a cost
function is formulated by a linear-quadratic form with full knowledge of linear system dy-
namics. However, solving a general PDE HJB equation is difficult or sometimes impossible
to get a solution analytically [Lewis]. Thus, DP is typically solved by iterative processes:
value function iteration, policy iteration, and policy search methods. System models are
used to query data points for the iterative processes. By the nature of DP, DP is typically
viewed as an offline learning approach dynamical system controls. Therefore, it is not easy
to apply DP for online and real-time controls when system dynamics vary over time (due
to fault effects and recovery strategies).
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To make DP applicable to practical problems, Differential Dynamic Programming (DDP)
solves a local trajectory optimization problem based on Bellmans dynamic programming
principle. By the nature of the Bellmans principle, the cost values are propagated back-
ward in time if we know V (x (tf ) , tf ). The Bellmans principle in discrete-time domain is
expressed in Eq. 3.32:
V (x (tk) , tk) = min
u(tk)
[l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) ∆t+ dV + V (x (tk+1) , tk+1)] (3.32)
Suppose that Q (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) = l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) ∆t. Sufficient conditions of
optimal solutions at u∗ (tk) are
∂Q(u∗)
∂u
= 0 and ∂
2Q(u∗)
∂u2
> 0. Since DDP solves a problem
with the second derivatives of Q, cost functions must be second order differentiable.
By the quadratic approximation of Q (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) and the linear approximation
of the system dynamics, an optimal control input correction, δu∗ (tk), can be expressed as
in Eq. 3.33. Detail derivations of the solution were derived, and typical canonical examples
were solved in Appendix C.
δu∗ (tk) = −Q−1uuQu −Q−1uuQuxδx (tk) (3.33)
where δ· is a small variation and subscripts mean partial derivatives. Matrices, Q and its
derivatives, are functions of V , l, and their derivatives. They are calculated by backward
propagation from tf to t0 along with the initial u and x. Then, δu∗ (tk) can be obtained by
the forward-sweep process, updating u and x. These backward and forward sweeps iterate
until convergence.
Figure 3.12 depicts how DDP works to find optimal control for a trajectory following
task. It starts from a random initial path coming from a random sequence of control inputs,
and gradually converges to a reference trajectory that a system has to follow.
Based on the review of alternative methods for Module 1 of the proposed resilience-
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Figure 3.12: An successful example of DDP and its convergence [81]
enhanced reconfigurable control framework, MPC-based AFTCS solving optimal control
problems by the DDP method seems to be a reasonable choice.
Research Question 1
What is a proper reconfigurable control method for Module 1?
Possible Answer
An MPC-DDP method is suitable for Module 1.
One of the most significant challenges using DDP in MPC was the computational bur-
den because it should solve the optimization problem at each control step. Thus, in the
past, MPC was only applicable to slow dynamics. However, improvement of computa-
tional power has alleviated this issue, and so MPC-DDP framework has been successfully
utilized in UAS controls [67]. Another challenge in MPC-DDP is model accuracy because
DDP is a model-based control approach. If the system dynamics model is not accurate
enough, solutions from DDP may not be able to produce optimal control inputs. Therefore,
in this study, it is assumed that system properties and dynamics are relatively well-known
and accurate.
Now, one thing that has not been shown is the applicability of MPC-DDP, recovering




If MPC-DDP is used for Module 1, then the system trajectory will be recovered
in the presence of a critical fault mode.
3.2.2 Module 2: Long-term mission capability trade-off
Research Question 2-1
How to obtain an optimal solutions from Module 1 considering long-term mis-
sion capability?
One way of adjusting system performances through MPC-DDP is to modify references on-
line directly. It is one of the ways that past researches proposed, according to the literature
review in Chapter 2. Drozeski used linear programming for the reconfigurable path re-
planning. The re-planning in his approach, however, was not aiming at long-term mission
capability [60]. Tang et al. appliedD∗ algorithm in a ground vehicle application to optimize
a path online considering different optimality criteria: mission time, RUL, and easiness of
travel [64]. It addressed the impact of the reconfigured path on mission capability but did
not combine it with control reconfiguration.
As discussed in the previous section, DDP generates optimal paths based on the objec-
tive function as well as the optimal control sequence. Let us revisit an objective function
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of DDP.
V (x (t0) , t0) = minu
[∫ t0+T
t0
l (x (τ) , u (τ) , τ) dτ + Φ (x (t0 + T ) , t0 + T )
]
(3.1 revisited)
The most primitive way of long-term performance optimization is to introduce a large
finite time window, T . DDP solves the optimization problem for the period of T . If T
covers the entire mission time, DDP will be able to find the optimal solutions covering the
entire mission.
However, choosing a long time window is practically not a good option. As pointed out
in the previous section, the MPC-DDP method can be already computationally burdensome
to solve in real time because of an iterative solution approach. A long time window will
add more computational burden to it. Moreover, choosing the right T is another problem.
Usually, T is set to be constant in an MPC-DDP formulation. Based on an operating point
and system health conditions, mission time can change accordingly. In order to choose the
right T , T needs to be a variable of the optimization problem, but it will cause another
complication. It makes a long time window out of an option.
Another option would be to adjust weights in the cost function. A typical form of the
running cost, l, is:
l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) =
1
2








Typically, the coefficient matrices, K and R, are design choices by the desirability of
control performances. The first term on the right-hand side of the running cost function is a
soft constraint for states, x. K implicitly governs the level of acceptability of performance
errors. The higher, the stricter. The second quadratic term is a regulation term for control
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effort. The higher R, the slower control responses. Changing the cost coefficients online
can reconfigure control strategy so that long-term mission capability can be managed.
This approach, however, may lead to a case where DDP cannot find its solution. As
identified in the previous section, Quu is required to be semi-positive definite at all times.
According to Appendix C, Quu is a function of K and R. A particular combination of cost
coefficients can cause Quu to be negative definite during the online adaptation, and then
optimal control solutions cannot be found.
Instead of manipulating the coefficient matrices directly, an additional parameter, ρR
can be introduced in the running cost function as shown in Eq. 3.3.
l (x (t) , u (t) , t) =
1
2
(x (t)− r (t))T K (x (t)− r (t)) + ρR ·
1
2
u (t)T Ru (t)
(3.3 revisited)
What ρR does is to adjust the level of penalty, which is imposed on control efforts. It
determines which cost term, the state error, or the control effort, contributes more to the
total running cost. Presumably, the high ρR will allow state deviations during the operation
by suppressing the use of the faulty component. Unlike manipulating the entire cost coef-
ficient matrices, the range of ρR can be easily determined so that Quu is maintained to be
invertible.
Reviews of the alternatives above suggest that introducing an adaptation parameter, ρR,
in the running cost equation is a preferable option. MPC-DDP generates an optimal path, so
optimizing each state reference can be somewhat redundant. Directly manipulating T , K,
or R can be impractical. Adjusting ρR is easier and presumably enables mission capability
trade-offs. However, it still needs to be proven that the adaptation parameter affects long-
term mission capabilities with Hypothesis 2.
75
Research Question 2-1
How to obtain optimal solutions from Module 1 considering long-term mission
capability?
Possible Answer
By introducing an adaptation parameter, ρR, in a running cost of the DDP for-
mulation
Hypothesis 2
If the adaptation parameter varies, then long-term mission capabilities will be
adjusted.
Now, the question is how to determine optimal ρR when a fault happens.
Research Question 2-2
How to determine the adaptation parameter considering long-term mission capa-
bility online?
The primary purpose of Module 2 is to maintain mission capabilities in the presence
of a critical fault mode until the faulty system completes its mission goals. The mission
is said to be satisfied if the system can produce the mission capabilities exceeding mission
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requirements during mission time as shown Eq. 3.35.
Mission requirements < Mission capabilities ∀t ∈ [t0, tF ] (3.35)
where t0 is an initial time, and tF is a mission terminal time. It means that the proposed
resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework needs to find a control strategy that
enables vulnerable mission capabilities to be extended beyond mission requirements. How-
ever, it inevitably comes with the expense of performance sacrifices.
With this regard, the long-term trade-off can be viewed as another optimal control rou-
tine. The objective function should represent given mission goals as a function of a set of
states and actions. What distinguishes this module from a common optimal control is that
this routine more focuses on consequences rather than system stability. (System stability
should be guaranteed by Module 1.) In order to improve the consequence-based resilience
metrics, consequence-related states should be considered in the objective function and com-
pared to the requirements. For example, a system RUL is a typical consequence-related
performance metric, and it needs to be compared to mission time remained when RUL
is defined in the time domain. Control actions, on the other hand, will be the adaptation
parameter.
Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a recently highlighted optimal control method. RL as-
sumes that state transition dynamics is unknown, or it is challenging to model because of
uncertainty. (In RL-related researches, state transition dynamics is called an environment
model more often.) For instance, in a game environment, one player cannot accurately
predict the behaviors of the opposite player. The opposite player is viewed as a part of the
environment, and so it is considered as a source of uncertainty.
In such an unknown environment, an RL-based control method enables an agent to learn
optimal policy by interacting with the environment [82]. It finds a way that a cumulative
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Figure 3.13: A concept of reinforcement learning
reward over a given mission to be maximized. Based on the concept of trial-and-error,
experiences are formed into a value or a control policy function as depicted in Figure 3.13.
For episodic cases, one can operate the system with a certain control policy, and then
evaluate its value from total discounted rewards. If the environment is uncertain, its value
incrementally converges as episodes are repeated. It is called the Monte Carlo (MC) learn-




γi−t · ri+1 = rt+γ · rt+1 + γ2 · rt+2 + · · ·+ γT−t−1 · rT (3.36)
where Rt is a total discounted reward at t, rt is an immediate reward at t, T is a final time,
and γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor. An update rule of the value function by MC is:
V (st)← V (st) + α (Rt − V (st)) (3.37)
where V (st) is a state value at t, and α is a learning rate (also called a step-size parameter).
MC learning algorithm initializes V (st) and incrementally updates it by the difference
between the collected Rt from an episode and V (st). We call Rt a target.
In a non-episodic environment, on the other hand, the value function is estimated at
each control action performed on the fly. It is called Temporal Difference (TD) learning
method. By evaluating a difference between estimated and actual rewards (costs), the state
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value is updated as shown below:
V (st)← V (st) + α (rt+1 + γ · V (st+1)− V (st)) (3.38)
This formulation involves one-step estimation, rt+1 + γ · V (st+1), for future rewards
and values. It is also called a backup. The term, rt+1 + γ · V (st+1)− V (st), is called TD-
error or temporal difference. It depends on the state and reward at t+ 1; thus, the update of
V (st) can be done at a time, t + 1. Therefore, it does not have to be episodic training. Of
course, TD can be used in the episodic system environment as well, but the value updates
do not have to wait until each episode is finished.
In terms of the concept of updating rules, MC and TD learnings use a different target
from each other; MC uses Rt, and TD uses rt+1 + γ · V (st+1). Rt is an unbiased estimator
of a true value function, but it has high variance. Thus, it takes a relatively long time
to converge. TD uses rt+1 + γ · V (st+1) as a biased estimator, but it has low variance.
Theoretically, TD results can be biased even though TD converges faster than MC. In order
to alleviate these limitations, the concept of eligibility trace was introduced. The basic
idea is to update every state, which has been experienced during learning, with a decaying
parameter, λ ∈ [0, 1]. The more states are recently experienced, the greater corrections are
applied in the value update. It is called TD() learning. The update rule is:
V (st)← V (st) + α · δt · et (3.39)
where
δt = rt+1 + γ · V (st+1)− V (st)
et (s) =

γ · λ · et−1 (s) + 1, if s = st
γ · λ · et−1 (s) , otherwise
(3.40)
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Figure 3.14: A summary and comparisons of DP, TD, MC and exhaustive search methods
[82]
et (s) is an eligibility trace. It is a function of all states and decays over time. For both
extremes, TD(0) is the simplest TD method, and TD(1) is similar to the MC method. How-
ever, it does not necessarily mean that TD(1) is only applicable to an episodic environment.
Figure 3.14 depicts a pictorial summary and comparisons of DP, TD, MC, and Exhaus-
tive search methods. (Exhaustive search is not considered as DP or RL, but it explains the
relationships of DP, TD, and MC.) Open circles are states, solid circles are actions, and
grey squares are terminals. DP considers every state and action available at the next time
step. TD only has a single backup. MC samples up to a terminal (a single and long path)
and updates values for all experienced states and actions. Exhaustive search samples every
possible state and action. TD(λ) falls between TD and MC.
MC, TD, and TD(λ) help estimate a value function. The real problem here is to choose
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optimal control policies maximizing the corresponding value. In many cases, an action
value function, Q (st, at) is introduced to solve the optimal control problem instead of
V (st).
Q (st, at)← Q (st, at) + α (“Target”−Q (st, at)) (3.41)
where a ∈ A is a control action within a control action set A.
In order to find optimal controls, there exist briefly two approaches, and each of them
can be categorized into three different approaches [83, 84]:
1. Value-based approach
(a) Value iteration method





The value-based approach improves Q (st, at), and then the optimal control policy is
implicitly determined. The value iteration method iteratively finds the optimal value func-
tion starting from an arbitrary action-value function, and then derives the optimal control
policy from it. The policy iteration method, on the other hand, repeats the iterative process
of policy evaluation and policy improvement: starting from an arbitrary control policy,
evaluating it by an action value, and improving it until the action value (or control pol-
icy) converges. Typically, the value-based approach is suitable for a discrete environment
with discrete states and control inputs. In a continuous domain, Value Function Approxi-
mation (VFA) method parameterizes a value function with a feature vector, φ (s, a), and a
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parameter vector, w. MC, TD, or TD(λ) can be directly applicable to determine the param-
eter vector, w. However, making φ (s, a) is not straightforward, and certain value function
approximators can cause convergence issues [84].
The policy-based approach, on the other hand, directly parameterizes the control policy,
and finds the optimal policy by optimization processes for an objective function, J (θ), for
the parameter, θ. Typically, the control policy can be parameterized as a stochastic control
policy:
πθ (s, a) = Pr (a | s, θ) (3.42)
where πθ is a parameterized control policy, which is a probability of actions at states and the
parameter θ. If the objective function is not differentiable for θ, then non-gradient methods
should be the right choice. Also, non-gradient methods can theoretically find the global
optimum. Gradient-based methods tend to find local optima in general. Using the gradient
is, however, more efficient than non-gradient methods.
The objective function for the policy-based approach can be formulated as either one
of the following:
1. A starting value for an episodic environment:
J (θ) = V πθ (s1) = Eπθ [R1] (3.43)




dπθV πθ (s) (3.44)











where dπθ is a stationary distribution of πθ.
Since the total discounted rewards are unknown, they must be estimated by data. MC
policy gradient method, also known as REINFORCE, uses episodic data, and iteratively
improves the control policy by using the gradient, ∇θJ (θ) [85]. The learning process
is performed when each episode ends. By using MC policy gradient method, the policy
parameter θ is updated at each episode by:
∆θt = α · ∇θ ln πθleft(st, atright) · Vt (3.46)
The important issue of MC policy gradient method is the speed of convergence due to
the nature of the MC process: high variance in R1. Also, it is suitable for the episodic
environment. In order to overcome the issue in MC policy gradient method, an actor-critic
approach aims at reducing the variance of the value estimates. The actor-critic approach
also parameterizes the action-value function and uses this estimate instead of Vt. When
Qw (s, a) is directly estimated, we call it Q Actor-Critic method.
∆θt = α · ∇θ lnπθ (st, at) ·Qw (st, at) (3.47)
In this formulation, the Critic evaluates the action value function by the parameter
w, and Actor improves the control policy along the gradient direction while considering
Qw (s, a) at the same time. Major advantages of the actor-critic approach over the policy
gradient method are :
1. Faster convergence
2. Applicability to the continuous state and action domain
As derivatives of Q Actor-Critic method, Advantage function, A (s, a), can be used
instead of Qw (s, a) in the Actor. The idea is to introduce the Base function, B (s, a), and
update the policy parameter to make the action value greater than B (s, a); i.e., A (s, a) =
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Table 3.4: RL value function estimation methods




TD No Biased, low variance Relatively fast Small
TD(λ) No In between MC and TD Faster than TD Moderate
Q (s, a) − B (s, a). Typically, state value function can be chosen as Base function, and
then Advantage function can be parameterized as a function of states, not actions. This
formulation specifically derives TD and TD(λ) Actor-Critic methods. The details of various
Actor-Critic methods are described in (ref).
So far, the derivations of Policy Gradient and Actor-Critic methods were based on the
stochastic policy. Limitation of the stochastic policy gradient method is the fact that as
the control policy converges to the deterministic policy, the variance of the policy goes to
infinity specifically when the action space is continuous [86]. Also, the stochastic policy
does not handle actions in continuous space. Silver et al. proposed deterministic policy
gradient algorithms as a special case of stochastic policy gradient method.
This subsection has covered a variety of alternatives in RL. Their characteristics are
summarized in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5.
According to the observations above, the Actor-Critic method seems to be appealing
because in general Module 2 is supposed to deal with states and actions in continuous do-
mains. However, it is still indecisive to decide on a specific method for Module 2. Using
value function approximators (parameterized representation) does not guarantee conver-
gence, specifically when non-linear function approximator is used [84]. Also, data effi-
ciency and difficulty in reward design are challenging [87].
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Parameterized Parameterized Fast Q Actor-Critic,
TD Actor-Critic,
Natural Actor-Critic
Simulation-based mission capability modeling
As pointed out in [84], RL with nonlinear value function approximation has a chance not
to be able to learn an optimal control solution. Even if RL can find an optimal control
solution, often, other methods out-perform RL due to the data inefficiency of RL [87]. In
this section, an alternative method for Module 2 is proposed.
Determining the adaptation parameter is an optimization process since it requires mis-
sion capability trade-off. A notional optimization problem of the long-term mission capa-




J (x (t) , xf (t) , ρR (t)) (3.5 revisited)
subject to:
MC (x (t) , xf (t) , ρR (t)) ≥MCreq. (3.6 revisited)
J is the most superior long-term mission capability that is impaired and sacrificed due to
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the fault and the reconfigured control strategy. The objective function, therefore, minimizes
the loss of the most superior mission capability after reconfiguration. MC is vulnerable
long-term mission capabilities available that need to be extended to satisfy the mission
capabilities required, MCreq.. MC is shifted by fault states and the adaptation parameter.
MCreq. is assumed to be constant. For instance, as claimed in Research Gap 3, as RUL
(MC) is extended by ρR, the mission time required would also increase. It makes the long-
term mission capability optimization problem challenging to solve by failure prognosis
only, which predicts RUL in the time domain in general.
This challenge addresses the necessity of comprehensive MC and MCreq. mapping
functions from x, xf , and ρR. Assuming that Eq. 3.2 and a mission profile are well-known
and given, a system can be simulated by inducing an artificial fault mode at any point
of the mission. Even though a simulation can never be the same as the real application,
the simulation-based approach has its benefits in identifying mission capabilities in the
presence of a critical fault in the system:
• Simulation Benefits
1. A fault can be induced at any point in time during the mission.
2. The fault intensity is controllable.
3. A failure can be introduced in the simulation. In real applications, safety and
cost-related concerns are inevitable.
4. Simulations are way faster than hardware testing.
As a fault mode is injected in the middle of the mission, the long-term mission capabil-
ities available needs to be evaluated for ρR. The long-term mission capability is dependent
on not only the choice of ρR at t, but also the series of ρR until the end of the mission. In a
discrete form, the prediction of MC available is represented by Eq. 3.48. According to the
definition of the long-term mission capability, the long-term mission capability is evaluated
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by simulating the system until the system fails.
MC (x (tk) , xf (tk) ,
−→ρR) = fMC (x (tk+N) , tk+N , x (tk) , tk) (3.48)
where tk is the current time step, tk+N is a system failure time after N steps, −→ρR =
[ρR (tk) , ρR (tk+1) , · · · , ρR (tk+N−1)], and x (tk+N) is a predicted state at tk+N . fMC is
a mapping from system states to mission capability. For instance, the predicted mis-
sion time is tk+N − tk, and the predicted distance available is Distance Traveled (tk+N) −
Distance Traveled (tk).
Estimated system states at tk+N , x (tk+N), is derived by the state propagation through
simulations:
x (tk+N) = F (x (tk+N−1) , xf (tk+N−1) , u (tk+N−1) , tk+N−1)
xf (tk+N) = Ff (xf (tk+N−1) , sf (tk+N−1) , tk+N−1)
sf (tk+N−1) = Fs (x (tk+N−1) , u (tk+N−1) , tk+N−1)
u (tk+N−1) = FMPC (x (tk+N−1) , xf (tk+N−1) , ρR (tk+N−1))
...
x (tk+1) = F (x (tk) , xf (tk) , u (tk) , tk)
xf (tk+1) = Ff (xf (tk) , sf (tk) , tk)
sf (tk) = Fs (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk)
u (tk) = FMPC (x (tk) , xf (tk) , ρR (tk))
(3.49)
where · is a predicted estimate, x is a system state, xf is a fault state, sf is a stressor influ-
encing the fault growth, and FMPC is the MPC-DDP controller from Module 1. Equation
3.48 and 3.49 show that MC is highly dependent on the reconfigured control policy, −→ρR.
Figure 3.15 depicts an example of conceptual system performance propagation for dif-
ferent −→ρR. The bold blue curve starting from t0 to tk is a trajectory traveled. tk is a current
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Figure 3.15: An example of conceptual system performance propagation (distance) for −→ρR
time step. The series of the adaptation parameter of case 3, −→ρR3, and case 4, −→ρR4, will re-
sult in mission success, whereas the other three cases will not. The cause of three failures
can be anything, not only the critical component failure. If the minimum mission time is
preferable, −→ρR3 will be a better choice than −→ρR4.
Now, this is the same problem to DP in that solving this problem is to find the optimal
series of the adaptation parameter, −→ρR, within tk+N . Therefore, the same challenges apply;
tk+N varies for different −→ρR, and solving for a long time window is not practical due to the
heavy computational burden.
One big difference from a typical DP problem is that the selection of −→ρR does not
jeopardize the system stability and the trajectory-following performances much if ρR is
within a safe range. Instead, −→ρR is more relevant to long-term mission capabilities such as
mission length or mission time.
This difference, however, also causes another challenge. Selection of−→ρR with any com-
bination of ρR at each tk+i would result in different consequences. It implies that there are
mN−1 combinations of −→ρR if ρR ∈ Rm. With this regard, MC prediction for every single
combination has a dimensionality problem. Moreover, N varies all the time based on x,
xf , and system noises. Therefore, modeling MC for every possible −→ρR is impossible.
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Figure 3.16: Conceptual representation of a series of optimal ρR
A simple and possible prediction modeling approach is to simplify the sequence of −→ρR
by a constant ρR throughout the prediction period as shown below:
−→ρR = ρR × [1, 1, · · · , 1]1×N−1 (3.50)
This simplification is a reasonable choice. Suppose that the series of optimal adaptation
parameters, ρ∗R, is known as depicted in Figure 3.16. Assuming a small time step size, states
at consecutive time steps will be similar. It means that the optimal adaptation parameters
at consecutive time steps will also be very similar.
x (ti) ' x (ti+1)⇒ ρ∗R (ti) ' ρ∗R (ti+1) (3.51)
A series of −→ρR with a constant ρR value will produce a certain consistent long-term
mission capability with stable system stability and tracking performances. Figure 3.17
shows the example of conceptual system performance propagation with respect to different
−→ρRi = ρRi×[1, 1, · · · , 1]1×Ni considering system noises. i is a case number. In this concep-
tual example, the average of both MC (x (tk) , xf (tk) ,−→ρR2) and MC (x (tk) , xf (tk) ,−→ρR3)
exceed the mission length. −→ρR2 finished the mission earlier than −→ρR3. However, due to the
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Figure 3.17: An example of conceptual system performance propagation (distance) with
respect to −→ρRi = ρRi × [1, 1, · · · , 1]1×Ni
uncertainty, the probability of success by −→ρR2 is less than −→ρR3. By certain statistical thresh-
olds, most preferable −→ρR will be chosen. Mission time can also be estimated in the same
manner as illustrated in Figure 3.18.
Now, MC (x (tk) , xf (tk) ,−→ρRi) can be modeled in statistical parameters. For instance,
by assuming a Gaussian distribution, MC prediction at tk can be expressed as:
MC (x (tk) , xf (tk) ,
−→ρRi) ∼ N (µi, σi) (3.52)
By collecting MC for x, xf , and −→ρR through multiple simulations, µMC and σMC can
be modeled as shown in Eq. 3.53. Since −→ρR is a vector of the same value, simply ρR is
used.
µMC = FmuMC (x, xf , ρR)
σMC = FσMC (x, xf , ρR)
(3.53)
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Figure 3.18: An example of conceptual system performance propagation (mission time)
with respect to −→ρRi = ρRi × [1, 1, · · · , 1]1×Ni
A statistical measure helps choose a robust long-term mission capability.
MCα = µMC ± zα · σMC (3.54)
where α is a confidence level, and zα is a standard-z value for α. The desirability of MC
determines the ± sign.
Now, the mapping function from x, xf , and ρR to MC is established. The last part of
Module 2 is to solve the optimization problem formulated initially in Eq. 3.5 and Eq. 3.6.
Since MC can be directly predicted, a stationary MCreq. can be chosen for x, xf , or ρR.
The optimization problem is in a simple form, given the mapping functions. Any itera-
tive solver would be applicable. If there is a clear trend, for instance, the objective function
is monotonic in terms of ρR, then a zero-crossing detection algorithm would also solve for
MCα −MCreq. = 0. Each time step, ρR is determined by the state estimation of x and xf .
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Alternatives Comparisons
Table 3.6 summarizes the characteristics of the two approaches proposed for Module 2.
Their different characteristics made it difficult to identify which approach would work or
be better than the other. Therefore, both approaches were tested. Test results are described
in Chapter 4.
3.2.3 Module 3: Situational awareness
Assuming that a fault growth model is not known, the situational awareness module needs
to identify two things:
1. Accurate fault detection and identification
2. Reasonable long-term mission capability prediction
As reviewed in Chapter 2, a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis approach is a state-
of-the-art technique. For proper diagnosis performance, it requires a reasonably accurate
fault growth model as well as data. By the assumption, however, a fault growth model is
not known even though its typical patterns can be modeled. If an inaccurate fault growth
model causes a significant delay or inaccuracy in fault detection time or state estimation,
the system will not be as resilient as it should be. It formed Research Question 3-1 below.
Research Question 3-1
How to improve the performance of the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis
routine when a fault growth model is unknown?
For the diagnosis performance improvement, online fault growth model estimation can
be integrated into the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis routine. Thus, it led to Hy-
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Table 3.6: A summary of characteristics of the two approaches
Reinforcement Learning (RL) Simulation-based Modeling
• RL enables to learn a control strat-
egy online while a system runs
– Control strategies keep updated
by new experiences.
• RL does not require the knowledge
of environments as long as states are
formulated in the Markov Decision
Process.
• Producing an optimal solution at
each control time can be nearly in-
stant once an optimal control strat-
egy is obtained.
• It needs a huge size of training sets
until a control policy converges be-
cause of the trial and error-based
learning.
• RL does not provide statistical mea-
sure of mission capability.
– RL does not inform whether
a faulty system can reach the
destination or not.
• Reward design is critical to learning
performances, but rewards to not ex-
plicitly represent expected results.
• The Simulation-based long-term
mission capability modeling ap-
proach can provide statistical
measure of mission capability
limits.
• The simulation-based long-term
mission capability modeling only
predicts the capability envelop, not
performance degradation over time.
– Performance degradation and
recovery over time are implic-
itly included in simulations.
– Performance boundaries are
imposed in simulations.
• The simulation-based long-term
mission capability modeling ap-
proach might be limited to apply to
fast dynamics systems.
– It needs to solve an optimiza-
tion problem at each control
step.
• Once long-term mission capability
models are built, it is challenging to
update the prediction models online.
– Offline modeling is required to
incorporate new experiences.
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pothesis 3-1 because the impact of model accuracy on diagnosis performance has not been
shown:
Hypothesis 3-1
If online fault growth model estimation is introduced, performance of the particle
filtering-based fault diagnosis will be improved when a fault growth pattern is
unknown.
Uncertainty of a fault growth model makes it difficult to obtain an adequate control
strategy for long-term mission capability. Different fault growth patterns yield different
mission capabilities. Since Module 2 relies on missions and scenarios, it is challenging
to model the mission capability for an unknown fault growth pattern as the fault growth
model is estimated. It raises the need for a way to instantly predict the long-term mission
capabilities for a new fault growth model.
Research Question 3-2
How to predict mission capability for Module 2 when a new fault growth model
is identified?
The reasoning is a thinking process of making logical conclusions. The foundational el-
ements are facts and premises. A broad scope of systems performing reasoning based upon
facts and/ premises, or also called knowledge, are known as knowledge-Based Systems
(KBS).
• Definition: Knowledge-based systems (KBS)
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– A system that uses artificial intelligence techniques in problem-solving pro-
cesses to support human decision-making, learning, and action from knowledge
[88]
KBS is an architecture of a system, and there is not a consensus of generic methods of
developing it [89]. Instead, KBS is system and domain-dependent. However, two standard
components consist of KBS:
1. Inference engine
2. Knowledgebase
An inference engine is a computer software resembling decision processes of humans.
It defines rules of reasoning about unknowns from the knowledgebase. The knowledgebase
is a collection of knowledge, which represents facts about the world of interest. Knowl-
edge can be represented by various forms for different applications: rules, semantic net-
work, cases, frames, or decision diagrams. The choice of the form of knowledge should be
determined to answer how humans (or experts) make decisions in similar situations [89].
The reasoning module of the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control frame-
work is required to achieve the following purposes:
1. To detect and identify new events (faulty conditions) from the knowledgebase
2. To provide reconfiguration strategy to the long-term and short-term trade-off modules
for known events
3. To suggest reconfiguration strategy to the long-term and short-term trade-off modules
for unknown events
4. To store and update knowledge from new events
To serve the purposes, one of the most popular reasoning methods is Rule-Based Rea-
soning (RBR). RBR forms a set of rules representing critical characteristics of the domain
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of interest. Rules consist of conditions and actions as multiple “If, then” statements. As
a new event comes in, all or a sub-set of If-conditions are evaluated, and the individual
actions are determined. Their rules are defined from expertise by domain experts. Even
though RBR method has a history of successful development and application [90], practi-
cally it has limitations such as [91]:
1. A bottleneck problem in knowledge acquisition [92]: Expert knowledge is difficult to
discover. Often, acquired rules do not accurately represent experts problem-solving
procedures.
2. No memory for experiences: Only rules are stored, not experiences of both success
and failure. Therefore, rules need to be evaluated whenever new events come in.
3. Lack of robustness: if no rules are matched, then no effective results are provided.
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) is an alternative method for RBR. In this method, cases
are forms of knowledge instead of rules. A case is a collection of information representing




A case, in this manner, can be constructed easier than expert rules because a problem
statement in a case requires no expert knowledge, but only measurable features for each
corresponding problem. These cases are updated in the case base as new experiences are
encountered. With this regard, CBR is not just reasoning method, but also machine learning
technique [68].
Considering the dynamic nature of a system, Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) rea-
sons about procedural task planning, given states, goals, intention, and an act (or called
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Table 3.7: Comparisons of reasoning methods
Properties RBR CBR PRS
Expertise knowledge High Mid High
Real-time applicability Limited Fair Yes
Knowledge update Difficult Easy Difficult
Memory required Small Moderate Large
Integrability to Module 3 Good Good Bad
Knowledge Area, KA) library. PRS is known to apply to dynamical systems and real-time
reasoning process in that it reactively provides partial and incremental task plans over time
under a dynamically changing environment [93]. PRS is suitable for strategic planning
when a mission consists of tasks in sequential order [94, 95]. A significant limitation of
PRS is in difficulty of formulating KA [93].
Table 3.7 compares RBR, CBR, and PRS. From the comparison, CBR appears to be
well-suitable for the problem of interest among alternative methods reviewed above.
Research Question 3-2
How to predict mission capability for Module 2 when a new fault growth model
is identified?
Possible Answer
CBR is suitable for Module 3.
When a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis routine detects a fault, CBR needs to
compare its growth pattern to cases in a case-base and eventually provide long-term mission
capability-relevant knowledge to Module 2. It led to Hypothesis 3-2, as shown below. It
will help prove the efficacy of CBR as Module 3 in the proposed framework.
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Hypothesis 3-2
If a new fault growth model is detected, CBR will be able to produce reasonable
mission capability prediction.
3.2.4 The integrated framework
Three modules described in the previous section are integrated as a sequential input-output
relationship. Module 3 (CBR) takes a feature vector transformed from sensor measure-
ments at each time. The parameter outputs and fault mode out of the CBR module are fed
into Module 2. Module 2 determines the adaptation parameter given conditions. Lastly,
Module 1 reconfigures control inputs to make the system satisfy long-term mission require-
ments and operate safely over time. Figure 3.19 illustrates the input-output relationship
between the three modules.
The most fundamental and ultimate research question is if the system resilience can be
improved through the proposed reconfigurable control framework.
Research Question 4-1
Will the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework im-
prove system resilience?
Therefore, as an integrated framework, the proposed reconfigurable control framework
needs to show the improvement of system resilience by an experiment. Chapter 2 pre-
sented different kinds of resilience metrics. In this study, the probability of mission success
was chosen as the resilience metrics. It will be able to represent the improvement from a
consequence perspective. It led to Hypothesis 4 below:
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If the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework is applied,
system resilience will be improved in terms of the probability of mission success
in the presence of a critical fault.
Last, but not least, the proposed reconfigurable control framework needs to apply to a
real application. For the real application, the whole process from monitoring and reasoning
to MPC optimal control routine should be relatively fast.
Research Question 4-2
Will the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework be ap-
plied to real-time control applications?
It is challenging to come up with the computation time required for real-time appli-
cation, though, because the real-time applicability highly depends on system dynamics,
mission requirements, or fault growth rates. If dynamics is fast or a particular fault grows
fast, then quick controls and responses are necessary. How quickly the proposed controller
needs to respond is scenario-dependent. Due to this scenario-dependent issue, therefore,
each computation time for each module was only observed during tests, instead.
3.3 Summary
Chapter 3 proposed a resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework for resilience
improvement. Based upon a conventional AFTCS structure, three fundamental functional
modules were introduced for the framework: immediate recovery, long-term mission ca-
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pability recovery, and situational awareness. Research questions shaped the technical ap-
proaches, and preferable technical methods were reviewed, selected, and developed. Three
modules are interconnected by input-output relationship. The proposed reconfigurable con-
trol framework is expected to improve the system usability in the presence of a critical fault
mode, and eventually to enhance system resilience. Table 3.8 summarizes the proposed
technical approaches, missing pieces that need to be shown, and hypotheses that help jus-
tify the proposed methods. Alternatives for the adaptation parameter optimization and the
real-time applicability are directly tested and observed.
In Chapter 4, test cases and corresponding results are illustrated to support the hypothe-
ses. As a testbed, a waypoint-following mission with an autonomously operable dynamical
system, hovercraft, is introduced. Results and observations from a set of experiments show















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Experiments need to show that the proposed technical methods are able to serve three main
functions and eventually improve system resilience by the whole framework. For that,
seven experiments are designed to support the hypotheses and fundamental functions, as
summarized in Figure 4.1.
Experiment 1 supports Hypothesis 1. It is about how accurate fault knowledge would
need for MPC-DDP to work correctly. Experiment 1, therefore, compared waypoint track-
ing performances of MPC-DDP with and without an accurate fault state estimation. An
actuator fault mode was induced, causing a control asymmetry and a loss of controllabil-
ity, in the waypoint-following mission. Experiment 1 is the foundation of the rest of the
experiments.
Experiment 2 supports Hypothesis 2. It needs to prove the efficacy of the adaptation
parameter for the long-term mission capability trade-offs. By introducing discrete levels of
the adaptation parameter in the MPC-DDP objective function, long-term mission capabili-
ties were observed via Monte Carlo simulations.
Experiment 3 is about the applicability of RL-based method for online optimization of
the adaptation parameter. Learning behavior of RL and the quality of the learned control
policy was evaluated in Experiment 3. Experiment 4, on the other hand, tested the appli-
cability of the simulation-based long-term mission capability modeling and optimization
method for the adaptation parameter. It turned out that the simulation-based method is suit-
able for the proposed framework, whereas the RL approach failed to show the applicability.
Experiment 1 through 4 were tested based on the assumption that fault states were
estimated correctly. Fault state estimation, however, can be inaccurate. With a particle

























uncertainty sources. RQ 3-1 posed a question whether the imperfection of the fault growth
knowledge would impair the performances of fault detection and diagnosis. In Experiment
5, different fault growth models were tested in a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis
module. Fault detection time was assessed. Fault states were estimated and compared to
actual time and states.
Experiment 6 showed the applicability of CBR, which includes cases and a case-base
for typical fault growth models. Fault growth characteristics were identified online, and a
corresponding mission capability prediction model was used to optimize mission capability
and to complete a mission. A new fault growth pattern was also introduced, and a solution
transformation rule for CBR was evaluated by comparing mission capability estimated to
simulation results.
Finally, Exeriment 7 evaluated the performance of the proposed resilience-enhanced
reconfigurable control framework as one whole control system. The improvement of the
probability of success was evaluated for the consequences of the framework. Also, the com-
putation time for CBR, long-term mission capability optimization, and MPC-DDP were
tracked to show the applicability of the proposed framework to a real application.
For such test plans, an under-actuated autonomously operable hovercraft was intro-
duced as a testbed. Hovercraft operates on a 2-D plane, which makes it simple to develop a
simulation environment. However, an under-actuated hovercraft can be challenging to con-
trol because of its sliding motions; therefore, it is significantly sensitive to actuator fault
modes that are relevant to a system operating point. Without a doubt, reaching to the failure
level of an actuator can be catastrophic, and low-level reconfiguration will not be able to
handle the impact of the faults.
It does not necessarily mean that an under-actuated hovercraft is the only application
for the proposed framework. It was only chosen to clearly show the impact of the fault and
failure to the system operations.
This chapter starts from the descriptions of the testbed and missions. Then, the rest is
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Figure 4.2: The autonomously operable hovercraft runs with two differential thrusts and a
LIDAR sensor; The left figure shows the hardware built by ASDL at Georgia Institute of
Technology, and the right figure represents hovercraft dynamics on a fix coordinate.
experiments and results. Each design of experiments was rationalized accordingly. Results
supported hypotheses and finalized the proposed framework.
4.1 Testbed and Mission Descriptions
The Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) at Georgia Institute of Technology
designed and built a scaled and autonomously operable hovercraft as a testbed, shown in
the left figure of Figure 4.2 [96, 97]. The hovercraft dynamics model was derived based
on a ground-fixed coordinate system as depicted in the right figure of Figure 4.2. The
hovercraft operates with two differential thrust fans with electrical brushless motors and a
LIDAR sensor for simultaneous localization and mapping. As a low-powered computing
processor onboard, Pandaboard takes all signals with the help of Robot Operating System
(ROS), which is a middleware handling sensor measurements and software signals.
The hardware platform, though, was only used to build a realistic software simulation
environment in Matlab. Software simulations have benefits over hardware tests as described
in [13]. Experiments can be expedited in a simulation environment, and it is easier and
more flexible to induce artificial fault modes in simulations than hardware testing.
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Table 4.1: Hovercraft System Properties
Parameters Values Descriptions
m (kg) 11.8 Vehicle mass
J (kg ·m2) 1 Vehicle moment of inertia
d (m) 0.25 Distance between a thrust motor and longitudinal line
crossing the mass center
dt 0.5 Frictional damping (translation)
dr 0.005 Frictional damping (rotation)
In the simulation environment, the hovercraft was assumed to move in two-dimensional
planar motion space only with three degrees of freedom. Given two input controls, the
hovercraft is under-actuated. Eq. 4.1 is the non-linear system dynamics model; x and y
are absolute positions on the ground-fixed coordinate, θ is a heading angle, ẋ is a velocity,
ẍ is an acceleration, m is the mass, J is the moment of inertia of the hovercraft, and Fl
and Fr are left and right thrust forces, respectively. d is the distance between a thruster
and an imaginary longitudinal line crossing the mass center. It was assumed that the mass
center coincides with the geometric center Based on the system dynamics equations, the
state is x =
[
x, y, θ, ẋ, ẋ, θ̇
]T
, and the input is u = [Fl, Fr]
T . Table 4.1 shows the system
properties used for the following experiments.
ẍ = −dt
m
ẋ+ Fl · cos θ + Fr · cos θ
ÿ = −dt
m
ẏ + Fl · sin θ + Fl · sin θ
θ̈ = −dr
J
θ̇ + d (Fr − Fl)
(4.1)
The motor-fan dynamics was simplified as a typical DC motor-fan static model by
assuming the dynamics of a motor is way faster than hovercraft dynamics. Figure 4.3
illustrates a typical DC motor structure. (past research) The DC motor model includes
input voltage, Vin, armature current, Im, armature resistance, Rm, and back electromotive
force (emf) voltage, Vemf , as shown in Eq. 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: A typical DC motor structure
Vin = ImRm + Vemf (4.2)
The back emf voltage is an induced voltage from the rotation of a rotor coil. The back
emf voltage is represented by a proportional to an angular velocity of a rotor, Ω as shown
in Eq. 4.3. A detailed derivation can be found from [98].
Vemf = keΩ (4.3)
where ke is a back emf voltage constant.




where ktIm is produced torque, and bΩ2 is torque load from fan aerodynamics. kt is a torque
coefficient, and b is an aerodynamic load coefficient. The quadratic torque load model was
assumed, and a simple hardware test verified it. Figure 4.4 shows the relationships between
the angular speed of the rotor and the produced torque.
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Figure 4.4: Test results of produced torque-rotor angular speed relationships
Table 4.2: DC Motor Model Coefficients
Coefficients Values Descriptions
ke 0.006061893 Back emf coef.
kt 0.006061893 Torque coef.
b 6.3867115e-9 Aerodynamic coef.
kf 0.000000529025 Thrus force coef.
Thrust force exerted by the fan was also modeled in a quadratic form for the angular
speed of the rotor as shown in Eq. 4.5.
F = kfΩ
2 (4.5)
where kf is a thrust force coefficient.
Table 4.2 includes the coefficients of the DC motor test model. The test model can
produce up to 2.036 N on a maximum thrust effort.
A simulation environment can emulate four different uncertainty sources in general.
The first uncertainty is aleatoric uncertainty. Equation 4.6 is state-space hovercraft dynam-
ics with Gaussian noises with zero means and small variances. Variances were chosen to
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ẋ+ Fl · cos θ + Fr · cos θ + ωx
ÿ = −dt
m
ẏ + Fl · sin θ + Fl · sin θ + ωy
θ̈ = −dr
J
θ̇ + d (Fr − Fl) + ωθ
(4.6)
where
ωx ∼ N(0, 0.013)
ωy ∼ N(0, 0.013)
ωθ ∼ N(0, 0.013)
(4.7)
The second source of uncertainty is measurement noise. State estimation module in the
simulation adds Gaussian noises with zero means and small variances.
x̃ = x+ νx, νx ∼ N(0, 0.05)
ỹ = y + νy, νy ∼ N(0, 0.05)
θ̃ = θ + νθ, νθ ∼ N(0, 0.03)
(4.8)
Numerical errors also add up uncertainties when velocity is estimated. A simple Euler’s











where dt is a time step size, tk − tk−1.
Lastly, model errors in system dynamics can be a significant source of uncertainty. For
instance, weight, the moment of inertia, lengths, or friction coefficients could be biased
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Figure 4.5: An example of a mission profile defined by waypoints
or inaccurate. Specifically, MPC-DDP requires accurate dynamics model to obtain proper
optimal control inputs. Since the system dynamics is vital in MPC-DDP, this study assumes
that accurate models are given. The impact of an inaccurate model was briefly investigated
in Experiment 1, though.
The mission is simple. The hovercraft starts from a starting point, follows a series of
waypoints, which are geographical positions, and ends the mission at the destination point.
Mission complete time is a metric for mission performance. The goal of a mission is to
reach the final destination as fast as possible.
The position vectors of waypoints define the mission profile. The waypoints were as-
sumed to be given and known. Figure 4.5 depicts an example of waypoints on an x-y
plane.
4.2 Fault and failure mode
Turn-to-turn short failure is one of the most common failure modes for electrical brushless
motors [99, 100]. A complete short causes a total loss of thrust forces. Insulation degra-
dation is the most common fault mode causing the turn-to-turn failure. Contaminants,
abrasion, vibration, or voltage surge can cause insulation degradation. Once insulation
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Figure 4.6: Turn-to-turn stator winding short of an electrical brushless motor [101]
Figure 4.7: Notional comparisons of healthy and faulty hovercraft on torque-force plane:
Left is a feasible torque-force envelop of healthy hovercraft, and right is a degraded envelop
due to the control asymmetry.
degradation starts, the area of wing short expands. Figure 4.6 is a visible picture of turn-to-
turn winding short [101].
A winding short leads to an increase in the resistance of a motor. High resistance
implies the loss of motor efficiency and thrust force correspondingly. Impairment of one
thrust motor, in turn, causes control asymmetry of hovercraft. Figure 4.7 depicts the impact
of the control asymmetry by the feasible torque-force envelop from healthy (left) and faulty
(right) hovercraft. Healthy hovercraft has a bigger feasible torque-force area than a faulty
one. As the level of fault grows, the feasible area becomes shrunken more. It can be
translated into the gradual loss of hovercraft control capability.
Fault growth is relevant to actuator loads [102]. In this study, loads were assumed to be
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a function of control inputs. Without loss of generality, a fault growth rate was modeled as:
σ̇ (t) = f (t, S (t)) = f (t, u (t)) (4.10)
where σ is a fault state, S is a load, and u is a control input.
A threshold in a fault state dimension defines failure. Once a severity level of a fault
reaches the threshold, the component is no longer able to function; i.e., zero thrust force
available.
F = 0, ifσ ≤ σmin or σ ≥ σmax (4.11)
where F is thrust force of hovercraft, σmax and σmin are maximum and minimum thresholds
for failure.
Fault severity levels are usually difficult to measure online directly. The size of an
armature winding short or the degree of insulation degradation requires overhauls of a
motor and manual inspections. However, tracking armature resistance can represent the
severity of the fault mode. By using the static equation of a DC motor, Eq. 4.2, 4.3, 4.4,
and 4.5, armature resistance was estimated as derived in Eq. 4.12 and used as a fault feature
in this study.
Rm (t) =
Vin (t)− keΩ (t)
Ω2 (t) · b
kt
(4.12)
In the following experiments, fault states were represented differently for simplicity,
though. Experiment 1 was enough to simulate only the impact of a gradual loss of thrust
effectiveness only. Instead of an actual fault model, therefore, simplified fault effects were






where F act is an actual thrust force exerted by the faulty thruster, and F nom is a nominal
thrust force.


































Experiment 2 to 8 used a detailed model of an electrical motor to emulate fault dynam-
ics and fault feature extractions. Therefore, the electrical motor-fan models, Eq. 4.2, 4.3,
4.4, and 4.5, were implemented in simulations, and armature resistance was monitored as
a fault feature.
4.3 Experiment 1: Hypothesis test for Module 1 (MPC-DDP)
Experiment 1 was designed to test Hypothesis 1 and answer Research Question 1. By
recalling Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1,
• Research Question 1: What is a proper reconfigurable control method for Module
1? →MPC-DDP
• Hypothesis 1: If MPC-DDP is used for Module 1, then the system trajectory will be
recovered in the presence of a critical fault mode.
If Experiment 1 shows that the hovercraft can manage its trajectory and proceed to the
next waypoint in the presence of an electrical thrust motor insulation degradation, then it
will support Hypothesis 1. Figure 4.8 describes the overall experimental procedure. Af-
ter all, Experiment 1 needs to identify if a fault state estimation is necessary in order to
run MPC-DDP properly as a reconfigurable controller. Thus, MPC-DDP for the hovercraft
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Figure 4.8: Overall procedure and test scenarios of Experiment 1
testbed was developed first, and its waypoint tracking performance as a fault tolerant con-
troller was proved by comparing it to a traditional PID feedback controller (Test 1). Next,
in Test Case 2, waypoint tracking performance was assessed with and without fault state
estimation in the DDP formulation. To see the impact of various uncertainty sources, Test
Case 3 was performed by inducing uncertainties in simulations.
4.3.1 Mission Description
In Experiment 1, two waypoints, including the final destination, were assigned in a mission
profile as drawn in Figure 4.9. Starting from a point (0, 0), the hovercraft passes by the
waypoint 1 (80, 80) and reach the final waypoint (160, 80). If the hovercraft got close to
a waypoint less than a 3-meter radius, it was assumed that the waypoint was checked, and
switched to the next waypoint.
4.3.2 Development of MPC-DDP Optimal Controller
As described in Chapter 3, the value function, V, at a time, t, of the optimal control-based
controller was formulated in discrete time as Eq. 4.15.





l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) ∆t+ Φ (tN)
]
(4.15)
System dynamics, Eq. 4.1 governs the state, x =
[
x, y, θ, ẋ, ẏ, θ̇
]T
. Control limits
bound control input, u = [Fl, Fr]
T . Table 4.3 shows control limits used in the following
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Figure 4.9: Mission profile for the test case (Two waypoints)




tests, and Figure 4.10 depicts the corresponding torque-force envelop. A discrete time step,
∆t, was set to 0.5 seconds. A receding horizon time window, tN , was set to 10 seconds.
umin ≤ u ≤ umax (4.16)
A running cost, l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk), and final cost, Φ (tN), were formulated in quadratic
forms for the state, x.
l (x (tk) , u (tk) , tk) =
1
2
xT (tk)Kx (tk) +
1
2




(x (tN)− xf )T Kf (x (tN)− xf ) (4.18)
The cost gains, K, R, and Kf , were manually tuned, and the final gains are shown in
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0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 10 0 0 0
0 0 0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0 10 0








10 0 0 0 0 0
0 10 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1

(4.19)
At each control time step, an optimal control sequence for a finite time can be obtained
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Figure 4.11: An intermediate target point for a finite time window in MPC
by repeatedly solving Eq. 4.20 until the control input, u, converges.
δu∗ (tk) = −Q−1uuQu −Q−1uuQuxδx (tk) (4.20)
To impose a steady cruise speed of hovercraft, an intermediate target at each control
time was introduced. The intermediate target is a target position for each MPC time win-
dow. The intermediate target was determined by the position, 5 meters ahead from the
hovercraft heading toward the waypoint. Since the MPC time window is 10 seconds, a
reference for optimal control is to proceed 5 meters in 10 seconds. Figure 4.11 illustrates
how to determine the intermediate targets at each control time.
4.3.3 Preliminary Results: MPC-DDP for normal (healthy) hovercraft control
In order to see if MPC-DDP work correctly for the hovercraft testbed, waypoint-tracking
performances of nominal (healthy) hovercraft were first observed. Figure 4.12 shows the
hovercraft trajectory following waypoints using MPC-DDP without uncertainty induced
in simulation. Green circles are starting and waypoints. Little orange circles are position
history of the hovercraft. Yellow arrows are heading directions of the hovercraft. The result
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Figure 4.12: Results of waypoint-following trajectory and headings without noises
shows that MPC-DDP successfully found the optimal path (shortest route).
Figure 4.13 is the trajectory history with induced simulation uncertainties. The uncer-
tainties included predefined aleatoric noises, measurement noises, and a numerical error.
As expected, MPC-DDP successfully handled uncertainties and made the hovercraft reach
to the final destination.
For both with uncertainty and without uncertainty cases, each state of the hovercraft
was plotted in Figure 4.14. Red dashed lines represent state profiles without uncertainty,
and solid blue lines show the results with uncertainties. The blue profiles fluctuate due
to the induced uncertainties, whereas the red profiles are smooth. The uncertainty also
caused delays. Without uncertainty, the mission ended at 472 seconds. With uncertainty,
the mission time was 493.5 seconds.
Preliminary results showed the efficacy of MPC-DDP as an optimal controller for
healthy hovercraft. Next set of tests induced an actuator fault in the middle of operations.
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Figure 4.13: Results of waypoint-following trajectory and headings with noises
Figure 4.14: State profile comparisons: with noise (blue solid) vs. without noise (red
dashed)
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4.3.4 Test Case 1: An induced fault in the right thrust motor
Test Case 1 proves the fault tolerant control capability of MPC-DDP by comparing to a
traditional feedback (PID) controller. A fault mode was induced on the right thrust motor
starting at 80 seconds after the hovercraft was launched. The impact of the fault mode was
modeled as shown in Eq. 4.21.
ẍ = −dt
m
ẋ+ Fl · cos θ +
F nomr
σr
· cos θ + ωx
ÿ = −dt
m
ẏ + Fl · sin θ +
F nomr
σr











The fault growth rate was represented by a function of the control input, F nomr , as
following:
σ̇ (t) = ρσ · {F nomr (t)}2 + σ0 (4.22)
where σ is a state of the fault, ρσ is a control-dependent coefficient, and σ0 is a control-
independent coefficient.
When the hovercraft is healthy, the fault state, , is set to one. Once the fault state reaches
10, then it is assumed that the thrust motor is failed, and no thrust force is exerted anymore.
A PID controller was able to successfully control the nominal (healthy) hovercraft as
shown in Figure 4.15. Control gains were manually tuned. A reference forward surge speed
was set to 0.45 [m/s] so that the average cruise speed of the PID-controlled hovercraft was
close to the one controlled by MPC-DDP.
In a faulty-hovercraft scenario, however, the PID controller was not able to successfully
control the faulty hovercraft and failed in the middle of the mission. Figure 4.16 demon-
strates the mission failure of the hovercraft controlled by the traditional PID controller. Of
course, it does not necessarily mean that a PID controller always cannot handle the effect
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Figure 4.15: Hovercraft (nominal) trajectory controlled by a PID controller
of the fault. By the reconfiguration of state references or control gain rescheduling may be
able to manage the fault effects and make the faulty hovercraft get to the final destination.
It requires separate analyses for those reconfiguration rules.
In this test, a fault state was added to the system state vector as Eq. 4.24 and assumed




x, y, θ, ẋ, ẏ, θ̇
]T
(4.23)
Figure 4.17 shows an unusual trajectory controlled by MPC-DDP. After the first way-
point, the hovercraft oscillated back and forth, but still successfully managed to reach to
the final waypoint.
The oscillating motion from MPC-DDP was, in fact, an optimal control strategy. As
the fault level grows, actual thrust forces exerted from the faulty thrust motor decrease. To
control the attitude (heading angle) of the hovercraft toward the waypoint, control efforts
on the faulty motor needs to increase so that the actual thrust forces match to the desired
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Figure 4.16: Failed mission trajectory of the faulty hovercraft controlled by the PID con-
troller
Figure 4.17: Successful mission trajectory of the hovercraft controlled by MPC-DDP
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Figure 4.18: Demonstration of the derived control strategy by MPC-DDP for faulty hover-
craft
thrust forces. The PID controller behaved this way, and eventually, it could not make the
hovercraft controllable when the fault level reached the failure. MPC-DDP, however, found
the way to minimize the control efforts on the faulty component. Instead of increasing
the control efforts on the faulty thrust motor, it let the hovercraft turn backward, and used
reverse thrust forces at a right timing in order to make the hovercraft head toward back to the
waypoint and proceed to the waypoint at the same time. To help the understanding, Figure
4.18 illustrates the notional control strategy and the corresponding hovercraft behavior.
Figure 4.19 compares the growing patterns of the fault level between PID and MPC-DDP.
The fault level from the PID controller reached the failure limit way faster than the MPC-
DDP controller.
The oscillating motions by MPC-DDP for the faulty hovercraft in Test Case 1 were not
expected. This unusual behavior is one of the advantages of DDP; i.e., DDP can produce
unexpected optimal patterns of a control sequence because it generates optimal trajectories
and control inputs simultaneously. Of course, it depends on how cost functions are de-
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Figure 4.19: Fault growth pattern comparison: Red dashed line is PID, and blue solid line
is MPC-DDP
signed. If heading angles were strictly forced to point the waypoint, the oscillating motions
might not be shown.
The complete mission time for the faulty case was 605.5 seconds. It took around 120
seconds more than the healthy condition (preliminary test case).
4.3.5 Test Case 2: Impact of fault state knowledge in MPC-DDP
Based on the MPC-DDP design from Test Case 1, Test Case 2 omitted the fault state in the
system state vector, x, and ran the same faulty condition as Test Case 1 in order to see if
the fault state knowledge is necessary for the proper control reconfiguration. Interestingly,
MPC-DDP without the fault state in the model was still able to make the faulty hovercraft
to reach the destination as shown in Figure 4.20.
The hovercraft trajectory by MPC-DDP without the fault states was almost the same
as MPC-DDP with fault states in the system dynamics. The hovercraft proceeded to the
final destination with the oscillating motions. It turned out that MPC-DDP controlled the
faulty hovercraft in the same way with a slightly different reason. This time, DDP did
not plan to swing at first. Instead, the hovercraft turned and headed backward first due
to the gradual loss of actual thrust forces. Once, it turned, DDP let the hovercraft swing
and used the left thruster by reverse thrust because it yielded the less cost after all. Figure
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Figure 4.20: Trajectory comparison: MPC-DDP with the fault state knowledge (left) and
MPC-DDP without the fault state knowledge (right)
Figure 4.21: Fault growth pattern comparison: Red dashed line is the case with an accurate
fault state estimation, and blue solid line is the case without the fault state estimation.
4.21 demonstrated the fault growth pattern difference between the case with the fault state
knowledge (red dashed line) and without the fault state knowledge (solid blue line). The
fault level grew more, and mission time took longer without the fault state knowledge, even
though the difference was small.
The test results without the fault state knowledge suggest that MPC-DDP reconfigures
control strategy and authorities flexibly as long as a system is controllable. According to
Han and Zhao, under-actuated hovercraft is controllable if it can produce both positive and
negative net torque. It means that the current testbed configuration is controllable even
though one thrust motor fails if the other thrust motor can produce reverse thrust forces.
Figure 4.22 depicts that net positive and negative torques are still feasible after the right
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Figure 4.22: Feasible torque-force areas: healthy vs. right motor failure. The feasible area
of the failed case collapses to a red line.




motor completely loses its effective thrust forces.
Without reverse thrust forces, the hovercraft controllability decreases significantly. Ta-
ble 4.4 is the adjusted control prohibiting reverse thrust force. Figure 4.23 is feasible
torque-force areas for healthy and faulty conditions. When the right motor fails, the hover-
craft becomes not controllable anymore due to the significant impairment in torque avail-
able.
The adjusted control limits changed the optimal control strategy entirely differently. No
more oscillating motions happened. Without the fault state knowledge, MPC-DDP was not
able to manage the faulty hovercraft to reach the final destination as shown in Figure 4.24.
With the fault knowledge, on the other hand, the mission length was extended. To ef-
fectively extend the mission length, the cost function in DDP included penalties by the
level of the fault state. A certain coefficient setting elongated the mission length enough to
complete the mission successfully. Figure 4.25 and Figure 4.26 show the trajectory of the
successful case and fault level growth pattern, respectively. Without the fault states knowl-
127
Figure 4.23: Feasible torque-force envelop for healthy and faulty conditions (no reverse
thrust forces)
Figure 4.24: Mission failure by MPC-DDP without fault state knowledge (no reverse thrust
forces)
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Figure 4.25: Mission success by MPC-DDP with fault state knowledge (no reverse thrust
forces)
edge, the fault level grew fast and eventually became uncontrollable before the mission
ended. With the fault states knowledge, fault growth was highly suppressed by minimizing
the use of the faulty motor. Because of the small control efforts throughout the mission
profile, the mission ended at around 1,360 seconds, almost four times longer than the nom-
inal (healthy) case. It means that the control reconfiguration recovered the mission length
at the expense of the mission time.
Note that the MPC-DDP control reconfiguration does not guarantee mission success.
Design of the cost functions significantly affect an optimal control strategy. Certain cases
could end up with mission failure even though the fault state is included in the DDP for-
mulation.
In summary, Test Case 2 identified that the hovercraft configuration without reverse
thrust forces is more vulnerable to the thrust motor fault mode with the MPC-DDP con-
troller. The rest of the experiments from this point on used no reverse thrust force configu-
ration for a severer scenario.
129
Figure 4.26: Fault level growth comparison (no reverse thrust forces): Red dashed line is
without the fault state knowledge, and blue solid line is with the fault state knowledge.
Table 4.5: Inaccurate Model Properties
Parameters Actual Values Test Cases
m (kg) 11.8 10.8
J (kg) ·m2) 1 1.2
d (m) 0.25 0.2
dt 0.5 0.35
dr 0.005 0.0035
4.3.6 Test Case 3: Impact of uncertainty sources other than fault states
The final test case of Experiment 1 was to investigate the impact of different uncertainty
sources other than fault states knowledge. Test Case 3 assumed that the fault states are
known. First of all, stochastic (aleatoric) system noises, measurement noises, and numeri-
cal errors were included all at once. The hovercraft controlled by MPC-DDP could reach
the final target successfully as depicted in Figure 4.27.
However, inaccurate system property parameters caused severe performance degrada-
tion as shown in Figure 4.28. In the test case, 10 to 25 percent errors in property parameters
were tried as summarized in Table 4.5.
Test Case 3 suggested that MPC-DDP properly managed a certain level of stochastic-
ity of system dynamics, zero-mean measurement errors, and numerical errors. However,
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Figure 4.27: Hovercraft trajectory with aleatoric noises, measurement noises, and numeri-
cal errors
Figure 4.28: Hovercraft trajectory with inaccurate system properties
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biases in model properties prevented MPC-DDP from producing optimal control strategies.
4.3.7 Summary of Experiment 1
Results of Experiment 1 supported Hypothesis 1 by showing that MPC-DDP enables trajec-
tory recovery in the presence of a critical fault mode. For the tests, an MPC-DDP controller
for the under-actuated hovercraft was developed and verified as a nominal and fault tolerant
controller by comparing its control performances to a typical PID controller. In order to
test Hypothesis 1 and answer Research Question 1, different sources of uncertainties were
demonstrated in the existence of the thrust motor fault. Observations were summarized
below.
• Observations
1. A typical PID controller was not able to control a faulty hovercraft due to the
fast growth of the fault.
2. MPC-DDP seemed to find optimal paths and control inputs if the system con-
trollability was not severely impaired.
3. The design of cost function would significantly affect the optimal solutions.
4. MPC-DDP required the knowledge of fault states when the fault effects were
critical.
5. MPC-DDP was able to manage stochastic noises in dynamics, zero-mean mea-
surement errors, and numerical errors.
6. MPC-DDP was NOT able to produce proper optimal solutions when the system
property parameters were inaccurate.
7. The mission length in the existence of the thrust motor fault was extended at
the expense of the mission time.
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4.4 Experiment 2: Hypothesis test for Module 2 (Adaptation parameter)
Experiment 2 was designed to test Hypothesis 2 and answer Research Question 2. By
recalling Research Question 2 and Hypothesis 2,
• Research Question 2: How to obtain an optimal solution from Module 1 considering
long-term mission capability? → By adaptation parameter
• Hypothesis 2: If the adaptation parameter varies, then long-term mission capabilities
will be adjusted.
If Experiment 2 shows that long-term mission capabilities (mission time and mission
length) are adjusted by varying the adaptation parameter, then it will support Hypothesis
2. It means that the adaptation parameter, ρR, can be a variable for long-term mission
capability optimization.
The adaptation parameter determines the level of penalties in terms of control efforts.
It was hypothesized that a small adaptation parameter leads to agile movements by an
aggressive control strategy and that a high adaptation value leads to slow movements.
Experiment 2 introduced an adaptation parameter in the MPC-DDP controller devel-
oped in Experiment 1. By varying the adaptation parameter from 0.1 to 100, two mission
capabilities were evaluated: the mission success/failure and the mission time. For simplic-
ity, a single-waypoint mission was assumed. The total mission length was set to 80 meters,
and the fault started randomly at any point in the middle of the mission. With uncertainties
induced, Monte Carlo simulation was done for 10,000 test cases.
Figure 4.29 depicts the results regarding the mission length for the adaptation parame-
ter. The horizontal axis is the adaptation parameter values that randomly chosen in each test
case. The vertical axis is the mission lengths left when the faults occurred. For instance,
data points drawn at the top area of the plot imply that faults began early in the mission,
leaving long mission distances. The color code distinguishes between successful (blue) and
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Figure 4.29: Adaptation parameter vs. mission length
failure (red) cases. The faulty hovercraft was not able to reach the final destination when
the mission length left was long. Also, the higher the adaptation parameter value was, the
longer the mission length was extended. With this plot, one can say that if 40 meters of the
mission length is left when the thrust motor fault mode is detected, 30 or higher should be
chosen for the adaptation parameter.
Note that mission success and failure was clearly distinguished at smaller adaptation
values than greater ones. For instance, at around 80 of the adaptation value and 65 of the
mission length left after fault, there seem to be success cases just as much as failure cases.
It means that mission lengths were prone to uncertainties at larger adaptation values.
According to Experiment 1, a longer mission time was inevitable to extend the mission
length. Figure 4.30 shows the same pattern as Experiment 1. The larger the adaptation
parameter value was chosen, the more the mission time was required. The color-coding
legend means where the fault occurred during the mission. For example, blue dots are cases
where the fault occurred early (0-16 meters away from the starting point) in the mission.
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Figure 4.30: Adaptation parameter vs. mission time
They are cases where the adaptation parameter values affect the most.
Figure 4.30 also showed higher variances at large adaptation values than low values.
4.4.1 Summary of Experiment 2
Results of Experiment 2 supported Hypothesis 2. It showed that the proposed adapta-
tion parameter results in long-term mission capability adjustment. In the hovercraft test
scenario, mission success/failure (mission length) and mission time were observed by in-
ducing the thrust motor fault mode at any point in the waypoint following mission. In order
to test Hypothesis 2, different levels of the adaptation parameter were tried once the fault
mode was initiated. Observations were summarized below.
• Observations
1. Faults at an earlier mission phase more likely caused mission failure due to a
higher mission length left.
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Figure 4.31: Overall procedure and test scenarios of Experiment 3
2. Larger values of the adaptation parameter increased the rate of mission success.
3. Larger values of the adaptation parameter increased the mission time.
4. Mission performances were prone to uncertainties at large adaptation values.
4.5 Experiment 3: Reinforcement learning for adaptation parameter optimization
If Experiment 3 shows that RL finds an optimal control strategy in terms of ρR, then RL
can be a candidate as a method of Module 2. Thus, Experiment 3 was designed to examine
the efficacy of RL for Module 2 in the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control
framework.
Figure 4.31 depicts the test procedure of Experiment 3. First, before the RL approach
was tested in the hovercraft example, four different RL methods were tested in the inverted
pendulum example in order to examine the characteristics of each RL method. The four
RL methods were:
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Figure 4.32: Inverted pendulum example
1. Q-learning / SARSA learning
2. Deep Q-Network (DQN) using Neural Network value function approximation
3. Double DQN (DDQN)
4. Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) using NN approximation for both value
and policy (Actor-Critic method)
Based on Test 1, one proper method was chosen and modified for the adaptation pa-
rameter within the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework. Test 2
evaluated the learning behavior of RL and waypoint-following performance of healthy hov-
ercraft. Finally, the right thrust motor fault mode was introduced, and RL-based Module 2
was assessed.
4.5.1 Test 1: RL Applications to the Inverted Pendulum Example
The inverted pendulum problem is a well-known problem in RL. The goal of the problem
is to hold or swing up the pendulum at/to the upright position as depicted in Figure 4.32.
The swing-up task is more challenging to learn the control policy.
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The pendulum model was simulated in Matlab. The pendulum dynamics is shown
below:
Iθ̈ + bθ̇ +mgl sin θ = u (4.24)
where I = ml2 is the inertia, m is the mass, g = 9.81m
s2
is the gravitational acceleration,
l is the pendulum length, b is damping coefficient, and u is the control torque. Table 4.6
shows the pendulum system properties.
Since RL is a model-free optimal control method, the dynamics equation was only used
for simulations producing state measurements. The state measurement, then, were used to
evaluate rewards at each learning time.




, and one input, u ⊂ [−2, 2], were used
in the RL formulation. Test cases were run for 2,400 simulation steps per each episode.
Simulation step size was set to 0.05 seconds.
Q-learning
Since Q-learning is the most stable algorithm in RL, the swing-up task was tested. The
initial condition for the swing-up task was:
θ (0) = 0
θ̇ (0) = 0
(4.25)
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Continuous states were discretized into 40,401 state features. A pair of two states is
one state feature. Continuous action was discretized into 5 actions: [−2,−1, 0, 1, 2].
In this example, the reward was set as shown in Eq. 4.26 and 4.27. Since it was a
negative reward, it was a cost. R (t) was composed of quadratic costs based on deviations
from the desired state, [π, 0]. Rbonus was a reward when the states were close enough to the
desired state.
R (t) = − (θ (t)− π)2 − 0.25× θ̇2 (t) +Rbonus (4.26)
Rbonus = 100, if (θ − π)2 + θ̇ < 0.01
Rbonus = 0, otherwise
(4.27)
Table 4.7 is a partial result of the Q-value table for the pendulum example. Each row
represents different state features: a state combination of θ and θ̇. There are 40,401 rows
in total. Columns are for each different action choice. The body of the table is a Q-value
for each action. For instance, the fourth action (1) has the best Q-value (17.53) for the first
row of the state feature.
The value, not the Q-value, is the best Q-value for each state feature. Figure 4.33
showed the converged value function on a 2-D state space. Different color codes represent
values for each state feature; dark blue is low value, and bright yellow is high value. The
value function clearly shows that the states around [π, 0], which was the goal condition,
have the highest value. The initial condition scored a low value as expected.
DQN
Both cases of holding and swinging up to the upright position were tested with DQN. The
reward design was the same as the Q-learning test case as Eq. 4.26. Five input choices
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Table 4.7: Q-value table (partial)
Actions








-19.57 -19.08 -18.41 17.53 -19.10
-11.30 -19.41 -18.43 -17.61 -16.71
-16.54 -13.63 -16.49 -13.00 -13.96
-15.94 -14.03 -14.19 -15.04 -12.04
-13.11 -6.81 -13.18 -14.56 -14.13
-11.57 -10.33 -10.75 0.60 -10.49
-9.27 -11.50 -9.89 -9.73 -0.81
-6.67 44.10 -10.72 -5.51 -5.12
-5.37 -6.55 4.19 -4.26 -4.36
0.57 -9.12 -4.00 -4.85 -4.24
-5.14 19.29 -6.08 -4.27 -5.62
1.46 -4.88 -5.78 -4.92 -4.99
0.74 -6.08 -4.75 -4.77 -4.89
Figure 4.33: Converged value function for swing-up by Q-Learning
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Figure 4.34: Multiple NN (left) vs. Single NN (right)
were set up, either.
The stochastic two-hidden-layer NN was used for the value function approximation:
10 nodes per each hidden layer. In order to optimize NN weights, Adam’s method was
implemented for the step size. For activation functions, hyper-tangent and linear functions
were used. There are two options: one using multiple NN approximation functions for
each control action, and the other using a single NN approximation with multiple outputs
for control actions. Figure 4.34 illustrates the two options for the value approximation with
NN.
Figure 4.35 shows the value function for holding upright position case with multiple
NN functions. The color coding looked similar to the Q-learning test case. Figure 4.36
explains the performance of learning, correspondingly. The x-axis is a sequence of training
episode. The y-axis is the number of counts that the bonus reward, Rbonus, got 100. The
higher, the better. As shown in Figure 4.36, DQN was able to learn the optimal control
strategy from around the 300th episode and converged after the 360th episode.
Figure 4.37 and 4.38 are test results for the swing-up problem with multiple NN func-
tions. The color coding for the value looked similar to the Q-learning result, but the learning
for the control policy was not successful. The general trend seemed to converge, but it kept
coming back to fail repeatedly.
From Figure 4.39 to 4.42 are the results where a single NN was used for the value
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Figure 4.35: Learned value function for holding upright position by DQN (multiple NN)
Figure 4.36: Learning performance for holding upright position by DQN (multiple NN)
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Figure 4.37: Learned value function for swing-up by DQN (multiple NN)
Figure 4.38: Learning performance for swing-up by DQN (multiple NN)
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Figure 4.39: Learned value function for holding upright position by DQN (single NN)
function approximation. Just like the multiple NN cases, the control policy for the holding
upright position task was successfully learned, but the swing-up test case was not success-
ful.
DDQN
This time, the cost, R, was modified as shown in Eq. 4.28. Only the angular position was
the source of the cost. Rbonus was set the same as the previous test cases.
R (t) = − (θ (t)− π)2 +Rbonus (4.28)
With a single NN approximation function, the learning performance was improved sig-
nificantly. Figure 4.44 shows the successful convergence as well as greater counts of the
bonus conditions (over 2,000) than the previous tests.
The test results showed some successful learning behaviors as an optimal control for
dynamic systems in test cases. The first three methods were able to find optimal control
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Figure 4.40: Learning performance for holding upright position by DQN (single NN)
Figure 4.41: Learned value function for swing-up by DQN (single NN)
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Figure 4.42: Learning performance for swing-up by DQN (single NN)
Figure 4.43: Learned value function for swing-up by DDQN (single NN)
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Figure 4.44: Learning performance for swing-up by DDQN (single NN)
paths and corresponding inputs.
However, the test cases also revealed limitations, too. Q-learning and its variants are
mainly formulated in discrete state and action spaces. Thus, scalability can be an issue.
If a particular problem requires to handle continuous state and action spaces with high
dimensionality, it is almost impossible to solve the problem. Also, a control policy is
heavily dependent on reward settings in RL, but it is difficult to find proper reward settings
for desirable system behaviors because the desirable properties do not explicitly represent
the rewards in most cases.
DDPG
The reward, R, was set to be the same as the DDQN experiment. For policy learning, a
deterministic gradient ascent method for actor, µw, was used.
wt+1 = wt +∇wQθ = wt +∇wµw · ∇aQθ (4.29)
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Figure 4.45: Learned value function for holding upright position by DDPG
where∇x is a partial derivative for x.










Figure 4.45 and 4.46 are test results for the holding upright position problem. The
value function is now quite different from the ones from other methods, and an optimal
control strategy was never learned as shown in Figure 4.46: the number of counts that the
pendulum was upright at control time decreased as the training was performed and never
went up to the level where DQN was able to reach (near 2400).
It turned out that the NN approximation for control policy went to the extreme of hy-
perbolic tangent activation function in the output node. It is a well-known problem in NN
approximation. There are no apparent causes of this phenomenon, but there are general
checkpoints: the selection of activation functions, the number of layers and nodes, and
the size of training data. More trials of different combinations of them also did not work,
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Figure 4.46: Learning performance for holding upright position by DDPG
though.
4.5.2 Test 2: RL applications to the nominal (healthy) hovercraft example
In order to test Hypothesis 2-2, learning behaviors of RL were observed, and the hovercraft
waypoint-following test mission evaluated the learned control policy for the adaptation
parameter. For simplicity, a single-waypoint mission was introduced. The mission length
was set to 50 meters. The desired mission performance for the test scenario was to reach
the destination as fast as possible. Since Test 2 runs in nominal hovercraft without fault
induced, there will be no failure cases. However, the complete mission time will indicate
whether the solution is optimal or not. On top of that, since Experiment 2 showed the
impact of the adaptation parameter on mission time, the minimum value of ρR is naturally
expected as an optimal control strategy.
As stated, Q-learning requires discrete state features and actions. The hovercraft ex-
ample, however, is in continuous state and action spaces; thus, the Q-learning was not
applicable due to its scalability limitation. Suppose that five states are introduced: mission
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Figure 4.47: Learning performance for the healthy hovercraft example by DQN
length left, angle to the target, x-directional, y-directional, and angular velocity. If they are
discretized into 50, 30, 30, 30, and 30 levels for each state, then the dimension of the state
feature (combinations of each state) becomes 40,500,500. If an action is discretized into 10
action levels, the size of the Q-table is 40,500,500 × 10. This huge Q-table is not treatable
in RL.
In the DQN approach, on the other hand, there is no limitation in states. The in-
put, on the other hand, needs discretization. Five input dimensions were tried: ρR ∈
[0.1, 1, 10, 50, 100]. Figure 4.47 shows the values in each episode. The light blue line
is the values at each episode, and the bold blue line is a moving average. The general trend
(bold blue line) seemed to be improved and converged, but actual value diverged as the
training was being executed. The consistent result is depicted in Figure 4.48. The y-axis
of the figure is mission complete time for each episode. It was supposed to decrease and
converge over time; rather, it fluctuated over the training episode without converging.
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Figure 4.48: Mission complete time for the healthy hovercraft example by DQN
Finally, the DDQN approach was introduced in the healthy hovercraft example. (DDPG
was not introduced because DDPG was not even successful in the pendulum example.) Up
to the 500th training episode, complete random adaptation parameter values were tried in
order to explore more state-action combination space. Figure 4.49 shows the value conver-
gence over the training episode. After the 500th episode, the value jumped up and showed
clear converging trend till the end. Figure 4.50 represents the complete mission time in
each episode. Considering the setting that the desirable mission capability was minimum
mission complete time, Figure 4.50 also shows the consistent result to the converging be-
havior in Figure 4.49. The complete mission time at episode 4,000 was 245.5 seconds,
which is the fastest mission time. Figure 4.50 also proves that DDQN found the optimal
solution. It shows the minimum setting of the adaptation parameter, 0.1, throughout the
control time steps at the 4, 000th episode. The DDQN approach was successful in finding
an optimal adaptation parameter in the healthy hovercraft example.
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Figure 4.49: Learning performance for the healthy hovercraft example by DDQN
Next test case is to apply the DDQN approach to the faulty hovercraft example. This
last test case of Experiment 3 will prove the efficacy of RL to Module 2.
4.5.3 Test 3: RL applications to the faulty hovercraft example
The last test case in Experiment 3 is to apply the DDQN approach to Module 2 in the faulty
hovercraft example since the DDQN approach showed a satisfactory learning performance
in Test 2.
In Test 3, the hovercraft launched with the right thrust motor fault mode. Initial fault
conditions are the same throughout the training episodes. The mission profile was a straight
line with a single waypoint as demonstrated in Test 2, but the mission lengths were varied
throughout the training episodes to make RL learn the adaptation level for various mission
lengths left.
Figure 4.52, unfortunately, represents the unsuccessful learning performance by over-
laying successful and failure cases for mission lengths against the training episodes. The
blue and red dots are successful and failure cases, respectively. Mission lengths of suc-
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Figure 4.50: Mission complete time for the healthy hovercraft example by DDQN
Figure 4.51: Adaptation parameter value sequence using learned policy for the healthy
hovercraft example by DDQN
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Figure 4.52: Mission success vs. failure over the training episodes for the faulty hovercraft
example by DDQN
cessful cases (blue dots) were slightly elongated over the training, but the DDQN module
did not learn enough to deal with the fault mode. It only had the fault hovercraft to reach
the waypoint for a short range of mission. Moreover, there was no improvement in the
probability of success, even for the short mission ranges.
A part of the reasons that the DDQN-based approach in this example was not successful
was the failure of competent representation of NN value function approximation. As shown
in Figure 4.53, the validation error profile over the training was converged, but it converged
into the unacceptable levels.
As expected, Figure 4.54 depicts the failure of a 50-meter traveling distance mission
with the hovercraft position trajectory with the DDQN approach. The mission failed at
about 20 meters away from the starting point, which is a consistent result to Figure4.52.
Figure 4.55 confirms that the fault level grew to the failure limit.
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Figure 4.53: NN value approximation validation error over the training episodes for the
faulty hovercraft example by DDQN
Figure 4.54: Faulty hovercraft trajectory controlled by the DDQN control policy
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Figure 4.55: Fault level profile over mission time for the faulty hovercraft example by
DDQN
4.5.4 Summary of Experiment 3
Results of Experiment 3 failed to show the applicability of RL method for Module 2 in the
proposed framework. Experiment 3 was designed to see the effectiveness and potentials of
four different popular RL methods - Q-learning, DQN, DDQN, and DDPG - in a simple
inverted pendulum example first, and then applied promising methods to the hovercraft
example afterward. Even though several test cases showed successful implementations of
RL methods to the inverted pendulum and (healthy) hovercraft examples, limitations of RL
were observed as summarized below.
• Observations
1. Q-learning, DQN, and DDQN successfully learned the control policy for the
inverted pendulum problem.
2. There was no noticeable differences between the single NN approximation and
multiple NN approximations for input dimensions.
3. A reward setting was critical to learning performances and control policies.
156
4. DDPG failed to learn the optimal control policy in the pendulum problem be-
cause the NN approximation for policy fell into the extreme.
5. Q-learning was not applicable due to the scalability issue. Discretization of
continuous states and actions resulted in an unmanageably huge Q-table.
6. DQN for the healthy hovercraft problem did not show satisfactory results.
7. DDQN for the healthy hovercraft problem did show the successful convergence
and optimal control policy for the adaptation parameter.
8. DDQN for the faulty hovercraft problem failed to learn optimal adaptation pa-
rameter values due to high validation errors in NN approximation.
4.6 Experiment 4: Simulation-based mission capability prediction modeling and op-
timization
If Experiment 4 shows that simulation-based long-term mission capability modeling and
optimization approach finds an optimal control strategy in terms of ρR and make the hov-
ercraft reach the destination in the presence of a critical fault mode, then simulation-based
long-term mission capability modeling and optimization approach can be a candidate for
Module 2.
According to Experiment 2, the maximum traveling distance available is the most vul-
nerable long-term mission capability in the presence of the thrust motor fault mode from
the hovercraft problem. The vehicle speed is the system performance that is sacrificed by
the adaptation parameter.
Figure 4.56 depicts the overall procedure of Experiment 4. First, two essential elements
for Module 2 were built: the long-term mission capability prediction model and an opti-
mization module. The mission for the hovercraft was to travel a straight path as long as
possible. The mission time was also constrained by 30 minutes. The maximum distances
available for states and the adaptation parameter were obtained from the Monte Carlo sim-
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Figure 4.56: Overall procedure and test scenario of Experiment 4
ulations. Then, The maximum distances available were approximated by two-layer NN.
This regression function was used in the optimization process during the operations under
the presence of the fault mode. Given the observations from Experiment 2, a zero-crossing
finding problem was introduced to find a minimum adaptation parameter for the optimiza-
tion routine because the complete mission time and the adaptation parameter is positively
correlated with each other.
Based on Module 2 developed, the test case was set up to examine the effectiveness
of the adaptation parameter optimization. The main focus of the test was to compare the
probability of mission success between two scenarios: with vs. without adaptation.
For simplicity, the fault growth rate was assumed to be a function of control input. The
fault growth model that was used in Experiment 4 is shown below:
ẋf (t) = 0.0025× u (t)2 (4.31)
where u is an input, specifically an input voltage, Vin, from Eq. 4.2.
Figure 4.57 represents traveling distances available (y-axis) against the states of the
fault (x-axis) ranging from 1.26 (healthy) to 100 ohms (failure.) Different color codes are
for different adaptation parameter values. In this result, the more significant fault levels,
the shorter traveling distances available. Also, the larger the adaptation parameters, the
longer traveling distances available in general. However, a plateau area was shown up at
158
Figure 4.57: Distance available vs. fault level by ρR
ρR = 100. It was because they reached the mission time limit as shown in Figure 4.58.
As observed in Experiment 2, Figure 4.58 also confirms that the operation time and the
adaptation parameter has a positive correlation in this scenario.
Figure 4.59 shows the histogram of traveling distances available at the fault state, xf ∈
(27.5, 29.5) (ohms) by the adaptation parameters. It demonstrates not only the extension of
traveling distance available but also increases of variances by higher adaptation parameters.
It is closely relevant to the slow vehicle speed and the increase in operating time. The longer
the vehicle operates, the more prone to noises the system performances get.
With a Gaussian distribution assumption, the average and standard deviation of the
maximum traveling distance available were regressed by NN for xf and ρR. The regression
was done in SAS JMP Pro 14.1.0. (In this specific example, the traveling distance available
was not dependent on system states, x.) Two hidden-layer NN models were used. The first
layer close to the input nodes had six activation nodes: three linear and three hyperbolic
tangent functions. The second layer close to the output layer used three linear activation
functions. Figure 4.60 shows the quality of the regression. The average prediction was
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Figure 4.58: Operation time vs. fault level by ρR
Figure 4.59: Histogram of traveling distance available @ the fault level, 28.5 ± 1 ohms
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able to be regressed accurately, whereas the standard deviation was not as accurate as the
average model.
The regression models were drawn on top of their histograms in Figure 4.61. The
regressions may not be perfect but seemed good enough to represent the traveling distance
available considering system noises.
For the optimization module, a zero-crossing problem was solved since the correlation
between the adaptation parameter and the operating time was identified. Equation 4.32
represents the problem to be solved in the optimization step in Module 2 for this example.
For the zero-crossing problem, Brent’s method was applied. Brent’s method is a numerical
root-finding algorithm using bisection, secant, and inverse quadratic interpolation methods
[103].
dist.α (xf , ρR) = dist.req. + buffer (4.32)
where
dist.α = µdist.avail.
(xf , ρR)− zα · σdist.avail.
(4.33)
µdist.avail.
is a traveling distance available, α is a confidence level, zα is a standard-z
value for α, dist.req. is a mission distance left, and buffer is a buffer distance for reserve.
The buffer was set to 3 meters.
4.6.1 Test Case: With adaptation vs. no adaptation
In order to compare two cases with or without adaptation capability, a test scenario de-
signed. A mission profile is a straight path with a single waypoint, which is 200 meters
apart from the starting point. The mission is complete when the hovercraft reached within
a 3-meter range around the waypoint coordinate. A thrust fault mode happens at 70 meters
away from the starting point. A default value of ρR is 0.1, which is the setting for the
hovercraft to move fastest. It was assumed that a fault state is perfectly known.
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Figure 4.60: NN regression on traveling distance available with respect to xf and ρR
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Figure 4.61: Gaussian distribution models of traveling distance available by adaptation
parameters laid over histograms
Figure 4.62 shows the effects of the adaptation on system performances and long-term
mission capability. The top plot is the predicted distributions of the distance available at the
onset of fault. The solid orange curve is the distribution of the predicted distance available
if ρR was kept at 0.1, and the orange dashed vertical line is the actual position where the
system failed. On the other hand, the solid blue curve is the prediction of the distance
available when the adaptation was active (when Brent’s method solved the zero-crossing
problem.) The solid red vertical line is the destination position.
The second plot is the fault level progression profiles over time. The orange line is the
case without adaptation, and it reached the failure limit at around 400 seconds. The blue
line is the case with adaptation, and it shows that the fault level did not hit the failure limit
when the hovercraft reached the destination.
The third plot is the corresponding adaptation parameter profiles. The orange line was
set to constant at 0.1 without adaptation, and the blue line varied over time by the adaptation
module. The adaptation profile shows a relatively smooth decrease up to 650 seconds. It
163
Figure 4.62: With adaptation vs. no adaptation
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implies a conservative adaptation at first due to a high prediction variance at the beginning.
After 650 seconds, the adaptation parameter varied aggressively because the controller
drove hovercraft harder as it got close to the destination range.
The bottom plot shows the distance traveled on y-axis over time. As it is displayed,
the vehicle speed (slope of the curve) with adaptation decreased significantly, whereas
there was no difference in speed without adaptation. This again implies that the immediate
recovery module (Module 1) in this framework works as AFTCS in that the operating point
comes back to the design operating point under the presence of a fault mode, but the long-
term mission capability module (Module 2) determines a new operating point to extend the
vulnerable long-term mission capability.
4.6.2 Summary of Experiment 4
Results of Experiment 4 succeeded in showing the online adaptation of ρR by simulation-
based mission capability modeling and optimization approach within the proposed frame-
work. Experiment 4 tested the proposed simulation-based mission capability modeling and
optimization method for long-term mission capability recovery by the hovercraft waypoint-
following problem. Experiment 4 covered the modeling and optimization procedure and
compared the case scenarios with and without the long-term mission capability adaptation.
The results clearly show the effectiveness of the proposed method in the online long-term
mission capability extension and the improvement of the probability of success under the
presence of a fault mode.
• Observations
1. A statistical model for long-term mission capability provided robust prediction
concerning uncertainty.
2. At the early adaptation, a conservative level of adaptation was observed.
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3. A long-term mission capability adaptation effectively extended the vulnerable
mission capability.
4. Module 2 with the proposed simulation-based long-term mission capability
modeling and optimization routine determined a new desirable operating point
in the presence of a fault, whereas Module 1 recovered the degraded operating
point to the desired operating point.
5. System performance was sacrificed as a new operating point was determined.
4.7 Experiment 5: Hypothesis test for Module 3 (Particle filtering-based fault diag-
nosis)
Up to Experiment 4, it was assumed that the fault detection and the state of fault were
perfectly done and known. In reality, there is no such scenario. Therefore, Module 3 in-
cludes a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis approach to detect a fault mode and estimate
fault levels correctly. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis
approach uses both a fault growth model and measurement data; thus, an incorrect fault
growth model may degrade the overall quality of fault diagnosis. By recalling Research
Question 3-1 and Hypothesis 3-1,
• Research Question 3-1: How to improve the performance of the particle filtering-
based fault diagnosis routine when a fault growth model is unknown?
• Hypothesis 3-1: If online fault growth model estimation is introduced, performance
of the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis will be improved when a fault growth
pattern is unknown.
Experiment 5 was designed to test whether the detection of a fault mode would be
affected by the accuracy of the fault growth model. If Experiment 5 shows that online
fault growth model estimation improves detection time and fault state estimation by using
a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis, then it will support Hypothesis 3-1.
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Figure 4.63: Overall procedure and test scenario of Experiment 5
An electrical motor described in Section 4.1 in this chapter was used as a test applica-
tion. This motor model is the same motor model that was used in simulations of Experiment
3 and 4 and will be used in Experiment 6 and 7, too. The fault feature was obtained by Eq.
4.12. Measurement noises were assumed to follow Gaussian distributions as shown in Eq.
4.34. Figure 4.63 describes the overview of Experiment 5.
Rm (t) =
Vin (t)− keΩ (t)
Ω2 (t) · b
kt
(4.12 revisited)
Ω ∼ N (0, 1)
Vin ∼ N (0, 0.03)
(4.34)
Figure 4.64 shows a baseline fault feature (bottom) along with the control input voltage
(top), corresponding motor shaft angular velocity (middle) profiles. According to Eq. 4.12,
Ω is in the denominator. It means that if there is no or very weak input signals, Vin, then
the fault feature will diverge. The red circles in Figure 4.64 clearly show this phenomenon.
It is natural because a fault can be seen only when the faulty system is running unless the
system is stripped down for maintenance.
In this regard, the variance of fault feature varies against the control input, Vin. Figure
4.65 and Figure 4.66 show the feature data against Vin and fault feature in pdf, respectively.
In the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis module, therefore, used different baseline
statistics based on Vin. The fault feature was not estimated if Vin < 1.
Having the baseline statistics, an insulation degradation fault mode was induced at 600
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Figure 4.64: Input signal, measurement, and fault feature for baseline
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Figure 4.65: Fault feature baseline variances with respect to Vin
Figure 4.66: Fault feature baseline pdf by three different ranges of Vin
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Figure 4.67: Particle filtering-based fault diagnosis result with the accurate fault growth
model
seconds. The simulated fault growth model was the same model that was used in Experi-
ment 4:
ẋf (t) = 0.0025× u (t)2 (4.31 revisited)
xf is the right motor resistance, Rm, and u is the control input voltage, Vin.
Figure 4.67 is the results of the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis routine. The top
plot shows the raw fault feature (green), estimate (black), and the actual fault level over
time. The estimate was not bothered by the noisy raw signals. The bottom plot represents
the confidence of the fault presence (blue line.) The red straight line is the 90 percent
confidence level, which is the fault detection threshold in this example. In this test case,
the fault was detected at 603 seconds.
Figure 4.68 shows pdfs of baseline and estimate before (the left plot recorded at 525
seconds) and after (the right recorded as soon as the fault was detected) fault. Before
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Figure 4.68: Baseline vs. estimate pdfs before detection (left) and right after detection
(right)
the fault occurred, the majority of the fault estimate pdf overlapped with the baseline pdf,
which implies the condition at 525 seconds was not distinguished from the healthy state.
At 603 seconds, the estimate pdf was away from the baseline, indicating that statistically
100 percent certain that the condition deviated from the healthy condition.
4.7.1 Test: Correct model vs. incorrect models
Incorrect fault growth models were introduced in the same particle filtering-based fault
diagnosis routine. The simulated accurate growth model is Eq. 4.31 again. The incorrect
models are:
1. Model 1: Ṙm (t) = 0.0125 · V 2in (t)
2. Model 2: Ṙm (t) = 0.0005 · V 2in (t)
3. Model 3: Ṙm (t) = V 2in (t)
4. Model 4: Ṙm (t) = 0.02 · Vin (t)
5. Model 5: Ṙm (t) = 0.1
Fault growth model 1 and 3 are faster growth rates than the simulated model. Model 2
is slower. Model 4 and 5, on the other hand, had even different fault growth patterns.
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Figure 4.69: Fault detection time comparisons with respect to fault growth model accuracy
Figure 4.69 shows histograms of fault detection time. Figure 4.70 is cdfs of fault detec-
tion time. Even though the models were quite different from the correct one in the growth
rates and patterns, the fault detection times for each model were not that different from the
detection time by the correct model.
Although the fault detection time was not significantly affected by the accuracy of the
fault growth model, fault state estimation could be substantially impaired. Figure 4.71
shows the fault estimation profiles over time when each incorrect fault growth model was
used in the particle filtering-based diagnosis routine. Model 1 and 4 showed slight devia-
tions from the actual fault levels. Model 3 caused significant errors for certain period times.
It led the conclusion that online fault growth dynamics identification is necessary after all.
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Figure 4.70: Fault detection time comparisons with respect to fault growth model accuracy
(CDF)
4.7.2 Summary of Experiment 5
Results of Experiment 5 supported Hypothesis 3-1 by showing that online fault growth
model estimation improves the performance of a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis
approach. Various fault growth models were introduced in the particle filtering-based fault
diagnosis routine and compared the fault detection and estimation performances with each
other. Although the fault detection time was not significantly affected by the inaccurate
models, there seemed to be a chance that the fault level estimation could be significantly
impaired. The observations from Experiment 5 were summarized below:
• Observations
1. A particle filtering-based fault diagnosis routine provided a statistical measure
of fault detection and fault level estimation.
2. A fault growth model did not significantly delay the fault detection time.
3. The test showed that the accuracy of the fault growth model did affect the qual-
ity of fault level estimation.
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Figure 4.71: Fault state estimation comparisons with respect to fault growth model accu-
racy
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Figure 4.72: Overall procedure and test scenario of Experiment 6
4.8 Experiment 6: Hypothesis test for Module 3 (CBR)
The fault growth model affects not only the fault level estimation but also the long-term
mission capability significantly. Therefore, knowing the fault growth model is critical to
the adaptation for long-term mission capability in Module 2. If Experiment 6 shows that
CBR results in long-term mission capability prediction model, which matches the actual
mission capability, then it will support Hypothesis 3-2.
Based on Research Question 3-2 and Hypothesis 3-2, Experiment 6 was designed to test
the performance of CBR in Module 3. Three fault growth models were set up for cases in
CBR. Then, an online regression module for fault growth model coefficients was developed.
Based on the cases and online regression capability, case identification performance was
observed. Finally, CBR reasoning results were compared to the simulation data. Figure
4.72 depicts the overall steps of Experiment 6.
• Research Question 3-2: How to predict mission capability for Module 2 when a
new fault growth model is identified? → CBR
• Hypothesis 3-2: If a new fault growth model is detected, CBR will be able to produce
reasonable mission capability prediction.
Figure 4.73 shows three different simple fault growth models that were included in the
case-base. Obviously, with the same control input profile, three different models resulted
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in different fault growth patterns. It was assumed that the fault growth model structures are
the same for the same fault mode.
Estimation of fault growth model coefficients cannot be deterministic because of mea-
surement and process noises. Considering the stochasticity, cases were formulated based
on the statistic model parameters. Gaussian distributions were assumed. Figure 4.74 shows
the coefficient distributions for each module.
4.8.1 Test 1: Case identification
The case identification performance was tested in Test 1 based on the cases and online es-
timation module. Figure 4.75 is the online estimation of the fault growth model coefficient
and case detection results. The left and right columns are when Ṙm = 0.0025 · V 2in and
Ṙm = 0.0005 · V 2in were simulated, respectively. The first row is the progression of fault
states, the second is coefficient estimation history, the third is the coefficient estimation
error profile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth are the detection confidence for Case 1, Case 2, and
Case 3, respectively. Due to the fault growth model estimation, fault levels were estimated
correctly. Also, as shown in the detection confidence, the case identification was correctly
made in this example; Ṙm = 0.0025 · V 2in was identified as Case 2, and Ṙm = 0.0025 · V 2in
was identified as Case 3.
Note that at the early phase of the coefficient estimation of the fault growth model, the
errors appeared larger than later. The fault growth can only be seen after the fault occurred;
thus, small sample size at the early phase made significant errors. The errors made the
detection delays in the case identification. The impact of this delay needs to be tested in
Experiment 7.
4.8.2 Test 2: CBR-based reasoning about long-term mission capability
Test 2 introduced a different coefficient from ones in the case-base. As described in Chapter
3, Shepard’s interpolation method was used as a solution transformation rule. Figure 4.76
176
Figure 4.73: Different fault growth models
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Figure 4.74: Coefficient distributions for each model
shows the comparisons between CBR-based prediction results and simulation data. The
induced fault growth model was Ṙm = 0.0035·V 2in. The CBR results indicate the reasonable
predictions in terms of the mean and standard deviation of traveling distance available.
4.8.3 Summary of Experiment 6
Results of Experiment 6 supported Hypothesis 3-2. It showed that Case-Based Reasoning
could suggest mission capability prediction for a new fault growth model. Three cases were
built in the case-base. By the online estimation of the fault growth model coefficient, state
levels and case identifications were done successfully. Based on the case identification, if
there are no matching cases, CBR reasoned about the long-term mission capability from
cases. The observations are summarized below:
• Observations
1. The online estimation module successfully did the estimation of the fault growth
model coefficient, and it helped the case identification.
2. Large estimation errors of fault growth model coefficient were observed in the
early phase of the estimation.
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Figure 4.75: Online case identification
179
Figure 4.76: CBR Prediction Results by ρR: red dots are CBR results and blue dots are
simulation data.
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3. The estimation errors in the early phase of the estimation delayed the case iden-
tification.
4.9 Experiment 7: Hypothesis test for the whole framework
Experiment 7 is the final test set, verifying the efficacy of the integrated framework. If
Experiment 7 shows that the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control frame-
work increases the probability of mission success for severer fault threat levels, then it
will support Hypothesis 4 in that the proposed framework improves system resilience in
a consequence perspective. According to Research Question 4-1, 4-2, and Hypothesis 4,
two test sets were designed: Test 1 was to examine the efficacy of the proposed adaptation
by the degradations at the electrical thrust motor insulation, and Test 2 was to observe the
computation time as a reference of real-time applicability.
• Research Question 4-1: Will the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable con-
trol framework improve system resilience?
• Hypothesis 4: If the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework
is applied, system resilience will be improved in terms of the probability of mission
success in the presence of a critical fault.
• Research Question 4-2: Will the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable con-
trol framework be applied to real-time control application?
4.9.1 Test 1: system resilience improvement
Test 1 induced an artificial fault in the hovercraft example. The mission was a single-
waypoint following task. The waypoints were 200 meters. To observe the improvement
of the probability of success, the same fault mode (an electrical thrust motor insulation
degradation) with the same fault growth model, Ṙm = 0.0025 · V 2in, was induced at dif-
ferent locations with or without the proposed adaptation in Monte-Carlos simulations. As
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Figure 4.77: Probability of success against the relative position that the thrust fault mode
started away from the starting point
mission lengths were the most vulnerable mission capability in this scenario, the initial lo-
cations that a fault occurred determined the severity of the fault. Therefore, in this way, the
consequences were observed by varying the threat levels in general senses.
Figure 4.77 shows a significant improvement in the probability of success by the pro-
posed reconfigurable control framework. The blue and red dots represent with and without
the adaptation. The case without the adaptation maintained the adaptation parameter at
0.1. As a result, the case with the adaptation covered around 80 meters more than the case
without the adaptation. It was about 40 percent of the mission length.
182
Table 4.8: Computation time statistics
Module Mean (sec.) Min (sec.) Max (sec.)
Fault Growth Model Estimation 6.3830e-5 1.0090e-6 0.0034
MPC-DDP 0.0074 0.0062 0.0556
Fault Diagnosis 0.0052 0.0044 0.0116
Adaptation optimization 0.0024 1.0085e-5 0.0382
CBR 0.0021 0.0018 0.0055
4.9.2 Test 2: Computation time
A final piece of the test is to observe the computation time of the entire process. The
simulation was performed in Matlab on a regular laptop computer. Computation times of
each module were summarized in Table 4.8.
MPC-DDP took the most time on average: 43 percent of the total computation time.
The performance of MPC-DDP appeared to drive the total computation time. The maxi-
mum calculation time happened at the very first calculations, so it did not affect too much
of the entire computation time.
The mean total computational time was 0.0172 sec. Considering the simulation envi-
ronment, which was a regular laptop and the Matlab, 0.0172 seconds is not a considerable
computation time. It would be shortened in a dedicated computation board with an efficient
software package.
4.9.3 Summary of Experiment 7
Results of Experiment 7 supported Hypothesis 4-1 by showing that the proposed resilience-
enhanced reconfigurable control framework improves the probability of mission success in
the presence of a critical fault mode. The improvement of the probability of success showed
its effectiveness and potentials of the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control
framework. Observations of Experiment 7 were listed below:
• Observations
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Table 4.9: Experiments, hypotheses, and modules
Experiment Hypothesis Module
Experiment 1 Hypothesis 1 Module 1
Experiment 2 Hypothesis 2 Module 2
Experiment 3 Test for RL Module 2
Experiment 4 Test for simulation-based approach Module 2
Experiment 5 Hypothesis 3-1 Module 3
Experiment 6 Hypothesis 3-2 Module 3
Experiment 7 Hypothesis 4 Framework
1. Probability of success with respect to the severity of a fault mode was improved
by the long-term mission capability recovery in Module 2.
2. Computation time shows the potentials of the proposed framework in real-time
applications.
3. The longest computation time only happened once at the very first computation
for each module. Mainly because initialization took the majority of the time.
4.10 Summary
Chapter 4 described the experimentation plans based on research questions and hypothe-
ses derived in Chapter 3 and tested each module & the integrated framework. The main
testbed was under-actuated hovercraft. The introduced critical fault mode was an electrical
thrust motor insulation degradation, which causes the loss of thrust effectiveness and con-
trol asymmetry eventually. In total, seven experiments were performed. Table 4.9 summa-
rized experiments, hypotheses, and relevant modules of the framework. Test results helped
decide the selection between alternative methods and showed the efficacy and applicability




Chapter 5 describes a design methodology of the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfig-
urable control framework. Of course, a reconfigurable controller itself is specialized to a
given mission and a specific system application, but the design procedure should be gen-
eralized so that the proposed framework is designed to improve the resilience of general
dynamical system applications.
Figure 5.1 depicts an overview of an offline design procedure by laying out sequential
and parallel design steps in the bottom half of the figure. Color shades of the boxes - yellow,
blue, and red - represent functional modules, corresponding to the elements in the online
operation feedback structure in the top half of the figure. The design procedure comes from
an integration of the design procedures of each module.
5.1 Design procedure of each module
The proposed technical approach was built upon a set of assumptions, as described in Chap-
ter 3. Especially, assumptions for knowns define necessary elements that a design proce-
dure has to elaborate for the proposed framework. Table 5.1 revisits the assumptions about
knowns and categorizes them into which module requires to know them.
5.1.1 Module 1: MPC-DDP
Ultimately, a design of MPC-DDP is to find adequate cost coefficients, K, Kf , and R,








































Table 5.1: Assumptions and relevant modules
Assumptions (Known) Categories
1. Mission and mission requirements are known.
2. The most superior mission capabilities are known.
3. Critical failure modes and corresponding common fault modes for
a given system are identified.
4. Vulnerable mission capabilities due to fault modes are known.
5. System dynamics models are known and reasonably accurate.
6. Fault features are known and selected for each fault mode accord-
ingly. → Fault features can isolate a fault mode from others.
7. Impact of fault levels on system performances and states are iden-
tifiable.
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= F (x (t) , xf (t) , u (t))
dxf
dt
= Ff (xf (t) , sf (t))
sf (t) = Fs (u (t) , t)
g (x (t) , u (t)) ≤ 0
(3.2 revisited)
l (x (t) , u (t) , t) =
1
2
(x (t)− r (t))T K (x (t)− r (t)) + ρR ·
1
2
u (t)T Ru (t)
(3.3 revisited)
Since MPC-DDP is a model-based optimal control method, system dynamics must be
identified before designing a controller. As shown in Experiment 1, fault states and their
impact need to be modeled correctly in order to guarantee trajectory recovery in the pres-
ence of a critical fault mode. Critical fault modes are assumed to be known, and it will
be addressed in a design procedure for Module 3. Then, cost coefficients are tuned based
on mission profile, mission desirability, and requirements. This set of design steps for
MPC-DDP derives four building blocks:
• Mission requirement analysis
• Fault impact analysis
• System dynamics modeling
• MPC-DDP development (determining K, Kf , and R)
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5.1.2 Module 2: Simulation-based long-term mission capability modeling and optimization
From the design procedure for Module 2, an online optimization routine needs to be de-
veloped as a function of an adaptation parameter and system/fault states. As defined in
Chapter 3, the optimization problem that Module 2 solves is:
max
ρR(t)
J (x (t) , xf (t) , ρ (t)) (3.5 revisited)
MC (x (t) , xf (t) , ρR (t)) ≥MCreq. (3.6 revisited)
This formulation indicates that the most superior mission capability needs to be deter-
mined, and vulnerable mission capabilities due to a critical fault mode should be defined.
In order to develop the mission capabilities for the optimization problem, a simulation
environment is required. The simulation environment includes system dynamics, fault
scenarios, mission profiles, an acceptable adaptation parameter range, and a level of un-
certainties/noises. In order to come up with robust predictions, Monte Carlo simulation
is performed with discrete levels of an adaptation parameter so that long-term mission ca-
pabilities are modeled by statistical parameters. Finally, a long-term mission capability
optimizer is developed by an optimization approach. A selection of the optimization ap-
proach depends on objective and constraint functions defined. These design steps lead three
design steps in addition to the ones for Module 1:
• Simulation environment development
• Long-term mission capability modeling
• Long-term mission capability optimizer development
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Figure 5.2: Particle filtering-based fault diagnosis and failure prognosis [33]
5.1.3 Module 3: Particle filtering-based fault diagnosis and CBR
Design for Module 3 builds a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis routine and CBR.
Figure 5.2 depicts general design steps for a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis. It
requires fault modes on interest and their growth models. Based on data or physics-based
knowledge, fault features are defined by fault feature extraction and mapping techniques.
These knowledge are foundations of the particle filtering-based diagnosis routine.
• Critical fault/failure mode analysis
• Fault feature extraction and selection
• Fault growth dynamics modeling
• Particle filtering-based fault diagnosis routine development
CBR requires to build two elements: case-base and solution transformation rule. Chap-
ter 3 describes how cases are established. By determining knowledge vocabulary, a case
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is defined by a problem-solution pair. Assuming that typical fault growth dynamics mod-
els are identifiable, model coefficients are signatures of a problem and long-term mission
capability is a solution. It derives two building blocks for the design procedure:
• CBR casebase development
• CBR solution transformation rule development
5.2 Design procedure of the resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework
The overall design methodology for the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable con-
trol framework is a collection of design procedures of each module identified in the previ-
ous section.
Step 1: Mission requirements analysis
The mission requirement analysis step helps specify a set of requirements that systems
performing the mission must satisfy. It needs to be able to define mission goals, mission
constraints, resources, and operating conditions. For complicated systems, Systems En-
gineering (SE) or Requirement Engineering (RE) disciplines guide systematic approaches
and processes as general requirement definition and analysis processes [104].
• Requirement Engineering [104]
1. Requirements definition and gathering: define top-level requirements and goals
2. Requirements analysis: refines the top-level requirements such that require-
ments can be prioritized
3. Requirements prioritization: handles the conflict of requirements
4. Requirements flow-down: helps define system and subsystem-level require-
ments
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The proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework also requires to
define mission requirements when the system is degenerating due to the presence of a crit-
ical fault mode during the operation. It may lead to changes in requirements prioritization.
Step 2: Critical fault/failure modes analysis
Critical fault and failure modes need to be identified based on a system specification.
Usually, functional and physical decomposition helps reveal each subsystem, component,
and their interconnections. Popular tools for health management are Failure Modes and
Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [22, 23], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [105], Proba-
bilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) [106], or Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) [107].
As discussed in Chapter 2, the criticality of fault and failure modes can be defined by
its inherent severity or impact on system performances and frequency of happening.
Once the critical fault and failure modes are identified and listed, their fault features
need to be defined.
Step 3: Fault feature extraction and selection
A fault feature is a processed signal efficiently representing fault characteristics and
state of health in a reduced dimension comparing to measurements [25]. Features can
be in time, frequency, or time-frequency domains. Fault feature extraction and selection is
viewed as a transformation process from data to information and information to knowledge.
Useful fault features have the following attributes [25]:
1. Computationally inexpensive to measure
2. Mathematically definable
3. Explainable in physical terms
4. Characterized by large interclass mean distance and small interclass variance
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5. Insensitive to extraneous variables
6. Uncorrelated with other features
There is no generic way of the feature selection method that applies to every fault
mode; i.e., the fault selection is application-dependent. However, there are general changes
in system properties when a fault occurs in a system [25]:






There are briefly two ways in fault feature extraction: data-driven and system/parameter
identification approaches. Specific methods were described in [25].
Step 4: Fault impact analysis
Since the proposed resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework involves a
model-based optimal control routine (Module 1), an accurate system dynamics model is
required. In this sense, the impact of fault levels on system states and performances need
to be identified.
If the fault feature is based on system or parameter identification process, the impact
will be easily modeled in system dynamics equations. The hovercraft example in Chapter 4
used such a feature. The actual fault mode was insulation degradation, but the fault feature
was represented by armature coil resistance.
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If data-driven approaches generate fault features, mapping from the selected features to
fault levels and from fault levels to the effects on system dynamics are required. Sometimes,
the impact is not much on system dynamics itself, but on the quality of performances such
as vibrations or comforts. If the impact is on system dynamics and it is properly modeled,
then MPC-DDP module will handle it. If the impact is on the quality of system perfor-
mances, system performance bounds should regulate the progression of the fault level.
Step 5: Fault growth modeling
Fault growth modeling is one of the critical parts of the resilience-enhanced reconfig-
urable control design methodology. Fault growth models have significant effects on fault
state estimation in a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis routine (Module 3) and long-
term mission capability prediction & optimization (Module 2).
Fault growth model can be expressed in a general form as shown in Eq. 3.2:
ẋf = Ff (xf , sf ) (3.2 revisited)
Finding a specific mathematical model of a fault mode can be done by system identi-
fication approach. System identification is to find a mathematical model, which fits best
to data. System identification uses statistical tools to build input-output relationships from
measured data [108]. There are briefly two different approaches:
1. Grey box model: A model structure can be derived by physical relationships between
inputs and outputs or expert knowledge. Data determine free parameters.
2. Black box model: Everything is unknown. The black box model approach only relies
on data.
As a black box model, symbolic regression can be a promising method for system
identification. Symbolic regression finds not only model parameters but also the best model
structure [109]. Eureqa is a symbolic regression-based modeling engine [110].
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Now, as fault growth models are known, and the fault impact analysis is performed, Step
1 might need to be re-iterated to identify mission requirements and prioritization under the
presence of critical fault modes.
Step 6: System dynamics modeling
A system dynamics model is also a cornerstone of the proposed framework. The dy-
namics model is used in the MPC-DDP optimal control routine online to find optimal con-
trol input sequences at every control time. Experiment 1 proved that the accuracy of the
system dynamics model has a significant impact on system control performances, and the
inaccuracy may even cause catastrophic failure.
System dynamics modeling is often based on physics-based analytical derivations in
state space. Model parameters come from system properties and characteristics. Some-
times, however, analytical relationships may not be known. Then, as described in Step
5, the system identification routine should be performed for the system dynamics model
again.
Step 7: Particle filtering-based fault diagnosis development
Figure 2.8 illustrates the overview of a particle filtering-based fault diagnosis process.
Step 2, 3, and 5 are foundations of Step 7. The theories and analytical derivations were
reviewed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. A practical design procedure is first to build a baseline
for the fault features selected in Step 3. As discussed in Experiment 5 in Chapter 4, the
baseline statistics may vary in terms of operating conditions.
Then, a fault level is estimated by the fault growth model, identified in Step 5, and
incoming measurements at each estimation time. Statistical thresholds, type-I & type-II
errors, determine if the estimate pdf deviates enough from the baseline pdf. The statistical
thresholds are design choices.
A basic algorithm of the particle filtering-based fault diagnosis approach is described
based on [33]:
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Particle filtering-based fault diagnosis algorithm
1. Generate a baseline pdf.
2. Initialize particles, p, weights, w, detection particles, d.
3. Update detection particles based on a random variable
4. Perturb particles based on a pre-defined process noise, fault growth rate, and
detection particles.
5. update weights based on measurements.
6. Re-sample weights and particles if particle weights degenerate below a specified
threshold
7. Compare the estimate pdf from particles and weights to the baseline pdf, and
monitor a statistical measure to declare fault detection.
8. Go to the algorithm number 3, and iterate the process until the operation is fin-
ished.
Step 8: MPC-DDP controller development
The theoretical backgrounds were reviewed and described in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and
Appendix C. By the iterative process, control input sequences, u, are obtained for the finite
time window based on Eq. 3.1, Eq. 3.2, Eq. 3.3, and Eq. 3.4.
To properly design the MPC-DDP controller, there are design choices for MPC-DDP
settings.
1. Size of a finite time window for MPC
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2. States and control inputs
3. States references
4. A structure of cost functions
5. Cost coefficient matrices, K, R, and Kf (cost coefficients for terminal states)
6. state constraints
7. control input constraints
8. Intermediate target points for a finite time window (optional)
A finite time window for MPC is the duration of prediction and optimization in MPC.
A long time window results in a better optimal control sequence than a short time window
but requires more computational time and power. A short time window results in faster
solutions for fast applications than a long time window but, the quality of optimality is
sacrificed. Therefore, the decision of the time window is system and scenario-dependent.
A proper trade-off study would be helpful.
States need to represent the Markov property of the system. The Markov property is
a necessary condition for the principle of optimality, which the DDP solution employs. It
is said to have the Markov property if a state at a particular time is only dependent on
the previous state and action. Almost all systems have the Markov property. However,
state settings affect the dynamics model to have or not to have the Markov property. For
example, if a helicopter dynamics is modeled by three orthogonal position and velocity
vectors, the model has the Markov property. If the dynamics model only has three position
vectors, then the next state cannot be determined only be control actions, but all the past
position vectors.
The design of K, R, and Kf depends on desirable system performances defined by
Step 1: mission requirements analysis. Fault states may be included in the formulation, but
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since the long-term mission capability prediction and optimization routine (Module 2) will
eventually regulates the fault growth, the inclusion of fault states in MPC-DDP would not
be necessary. It is beneficial to have Module 2 because the MPC-DDP formulation will be
way simpler than having all possible critical fault states in state and cost function equations.
Hard constraints in states are, unfortunately, difficult to handle in the DDP formula-
tion. Usually, therefore, state constraints are included in the objective function as soft
constraints.
Step 9: Simulation environment development
For long-term mission capability prediction modeling, simulation environment needs to
be developed. The foundations of the simulation environment are mission (Step 1), critical
fault scenarios (Step 2), fault growth models (Step 5), system dynamics models (Step 6), a
fault diagnosis routine (Step 7), and an MPC-DDP controller (Step 8.) By putting them all
together, system behavior and performances can be tracked and monitored.
Simulation environment, however, can never be the same to the real world because
of uncertainty factors. Uncertainty sources and their representations were described in
Chapter 4.2. Characterization and quantification of uncertainty for a system and operating
conditions are necessary for an accurate simulation environment.
The software simulation environment is also fundamentally different from the real
world because the software simulation is discrete. Therefore, a time step size can be an-
other source of harming the accuracy of the simulation. Generally, the small size of the
time step results in more accurate results than a large size. However, more computational
power is required as the step size becomes smaller.
Another concern is the asynchronous acquisition of sensor data. In other words, obtain-
ing sensor measurements and control time cannot be the same in the real world. Several
simulation environments can inherently handle this issue; for example, Robot Operating
System (ROS) and Gazebo simulator can simulate virtual sensors and sensor signals just
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like hardware sensor measurements. ROS is a middleware handling sensor measurements
and software signals [111]. As a middleware, ROS can process both hardware and vir-
tual measurements in the same way. Gazebo is a high fidelity 3D robot simulator [112].
Gazebo uses an open-source physics engine, called Open Dynamics Engine (ODE) [113],
which solves 3D rigid-body dynamics numerically. Such simulators can help simulate a
system dynamics and behavior more realistically.
Step 10: Long-term mission capability prediction modeling
Step 10 is to identify the maximum capacity of mission capability for the adaptation
parameter, ρR, by Monte Carlo simulations. For efficient modeling, a proper design of
experiments is necessary.
Without loss of generality, long-term mission capability can be affected by four variable
sets:
MC = FMC (x, lr, xf , ρR) (5.1)
where x is system states, lr is the level of future load on a faulty system, a fault state, xf ,
and an adaptation parameter, ρR. It implies that the simulation experiments need to include:
1. A range of possible states
2. A range of future load on a faulty system
3. A fault state ranging from healthy to failure
4. A range of the adaptation parameter
As discussed in Chapter 3, the adaptation parameter is set constant within a single
episode. At each simulation episode, different adaptation parameter values are introduced.
For the system and fault states, initial states are controlled at each episode so that the impact
of the fault state levels on the long-term mission capability can be easily obtained.
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Table 5.2: An example of the table structure for the Monte-Carlos simulation results
x lr xf ρR MC1 MC2
23 1 1 20 120 89
23 1 1 10 103 78
...
The future reference trajectory can represent the level of the future load. For instance, a
straight reference trajectory will be different from a zig-zag trajectory in difficulty perspec-
tives. Thus, a mapping from the reference trajectory to the load level variable is needed:
Future Load Level (tk) = f (xr (tk, tk+1, · · · tk+N)) (5.2)
An example result is shown in Table 5.2. In this example, MC1 and MC2 are 120 and
89, respectively, if ρR = 20 at x = 23, lr = 1, and xf = 1.
With MC’s as dependent variables and others as independent variables, MC’s can be
modeled by regression. In general form,
MCi = fMCi (x, lr, xf ) (5.3)
In nature, introducing higher-order or more regression coefficients will improve the
quality of fit. However, the fault growth model should be as simple as possible in this
framework. Because, later in Step 12, the regression coefficients will be used as a part of a
case in CBR. A large number of coefficients would cause difficulty in case identification in
CBR.
Considering uncertainties, MC would be parameterized by a statistical model. For
instance, assuming Gaussian distribution assumption,
MCi = fMCi (x, lr, xf ) ∼ N (µMC , σMC) (5.4)
The statistical model will enable to produce robust solutions in the optimization step.
200
Step 11: Development of the long-term mission capability optimization routine
The optimization is formulated to maximize the most superior long-term mission capa-
bility and to constrain the vulnerable long-term mission capabilities to satisfy the mission
requirements. The superior and vulnerable mission capabilities are obtained in Step 1. A




J (x, lr, xf , ρR) (5.5)
subject to
MCi (x, lr, xf , ρR) ≥MCreq.i (5.6)
where J is the most superior long-term mission capability, and MCreq.i is the i
th mission
requirements.
In the constraints, statistical models for MCi can be introduced.
MCαi (x, lr, xf , ρR) ≥MC
req.
i (5.7)
where α is a confidence level and MCαi is the long-term mission capability limit at α
confidence.
Step 12: CBR case-base development
A case is composed of a problem-solution pair. As described in Chapter 3 and Chapter
4, a problem is represented by a vector of regression coefficients of a fault growth model,
which was analyzed in Step 5. A solution is a mission capability prediction model identified
in Step 10. A case representation was shown in Eq. 3.11 and Figure 5.3.
ci (coef.i,MCi (x, xf , sf )) ∈ CB (3.11 revisited)
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Figure 5.3: Offline case-base modeling procedure
A case-base is a collection of cases. In general, the more cases, the better reasoning
results.
Step 13: CBR solution transformation rule development
As described in Chapter 3, a distance-based solution transformation rule can be used by
assuming that similar cases result in similar consequences. Since a shorter distance must
have more weights, an inverse distance-weighted average method can be applied. Chapter
3 introduced Shepard’s interpolation method, but there is no one method to solve every
problem. The rule relies on systems, fault modes, and missions.
5.3 Summary
Chapter 5 described a step-by-step design procedure for the proposed resilience-enhanced
reconfigurable control framework. A set of assumptions were reviewed as requirements
and limitations for the proposed framework, and research problems that the framework
addresses. The requirements are included in the design methodology to generalize the
framework and the design procedure to work for applicable dynamical systems. Limitations
revealed the applicable systems for this reconfigurable control framework.
The design methodology generalized the processes and opened up options. At the same
time, the characteristics of each module and their interconnections suggested specific ways
to guide for better results out of the framework. The thirteen design steps produce three
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necessary elements for the proposed framework. These elements fit into the feedback con-




This chapter concludes the research by reviewing the research objectives, the technical ap-
proaches, and test results along with research questions and hypotheses. Research contri-
butions are summarized, and potential future works are described for further advancement
based on the fundamental concept of this research.
6.1 Research reviews
This research is motivated by the growing need for safety improvement for unmanned sys-
tems in practical applications. Historical incidents have suggested that mechanical failure
is one of the key factors threatening the unmanned system safety.
Researchers have been studied for safety improvement in many different aspects. Chap-
ter 2 reviewed the past researches and state-of-the-art techniques. The literature reviews
helped identify research gaps that drove this research.
• Research Gap 1 from resilience design approach: A resilience design approach does
not explicitly address the practical implementation of adaptation/recovery policies
under threats.
• Research Gap 2 from prognosis-enhanced reconfigurable control frameworks: If the
mission time required is unknown, current prognostics-enhanced reconfigurable con-
trol methods cannot find a control strategy, properly extending RUL over mission
time required.
• Research Gap 3 from prognosis in MPC formulation: Performance of MPC-based
approach with SOH bounds is very sensitive to the SOH bounds, which are highly
dependent on a mission time required and fault growth patterns & rates.
204
Research Gap 2 and 3 pointed out a lack of a comprehensive long-term mission ca-
pability assurance, which is an essential concept of resilience. By hypothesizing that the
comprehensive long-term mission capability prediction and optimization will improve the
system resilience, the research goal of this research is defined: to develop a design method-
ology for reconfigurable control framework handling critical fault modes in consideration
of system resilience improvement.
By testing and comparing possible alternatives, the proposed resilience-enhanced re-
configurable control framework is composed of three fundamental modules:
1. Reconfigurable controller by MPC-DDP
2. Long-term mission capability optimization by simulation-based mission capability
modeling
3. Situational awareness by CBR with repect to different fault growth patterns
Research questions helped shape the technical approaches, and hypotheses derived a
set of test cases to prove or disprove the efficacy of the suggested technical methods for
each module and the whole integrated framework as well. The main focuses were research
questions about the adaptation parameter introduced in the MPC-DDP formulation. Thus, it
was hypothesized that the adaptation parameter determines the control strategy influencing
long-term mission capability eventually. Another significant problem that this research
addressed was the impact of uncertainty in fault growth model on the quality of adaptation.
A CBR approach was introduced to properly optimize the adaptation parameter when a
new fault growth model was observed.
As a testbed, under-actuated hovercraft with a waypoint-following mission was intro-
duced. An electric thrust motor insulation degradation was artificially induced in sim-
ulations as a critical fault mode affecting the overall mission capability. The proposed
framework, however, is not limited to the hovercraft application. The assumptions of the
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proposed framework described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 suggested the necessary prop-
erties of applicable systems.
Test results in Chapter 4 showed the resilience improvement of the integrated frame-
work. The introduced adaptation parameter enabled the mission capability trade-offs: mis-
sion length vs. mission time in the hovercraft example. The long-term mission capability
optimization module (Module 2) was able to find a proper adaptation parameter extending
the usable mission length while minimizing the impact of the adaptation to other mission
capabilities. The CBR approach for situational awareness improved the system resilience
for unknown fault growth patterns.
Finally, the design methodology for the proposed reconfigurable control framework
was proposed. For that, a set of assumptions determining required properties for the frame-
work was reviewed. It derived the entire procedure for the proposed resilience-enhanced
reconfigurable control framework in general senses.
6.2 Research Contributions
This thesis presents the reconfigurable control framework for system resilience improve-
ment. The contributions of this work are summarized below:
• An introduction to the concept of resilience in AFTCS. This research addressed the
necessity of the resilience in AFTCS not only to recover the operating point but also
to find a new optimal operating point with the consideration of the long-term mission
capability recovery.
• An introduction to the adaptation parameter. This research realized an idea that the
shape of the objective function changes the optimal operating point by the adapta-
tion parameter. Minimizing the risk of having ill-conditions for DDP, the adaptation
parameter was able to adjust the level of regularization of control inputs.
• Consideration of the impact of the adaptation on mission capabilities. An adaptation
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not only enables the recovery of vulnerable mission capabilities but also causes sac-
rifices on other mission capabilities. This research addressed this issue and proposed
the mission capability trade-offs in the presence of a critical fault mode.
• Resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework. A noble resilience-enhanced
reconfigurable control framework was proposed as a feedback controller for dynam-
ical system. Three fundamental components for the framework were established:
immediate recovery (Module 1: MPC-DDP), long-term mission capability recovery
(Module 2: Long-term mission capability optimization), and situational awareness
(Module 3: CBR and particle filtering-based fault diagnosis)
• MPC-DDP as AFTCS. An MPC-DDP optimal controller was introduced and tested
as AFTCS. One of the test cases revealed interesting characteristics of DDP, which
is the capability of finding optimal controls as long as the system is controllable even
though the impact of the fault was not known.
• Simulation-based mission capability modeling. Monte Carlo simulations and regres-
sion methods introduced modeling of the long-term mission capability in terms of
states and the adaptation parameter.
• CBR for unknown fault growth models. This research addressed significant issues
regarding the uncertainty of fault growth patterns that could lead to inaccurate fault
level estimation and long-term mission capability prediction. CBR enabled a proper
reasoning about the long-term mission capability prediction and, in turn, a better
adaptation.
• Under-actuated hovercraft and thrust motor fault example. As a dynamical system,
under-actuated hovercraft was introduced as a testbed. An electrical thrust motor
fault was artificially induced in the simulation affecting system dynamics and behav-
ior significantly. With the waypoint-following mission, mission length and time were
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tracked.
• Demonstration of resilience improvement. The test results showed the improvement
of the resilience by the probability of success with the integrated framework. It was
compared to the test results without the proper adaptation. The proposed framework
also improved the mission time.
• Design methodology for the proposed framework. This research proposed the design
methodology of the resilience-enhanced reconfigurable control framework. Assump-
tions were characterized into requirements and limitations of the framework, and
problems that the framework addresses. Requirements were addressed as a part of
the design methodology.
• Demonstration of test cases in Matlab.
6.3 Future works
The proposed technical methods and integrated framework showed potentials of the long-
term mission capability trade-offs in control reconfiguration. However, there are several
conceptual and technical aspects to advance resiliency.
1. Learning capability: Resilience systems learn from experience. CBR forms experi-
ences into cases for future use. However, CBR updates cases manually with human
intervention. A Dynamic Case-Based Reasoning (DCBR) approach has been studied
for automatic updates on cases, but it requires careful design to apply DCBR in the
framework properly. Moreover, when a new experience is observed, making a new
case with the mission capability prediction model imposes another difficulty in an
accuracy improvement. Regarding learning for the mission capability prediction, an
RL approach is still an appealing concept. If general reward settings of RL can be
found for the framework and stable learning by value function approximation can be
entailed, then RL will be able to enhance the learning capability significantly.
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2. Unknown mission profile: A mission profile is often not known. For instance, if a
drone is supposed to reach a given destination, but the path is unknown, there will be
briefly two challenges to be addressed:
(a) A considerable amount of uncertainty in mission capability prediction model-
ing: A large amount of uncertainty may lead to the loss of effectiveness of the
long-term mission capability prediction models.
(b) Pathfinding with obstacle avoidance: MPC-DDP can manage to find an optimal
path, but online obstacle avoidance capability would be still required.
3. Generalization of CBR: This research uses CBR to obtain reasonable long-term mis-
sion capability prediction when a fault mode is known, and only the fault growth
model is unknown. In fact, the beauty of CBR is a reasoning capability about the un-
known phenomenon from the experiences, even from different domain knowledge.
For instance, if a completely new fault mode occurs and threatens system capability,
there should be an adaptation strategy based on the knowledge about different fault
modes that have similar effects on long-term mission capabilities. This functionality
will improve the system resilience to another level.
4. Link to complex system theory: It will provide a theoretical background for the ap-
plicability of the proposed framework to general dynamical systems. It may also
be able to define system characteristics that the proposed framework can or cannot
apply.
5. Identification of real-time applicability bounds: This research only observed the com-
putation time for the proposed framework. It showed potentials of real-time appli-
cability through relatively fast computation time. However, it is still challenging
to answer if the proposed framework would work in real-time application because
it all depends on missions, system dynamics, and fault growth rates. If particular
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conditions or bounds can be defined for those scenarios that the proposed reconfig-






LITERATURE REVIEWS ON DESIGN APPROACHES FOR SYSTEM SAFETY
IMPROVEMENT
The increasing trend of system complexity involves risks in terms of system safety. In
order to reduce risks by improving system safety, governmental agencies have recognized
the importance of system safety requirements. Department of Defense (DOD) has defined
and keeps revising system safety requirements while identifying hazards and risks [114].
The demanding system safety requirements have been pursued by introducing advanced
design methodologies, which aim at improving system survivability, system reliability, and
risk mitigation [115]. Naval engineering community also highlighted the significance of
system effectiveness and survivability as design attributes, and pointed out that those design
attributes should be considered in the early design phase [116].
As a matter of fact, traditional conceptual/preliminary design approaches more focused
on mission capability, not system safety [117]. The way they improved system safety
was to address system certification and safety-related issues after conceptual/preliminary
designs. This approach naturally caused more weights and costs because of additional
hardware redundancies, design changes, or design iterations, implying less affordability
of a system. Specifically, for complex systems, design changes or retrofits compensat-
ing for safety issues is not plausible [118]. Figure A.1 notionally describes how severe
the late safety implementation would cost in the long-term system utilization perspectives
as well as how difficult system safety consideration could be in the early design phases.
This indicates that there is research opportunities so as to move safety from retrofit safety
enhancement to safety through design approaches. Aerospace and naval authorities and
experts also highlighted the importance of early consideration of system safety for military
system acquisition [119].
212
Figure A.1: Safety early in the design process [117].
Major elements of safety management concepts associated with fault events are sys-
tem reliability and survivability. Reliability is the probability that a system component
performs its functionality for a predefined operational time under a specified operating
conditions [120]. It is assumed that the effects of maintainability and a rate of deterioration
are also factors that assess system reliability. Reliability analysis is a bottom-up approach,
evaluating component failures and their effects on system functions. Safety analysis, on the
contrary, is a top-down approach. It assesses how dangerous conditions can happen during
the operations. It implies that system safety is a super set of system reliability [46]. High
reliability, therefore, does not necessarily guarantee a safe system. System safety should
be evaluated in a large picture as components operate together in a system [121].
Survivability, on the other hand, is a concept, which was originated from military
aerospace applications [122] and populated in other engineering disciplines [123, 124].
As depicted in Figure A.2, survivability consists of susceptibility, vulnerability, and re-




Figure A.2: Survivability breakdown [46].
or secondary hit effects through an attack by its environment [125]. This property differ-
entiates survivability from reliability in that survivability encapsulates system resistance
characteristics against externally perturbed system conditions. Vulnerability is defined as
the conditional probability that the system is terminated after an attack by its environment
[125]. Likewise, recoverability is the conditional probability that the system is recovered
after an attack by its environment if the system is not terminated [125].
Based on the concepts of system survivability and reliability, safety engineers target
to confirm and verify whether a system design is safe as a part of system characteristics.
Usually, they conduct fault and failure analysis in order to propose safety requirements in
the design specifications [46]. The safety management methods have been addressed under
risk identification [126], assessment and estimation [127], reliability engineering [128],
and survivability engineering [125]. Recently, resilience engineering has been accentuated
for safety management [38].
A.1 Risk management
For safety management, risk is an important metric [129]. Risk has been used as many
different kinds in many different disciplines [130]: business risk, social risk, economic risk,
safety risk, investment risk, political risk, etc. As a basic notion of risk, Kaplan defined
risk based on the distinction between risk, uncertainty, damage, and hazard [130] as shown
in the symbolic equations below:
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The first equation above pointed out that the notion of risk is a combination of uncer-
tainties and losses as its consequences. The second equation implies that hazard is a source
of danger and the notion of safeguards is awareness of risk [130]. With this basic concepts
and distinctions in mind, risk is measured probabilistically based on a list of undesirable
scenarios, associated with their consequences [130].
Based on the definition and measure of risk, complex systems inevitably involve more
risk. Complexity itself is a critical feature of uncertainties in design and operations [131].
In most cases, complex systems behave nonlinearly and non-deterministically [132]. Chal-
lenging mission expectations or changes in operational environment also cause more risks
[40].
Risk identification is a popular technique for safety management [46] along with risk
mitigation. Risk identification aims at finding the root cause of system faults and failures,
which potentially trigger dangerous situations as well as reducing the number of root causes
of severest risk factors. With this context, common risk identification techniques are listed
below [46]:
• Common cause failure (CCF) analysis [133]
• Fault tree analysis (FTA) [134, 135]
• Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) [22, 23]
These techniques concentrate on accident mechanism investigation since most acci-
dents and malfunctions have been caused by performance losses and security & system
integrity under the presence of threats and operational hazards [46]. Thus, they develop
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Figure A.3: General safety by-design practical procedure [46].
fault generation and propagation models. Advanced methods have endeavored to develop
physics-based modeling and simulation for more accurate accident and damage prediction
[136].
In order to make the risk identification techniques effective, critical scenarios should
be carefully investigated in a finite set of undesirable scenario list, and policy-making de-
cisions should be carried out for appropriate technology infusion as a means of worst case
prevention [137]. As a part of design problem, maximum threshold for risk is identified.
Risk assessment is critical for strategic decision support; e.g., hardware redundancy, sep-
aration, safety-related technology infusion, etc. Then, risk-benefit studies and prototype
testing verify how safe a system is and how further the system safety should be improved.




Reliability engineering mainly focuses on failures and failure rates reduction, which are
root causes of safety-threatening accidents [46]. Failure scenarios can be component fail-
ure, incorrect maintenance, control problems, human mistakes, design errors, and their
combinations [138]. Thus, reliability engineering aims at minimizing the rate of compo-
nent failures by functional redundancy, standby sparing, safety margins, and maintenances
[139]. One of the famous design techniques is Reliability-based Design Optimization
(RBDO). It focuses on probabilistic evaluations in system reliability in consideration of
known operating environment and uncertainties [128]. Another popular technique is Ro-
bust Design, which is aiming at improving system quality and performances with various
external factor [140].
A.3 Survivability engineering
As discussed earlier, survivability is a key feature of system dependability, especially when
other “-ilites” such as reliability, availability, maintainability, etc. - which are also elements
of system dependability - do not dynamically change along time. Due to this reason, system
survivability has been primarily highlighted as a means of concurrently maintaining avail-
ability and capability for more effective systems. Originally, it was a popular concept in the
military combat systems. Ball summarized combat losses and loss rates for various aircraft
at a variety of conflicts from the historical data [125]. This brought survivability-based
design philosophy for military systems.
The concept of survivability is also applied to civilian systems because civilian systems
also sometimes undergo dangerous conditions, potentially causing accidents; thus, civil-
ian systems should be able to endure the effects of dangerous environment and continue
its mission with safe system conditions including crew and passengers. For this, system
survivability is a crucial priority [46].
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The traditional survivability was formulated as below [125]:
PS = 1− PK (A.1)
where, PS is the probability of survival and PK is the killability or probability of not sur-
viving the disturbance.
Survivability often refers to the resistance against external attacks, Equation A.1 can be
expressed as [125]:
PS = 1− (PH · PK/H) (A.2)
where, PH is the probability of being detected (susceptibility) and PK/H is the conditional
probability of not surviving the attack and getting killed after detection and attack.
Sometimes the formulation of survivability depends on the sequence of events, which
are about threats and consequences. In military systems, a kill chain was introduced as
system survivability assessment support for a system-threat encounter scenarios [125]. Ac-
cording to this kill chain, Equation A.1 can be reformulated with a multiplication of con-
ditional probabilities which represent each chain element in the kill chain model [46]. An
important thing to note is that based on the described concept and probabilistic formula-
tion, survivability is scenario and system dependent; thus, applications of survivability are
varying in many scientific and engineering disciplines within their own context [46]. De-
velopment of general characteristics of survivable systems, though, attempted by Ellison in
three key notional terms: essential functions, attacks & failures, and timely manner [141].
He defined survivability as “the ability of a network computing system to provide essential
services in the presence of attacks and failures, and recover full services in a timely man-
ner.” Essential functions are the requirements that a system must deliver. These functions
are not only related to mission goals, but also safety-mode operations. Attacks & Failures
are undesirable conditions that a system must prevent in order to protect its essential func-
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tion. Disturbances are a form of any undesirable interruptions on essential functions such
as attacks, faults, or failures. All systems have, on some levels, a natural absorbability with
respect to disturbances, but the question will be how absorbable a system is. Lastly, timely
manner reflects how responsible a system is against disturbances [46].
Richard extended the definition of system survivability based on the three key charac-
teristics as [42]:
“the ability of a system to minimize the impact of a finite-duration disturbance on value
delivery, achieved through (I) the reduction of the likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance,
(II) the satisfaction of a minimally acceptable level of value delivery during and after a dis-
turbance, and/or (III) a timely recovery.”
He also illustrated a notional behavior of dynamic systems that encounter and withstand
disturbances with the introduction to time periods for behavior categorization as shown in
Figure A.4 [42].
Epochs are time periods which characterize dynamic system behavior from original
states to recovered states. They are fixed properties: i.e., static constraints, design phi-
losophy, technology selection and properties [142]. Epoch 1 is a time period of normal
operating conditions at which a system delivers a notional performance value, Vo, as its
original states. At epoch 2, disturbances occurs; it causes system performance degradation
by a certain level in the end. After epoch 2, a system endeavors to recover so as to make
the performance value to be the original state value, Vo within epoch 3. However, a system
may not be able to fully recover, or it may not be necessary to make the performance value
to be Vo just for survival. Then, a system restores the performance value just to be higher
than the minimum value, Vx, by the recovery time, Tr [142].
As for survivability-based design philosophy, many different approaches have been de-
veloped for different applications [46]. One of inclusive methods is Ball’s method which
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Figure A.4: Conceptualization of survivability [42].
assesses survivability with susceptibility and vulnesrabitliy reduction concepts [125]. He
targeted to maximize Return On Investment (ROI) by maximizing benefits of survivability
while minimizing acquisition and operating costs associated with costs for upgrades [125].
Since it is a design process, design revision-evaluation iterations are necessary. Figure A.5
depicts an overview of Ball’s survivability-based design procedure [125]. An example of
susceptibility and vulnerability reduction strategies for F/A-18 is shown in Table A.1 [125].
Other entities also developed and suggested survivability-based design methods for
their own applications. Joint Technical Coordinating Committee for Aircraft Survivabil-
ity (JTCG/AS) published the Aerospace Systems Survivability Handbook Series in order
to provide survivability requirements and suggest survivability considerations in Integrated
Product and Process Development / Integrated Product Teams (IPPD/IPT) [143]. The U.S.
Navy also promoted survivability as a part of design discipline by offering a standard pro-
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Figure A.5: Overview of Ball’s survivability-based design procedure [125].
Table A.1: Susceptibility and vulnerability reduction strategies for F/A-18 [125]
Susceptibility reduction Vulnerability reduction
Threat warning Component redundancy with separation
Noise jamming and deceiving Component location
Signature reduction Passive damage suppression
Expendable Active damage suppression
Threat suppression Component shielding
Weapons and tactics, flight performance Component elimination
Crew training and proficiency Component replacement
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APPENDIX B
STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR MPC
A value function of an optimal control problem in discrete time is:
VN (x (t0) , u) =
N−1∑
j=0
l (x (tj) , u (tj)) ∆t+ Vf (x (tN)) (B.1)
where x (t0) is the current state, u is the control input sequence, and Vf (x (tN)) is the
terminal cost. The cost function VN (x (t0) , u) evaluates costs forN discrete time segments
at x (t0). Define u∗ (x (t0)) the optimal control input sequence given the initial condition,
x (t0), and V ∗N (·) is the costs along the optimal control input, u∗ (·) at any given current
state. Considering discrete system dynamics constraints,
x (tk+1) = f (x (tk) , u (tk)) (B.2)
where u (tk) ∈ U , U is a feasible input set, and V ∗N (·) can be said as a Lyapunov function
if,
V ∗N (x (tk+1))− V ∗N (x (tk)) ≤ 0 (B.3)
for all tk. Then, MPC with the cost function, Eq. B.1, is stable. The proof is following:
Suppose that there exist the optimal control input at time, tk:
u∗ (x (tk)) = [u
∗ (tk) , u
∗ (tk+1) , · · · , u∗ (tk+N)] (B.4)
Now, consider the control input sequence at time, tk+1 as:
u (x (tk+1)) = [u
∗ (tk+1) , u
∗ (tk+2) , · · · , u∗ (tk+N) , u (tk+N+1)] (B.5)
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Equation B.5 is not an optimal control sequence because u (tk+N+1) ∈ U is not optimal.
By the definition of the cost function,
Vf (x (tk+N+1)) + l (x (tk+N) , u (tk+N)) ∆t ≤ V ∗f (x∗ (tk+N)) (B.6)
Therefore,
VN (x (tk+1) , u (x (tk+1))) ≤ V ∗N (x∗ (tk))− l (x (tk) , u∗ (tk)) ∆t (B.7)
Finally,
V ∗N (x
∗ (tk+1)) ≤ VN (x (tk+1) , u (x (tk+1)))
≤ V ∗N (x∗ (tk))− l (x (tk) , u∗ (tk)) ∆t
(B.8)




C.1 Part I: DDP derivation
Consider optimal control problem with the cost function
V (x (t0) , t0) = min
u
[
φ (x (tf ) , tf ) +
∫ t0
tf
l (x,u, t) dt
]
(C.1)
where x ∈ Rn the state and u ∈ Rm the control.
Bellman’s principle is shown in Equation C.2
V (x (tk) , tk) = min
u(tk)
[L (x (tk) ,u (tk) , tk) + V (x (tk+1) , tk+1)] (C.2)
where dt = tk+1−tk, L (x (tk) ,u (tk) , tk) = l (x,u, t) dt the running cost, and V (x (tk) , tk)
the value function at state x (tk) & time tk.
C.1.1 Linearize the dynamics in discrete time
A general dynamics is shown as:
dx
dt
= f (x,u, t) (C.3)
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Then, following derivation holds:
dx
dt
= f (x,u, t)
= f (x− x̄ + x̄,u− ū + ū, t)
= f (x + δx,u + δu, t)
= f (x̄, ū, t) + fxδx + fuδu (Tayler series expansion)
(C.4)
where fx and fu are partial derivatives of f (x,u, t) with respect to x and u, respectively.







= fxδx + fuδu
dδx
dt
= fxδx + fuδu
(C.5)
By Euler method, Equation C.5 can be discretized as below:
δx (tk+1) = δx (tk) + dδxdt |tkdt
= δx (tk) + (fxδx (tk) + fuδu (tk)) dt
= (In×n + fxdt) δx (tk) + (fudt) δu (tk)
(C.6)
Suppose that (In×n + fxdt) = Φ and (fudt) = B, then
δx (tk+1) = Φδx (tk) +Bδu (tk) (C.7)
C.1.2 The second order expansion of Q (x,u, t) as a function of the running cost and the
value function
Given that
Q (x (tk) ,u (tk) , tk) = L (x (tk) ,u (tk) , tk) + V (x (tk) , tk) (C.8)
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The left-hand side of Equation C.8 can be expanded as follows:
Q (x (tk) ,u (tk) , tk) = Q (x (tk)− x̄ (tk) + x̄ (tk) ,u (tk)− ū (tk) + ū (tk) , tk)
= Q (x̄ (tk) + δx (tk) , ū (tk) + δu (tk) , tk)
= Q (x̄ (tk) , ū (tk) , tk) +
[
Qx Qu












As such, the right-hand side of Equation C.8 can be expanded in the same fashion as
follows:
L (x (tk) ,u (tk) , tk) + V (x (tk+1) , tk+1) = L (x̄ (tk) , ū (tk) , tk) +
[
Lx Lu











+V (x̄ (tk+1) , tk+1) + VTx δx (tk+1)
+1
2
δx (tk+1)T Vxxδx (tk+1)
(C.10)
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Substitute the linearized dynamics in discrete time, Equation C.7, into Equation C.10:
L (x (tk) ,u (tk) , tk) + V (x (tk+1) , tk+1) = L (x̄ (tk) , ū (tk) , tk) +
[
Lx Lu











+V (x̄ (tk+1) , tk+1) + VTx (Φδx (tk) +Bδu (tk))
+1
2
(Φδx (tk) +Bδu (tk))T Vxx (Φδx (tk) +Bδu (tk))
(C.11)
Now, equate Equation C.9 and C.11 in terms of δx (tk) and δu (tk), then
Q (x̄ (tk) , ū (tk) , tk) = L (x̄ (tk) , ū (tk) , tk) + V (x̄ (tk+1) , tk+1)
Qx = Lx + ΦTVx (tk+1)
Qu = Lu +BTVx (tk+1)
Qxx = Lxx + ΦTVxx (tk+1) Φ
Qxu = Lxu + ΦTVxx (tk+1)B
Qux = Lux +BTVxx (tk+1) Φ
Quu = Luu +BTVxx (tk+1)B
(C.12)
C.1.3 Optimal control corrections for δu∗
The optimal control corrections for δu∗ can be found by taking the first partial derivative of






δx (tk)T Qxu +
1
2




By knowing that QTux = Qxu, Equation C.13 can be rewritten as follows:
δu∗ (tk) = −Q−1uu (Qu + Quxδx (tk))
= −Q−1uu Qu︸ ︷︷ ︸
feedforward
−Q−1uu Quxδx (tk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
feedback
(C.14)
C.1.4 Backward equations for V (x̄), Vx, and Vxx
By substituting Equation C.14 into Equation C.2, the minu operator can be removed and
shown as follows:













 δx (tk)−Q−1uu (Qu + Quxδx (tk))

(C.15)
Then, expand the left-hand side of Equation C.15 by the second order:
V (x (tk) , tk) = V (x̄ (tk) , tk) + VTx δx (tk) +
1
2
δx (tk)T Vxxδx (tk) (C.16)
Equate Equation C.15 and Equation C.16 in terms of the zeroth, first, and second order
of δx (tk):





Vx = Qx − QxuQ−1uu Qu
Vxx = Qxx − QxuQ−1uu Qux
(C.17)
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C.2 Part II: DDP implementation
C.2.1 The inverted pendulum problem
Setup
The inverted pendulum dynamics:
Iθ̈ + bθ̇ +mgl sin θ = u (C.18)
where I = ml2 is the inertia, m is the mass, g = 9.81 msec2 is the gravitational acceleration, l
is the length, b is damping and u is the control torque. The initial states are θ = θ̇ = 0, and





































Let’s define the terminal and running cost functions. In order to make them convex,
quadratic forms in terms of x and u are appropriate.
φ (x (tf ) , tf ) = 12 (x (tf )− xfinal)
T Kf (x (tf )− xfinal)









where Kf , K, and R are control gains.
Results












The simulated time horizon was three seconds, and the time horizon was discretized
into 20 segments. Figure C.1 and C.2 depict the results of DDP process. It shows that the
pendulum pushed slightly forward first, and then backward, and finally forward again.
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Figure C.1: Inverted pendulum simulation results - states
C.2.2 The cart pole problem
Setup




f +mp sin θ
(





−f cos θ −mplθ̇2 cos θ sin θ − (mc +mp) g sin θ
) (C.25)
where f is the control, g = 9.81 msec2 is the gravitational acceleration, mc = 1.0kg is the
mass of the cart, mp = 0.01kg is the mass of the pole, and l = 0.25 is the length of the
pole. The initial states are x = ẋ = θ = θ̇ = 0, and the final desired states are ẋ = θ̇ = 0
and θ = π.
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Recall Equation C.6 and C.7,
fx =























f23 = − 2mpu sin θ cos θ
(mc+mp sin2 θ)
2 +






u sin θ−g(mc+mp) cos θ
l(mc+mp sin2 θ)
+ 2mpf sin θ cos











Φ = I4×4 + fxdt
B = fudt
(C.30)
Finally, define the terminal and running cost functions. In order to make them convex,
quadratic forms in terms of x and u are appropriate.
φ (x (tf ) , tf ) = 12 (x (tf )− xfinal)
T Kf (x (tf )− xfinal)









where Kf , K, and R are control gains.
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Results
The cart-pole problem was implemented and simulated in Matlab. The designed gains are:
Kf =

0 0 0 0
0 300 0 0
0 0 300 0




0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0




The simulated time horizon was two seconds, and the time horizon was discretized into
20 segments. Figure C.3 depicts the state and control results of DDP process, and Figure
C.4 shows its convergence behavior.
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Figure C.3: Cart-pole problem results
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Figure C.4: Cart-pole problem convergence behavior
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